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Abstract of Thesis
Since the inception of phenomenological philosophy at the outset of the 20ieth century, it
has spurred a number of responses and developments. As a supposed 'radicalisation of
philosophy', in the specification of philosophy as 'practice', it set its focus with a 'return
to experience'. However, as the development into various forms of phenomenology
brought to light, the practice of classical phenomenology involved a 'scientism' that leads
to specific impasses. Husserlian phenomenological methodology, beyond developments
and differences in subject matter and emphasis between the earlier and later works,
ultimately rests on problematic premises: the return to the 'experiences of thinking and
knowing' relied on a supposition of rational intuitive knowledge based in a correlation of
'eidetic seeing' and a determinable essence of things. Classical phenomenology operates
with an ultimately reductive account of cognition, insofar as the focus remains with the
rationality of a thought in supposed adequation to itself and the essential generalities
ultimately referable to it.
This thesis takes up the question of the missing aspect in classical phenomenology's
inadequate account of cognition and genesis. It does so by engaging with a specific
response to classical phenomenology according to the work of Gilles Deleuze and Michel
Henry and Emmanuel Levinas's and Jacques Derrida's reading of Husserl. The thesis
addresses these writers in the capacity that their work comes together in a particular
approach to embodiment or corporeality, which identifies the aporias that inform the
determinations and theoretical assumptions of classical phenomenology. To this extent
their work represents a singular French response to Husserl, operating close to the
phenomenological discourse. Bringing together these approaches to embodiment sheds
light on the manner in which classical phenomenology operates with a reductive account
of language and signification and allows me to ask the question of immanent genesis. A
re-examination of genesis is brought about through the specific orientation pertaining to
the question of genesis in the work of Deleuze, Henry, Levinas and Derrida.
The re-orientation of certain premises of classical phenomenology undermines some of
its central tenets and thematisation. The re-orientation demonstrates that a tradition of
thought, culminating in classical phenomenology, operates according to a certain
forgetfulness of the subjective body, of sensibility or the body in thought, which prevents
an adequate account of genesis and language/signification. This thesis argues that these
specific approaches to embodiment and language provide an adequate notion of
immanent genesis, and opens up a space for a re-examination of and challenge to the
orientation of T/thought with regard to its presumptions regarding genesis and meaning.
The thesis concludes with a consideration of the art of Henri Michaux, and argues that
this specific reception of classical phenomenology develops an understanding of genesis
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Introduction
Is it so certain that the entire will is practical reason
in the Kantian sense? Does the will not contain an
incoercible part that the formalism of universality
could not oblige? And we might even wonder
whether, Kant not withstanding, that incoercible
spontaneity, which bears witness both to the
multiplicity of humans and the uniqueness of
persons, is already pathology and sensibility and
a 'bad will'.
Emmanuel Levinas, "The Rights of Man and
the Rights of the Other".
Emmanuel Levinas's writings present a critique of the digressive formalism and
universalism of the concepts that mark the philosophical tradition's will to rationality. In
a chapter of Totality and Infinity, the first of his two major philosophical critiques,
entitled "Will and Reason", Levinas argues that the formal distinction of will on the one
hand and understanding and reason on the other according to the Kantian tradition,
constructs a limited concept of rationality as well as cognition. The limitations of the
concepts come to the fore in the way they inform Edmund Husserl's phenomenology in
its emphasis on acts of intentionality, as a rational will to objectivity or, in other words,
the manifestation of objects for a subject according to its rational cognitive capacity.
Insofar as a rather rigid constellation of rationality and cognition marks phenomenology's
epistemological will, Levinas argues that the project misses a crucial dimension of lived
subjectivity. Classical phenomenology, in line with much of philosophy's preoccupation
with an epistemological project, premises its project on its capacity for a universal
'scientific' inclusiveness synonymous with its concepts' powers of generalisation. The
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constellation, to the point of identification, of rationality and cognition, refers to a
specific sense of 'the intelligible', the cornerstone of 'scientific' philosophy. Levinas
criticises the exclusive emphasis on the intelligible in cognition and its references in
philosophical knowledge. Totality and Infinity is subtitled "An essay on exteriority" and
refers to the fact that, for Levinas, ethics describes a relation with another, not a
conceptualisation nor experience of values, but "an access to exterior being" which is
understood according to an orientation towards otherness in a corporeal sense inseparable
from the meaning of the subjective I. Classical phenomenology and philosophy's
emphasis on cognitive apprehension is subsuming and reductive of the other; the Other
"exceeding the idea of the other in me" (TI 50) is irreducible to a concept of the other 'in
the same', irreducible to otherness comprehended according to a cognitive thematisation
or reflection. The problem Levinas takes up is that the reduction of what is other than
thought, in its supposed presence to self, to a general concept, is forgetful of a crucial
dimension of lived subjectivity. The reduction is forgetful of affective life, which must be
thought in terms of the life of the subjective body, sensibility, and a genesis that pertains
to this sensibility, in excess of the determinations of rational thought.
Imbued with particular significance in Levinas's philosophy, 'the face' of the Other (/e
Visage d'Autrui) expands upon the notion of the rational and intelligible1. Levinas
suggests that if the face be considered "the very upsurge of the rational, then the will is
distinguished fundamentally from the intelligible, which it must not comprehend and into
which it must not disappear, for the intelligibility of this intelligible resides precisely in
ethical behavior, that is, in the responsibility to which it invites the will" (TI 194). This
quotation sums up the charge of intellectualism that Levinas extends to Husserl via the
Kantian relation of the will to understanding and reason. The will, for Levinas, is rooted
1 The other presents himself to ethical subjectivity according to an affective relation. 'Exceeding the idea of
the other in me', the other presents himself in a manner which Levinas says "we here name face" (TI 50).
The point raised with respect to the philosophical tradition is that the Other affects in a manner which
exceeds my thought or what I can know of him. Levinas describes an infinity of the other person as
betraying the structure of a thought that 'thinks more than it thinks' or carries an excess within itself. See
Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 54. In this sense, Levinas's notion of ethics ultimately refers
thought to an anterior sensibility as ethical orientation toward an Other. The Other as face or Autrui is the
central concept of a thought that emphasises the extent to which it is based in sensibility, a corporeal
relation.
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in a sensibility, wherein ethics is premised in a response or rather a responsiveness, which
precedes reflection by understanding, or reason according to 'universal law'. The face is
"intelligible", given sense, according to its own 'expressivity'. 'The face of the Other'
signifies as itself, by itself, without the mediation of the categories of understanding and
reason and beyond the Kantian categorical imperative. That is to say, ethical
response/ibility does not originate with the philosophical I or self in reflection, but with
the Other, or the other in the Other and the manner in which I am affected. 'The face'
makes sense in the giving and receiving of signs that make up the relation in which one's
subjectivity is oriented 'for the Other'. Levinas raises an objection to the simple
correlative basis of the subject-object relation in the tradition that culminates in classical
phenomenology's constitutive philosophy, and contends that the Other is irreducible to a
known object for subjectivity. In fact, the subject-object relation that is worked with in
the tradition betrays its dis-orientation in that it portends to a sort of transparency in the
relation. The phenomenology of Husserl orients its ontology and epistemology from a
premise of methodological transparency2. Levinas responds to this by saying that he
"neither believe[s] that there is transparency possible in method, nor that philosophy is
possible as transparency"3.
In this work, I follow to a great degree the premises of Levinas's critique of Husserlian
phenomenology. Levinas constructs an approach to the question of the Other and
sensibility, according to a conception of the other in the Other. For Levinas, subjectivity
emerges as a specific awareness or sensibility receptive to the approach o/the Other; this
awareness emerges from the orientation of a corporeal situation, and so reorients the
Kantian 'imperative'. Levinas suggests that ethics is the concrete 'putting into question of
my spontaneity' by the manner in which I am exposed to the Other (TI 43). The
2 The particular correlative presumption regarding the known object in Husserl's schema of the noesis-
noema, the act and object of the intentional analysis, is targeted by Levinas. I take up this point in chapter
one. For Levinas, the reductions of conceptualization and cognition in the projects which mark the thought
of much of the philosophical tradition, and which he calls ontology, refers to the bypassing of Autrui
insofar as the other does not affect me according to these terms, is not reducible to an ontological relation I
can judge according to noetic correlation. The 'affect' of the Other on or in me precedes my removal from
the relation as spectator or my 'consciousness of'. The other is not given as an object for reflection.
3 Levinas quoted in Critchley and Bernasconi (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Levinas (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 6
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relevance of Levinas with respect to the philosophical tradition is his development of the
significance of the Other's 'entry' with regard to my subjectivity, as a singular affection
with regard to my subjective awareness, and not as correlative to my intentions. Ethics,
according to Levinas, operates outside an epistemology based in ontological correlation
according to the presumed transparency of method, and in fact concerns the emergence of
thought4 according to a prior affective orientation. If epistemology on the classical
account is premised on an originary autonomy in reflective subjectivity, the
methodological premise implicit here is based on a certain forgetfulness of the extent to
which thought, as reflection, originates from sensibility. This is evident, not only in the
Kantian separation of the faculties and the categories of the mind as what produces
thought, but in the entire Cartesian tradition's bracketing of the embodied affections
which necessarily inform thought. Husserlian phenomenology continues the tradition to
the extent that Husserl never succeeds in presenting an adequate account of the body
within the methodology. The significance of the body, or what I will term the life lived
according to the 'subjective body' in concordance with Michel Henry's development of a
'material phenomenology', remains reduced in classical phenomenology. Michel Henry's
notion of the subjective body, as propagated in his Philosophy and Phenomenology of the
Body (1975) makes sense of the orientation of Levinas's thought according to an
understanding of affectivity premised on the orientation of the body in B/being.
My aim in this work is to demonstrate a specific alliance of shared premises in the French
phenomenologicalreception and critique of Husserl's philosophy. I aim to show that the
affiliations between Levinas's and Jacques Derrida's reading of Husserl foreground the
question of genesis in phenomenology as the main problematic and show how (the
question of) genesis in classical phenomenology is - according to Derrida and Henry
necessarily- inadequately approached.
4
According to Levinas, the so called declaration of the end of metaphysics 'is premature'. In fact,
"metaphysics - the relation with the being [etant\ which is accomplished as ethics - precedes the
understanding of Being and survives ontology". Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, cited in Critchley
and Bernasconi, 2002, p. 10. What I want to show in this work is that this meta-physics comes out of a
specific corporeal situation.
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Derrida's reading of Husserl, as much as Levinas's, remains to a great extent
phenomenological. Both present a critique within phenomenological parameters and
presumptions, keeping close to the phenomenological discourse. Levinas as well as
Derrida counter phenomenology with its missing dimension, what Derrida argues is an
inadequacy in Husserl's notion of time-consciousness. Husserlian phenomenology fails to
sufficiently account for the time of the body or 'sensibility' despite his acknowledgement
of an internal division in the present of time-consciousness: Derrida shows, in Speech and
Phenomena, that Husserl's account of time works against the isolation of the 'now'
according to its own premises. Levinas and Derrida supplement phenomenology by
introducing the notion of trace5. The trace of the other or the time of the Other, as
premised in sensibility and the affective order of a time of the body, presents a challenge
to the supposed adequacy and transparence of consciousness to itself, its presence-to-self.
Arguing that self-presence is always already awareness of the presence of otherness,
Levinas and Derrida operate with a notion of 'awareness' which originates in an
embodied situation and a 'present' conditioned by a source of non-presence. In fact, the
implicit premise in both is that self-awareness - and by extension thought and reflection -
originates by a separation of what is self and other than self, which then always already
informs or conditions self-awareness. The point of the argument here is that the trace or
temporality of the other - diachrony on Levinas's account - disrupts the absolute self-
presence of what Husserl designates as the purity or transparency of consciousness in
reflection. Levinas and Derrida point out that the phenomenological project - as
primarily an epistemological project and identified by a certain methodology - stumbles
on one of its main methodological principles, an originary presence-to-self of a
subjectivity identified as rational will to knowledge. I aim to demonstrate the extent to
which Levinas's and Derrida's critiques of Husserlian phenomenology reorient the
question of genesis outside the parameters of self-present consciousness and deconstruct
phenomenological 'beginnings' premised on the absolute identity of self-presence and the
doctrine of constitution. In this work I work through and with the critiques to the extent
5 The meaning of the notion appears originally in Levinas. Derrida adopts the notion and its meaning in
Levinas, and refers specifically to Levinas in his essay "Difference" in Margins ofPhilosophy, trans. Alan
Bass (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978).
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that they present arguments for an immanent genesis, that is, a genesis pertaining to an
orientation or 'manifestation' of a corporeal situation. I take up specific aspects of
Deleuze's as well as Henry's thought in so far as I consider them to support this argument
regarding immanent genesis.
Chapter One undertakes the critique of Husserlian phenomenology on the basis of a
Levinasian and Derridean reading. The first part works with an implicit Levinasian
approach, and underwrites the paradoxes in which classical phenomenology is imbricated
according to the methodological impasses. I take up this point according to Eugen Fink's
1933 Kantstudien essay, in which he reads the impasses in terms of the problem of
genesis. The second part deals with the Derridean critique of Husserl. I show that Derrida
takes up precisely the Finkian paradoxes in his essay '"Genesis and Structure' and
Phenomenology" to argue that real genesis is ultimately closed off in Husserlian
phenomenology by the structure dictated by its methodological impasse. I proceed to
develop the argument of immanent genesis according to Derrida's Speech and
Phenomena, which demonstrates that because Husserl's methodology determines its
epistemology and premises ontological possibility, genesis of meaning outside supposed
self-present consciousness necessarily eludes it.
Derrida's argument proceeds via the critique of the notions of 'expression' and
'indication' as developed in the first of the phenomenological studies of Husserl's
Logical Investigations. Derrida's account of the role of the trace, primarily, and the
movement of 'difference', demonstrates the omissions - or rather elisions - in the
Husserlian account of the origin of signification. Husserl fails to account for signification
and language in a broad sense. Derrida shows that Husserl's attempt to isolate a pure self-
present expression must necessarily lead to an aporia: subjectivity is not at any point
enclosed in the present-now of transcendental consciousness; language cannot be
conceived as pure expression according to a reduced meaning sphere where empirical
sensibility or bodily being is bracketed off according to an ideal realm of meaning
content. Derrida's argument operates within the recognition that language works
according to a complex of signifiers and significations, which eludes the purity of
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transcendental self-presence and precedes concepts of self and meaning: there is no
absolute objective meaning or identity of presentation that can be isolated as pure eidos
or form in the conscious act. 'Expression' cannot be isolated from 'indication' according
to the Husserlian account: any presentation in language is already a re-presentation.
Language works according to the fact that reality is that which is always already scripted
or inscribed with significance. Signification and sense works in language as
representation of 'difference' or 'alterity', in other words as repetition of a non-presence
or an-other presence which is not containable in the form(ation) of the Husserlian
presence to consciousness. I argue that the development of classical phenomenology
represented by these four writers have this in common: they recognise that thought
originates in a signification inseparable from sensibility or the life of the subjective body.
Chapter Two takes up Merleau-Ponty's departure from classical phenomenology in his
late unfinished work, The Visible and the Invisible (1967). Like Levinas and Derrida, he
contests the Husserlian account of origins referred to acts of representational
intentionality, 'found' in a transcendental ego-consciousness. I present Merleau-Ponty's
late work insofar as it provides a valuable corrective in its critique of the Husserlian
reduction of genesis to what is visible to a subject in its absolute presence to self. The
notions of Visible and Invisible as developed in Merleau-Ponty underscore an important
argument regarding the possibility of immanent genesis; genesis is in excess of what is
visible to the intuitions of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty effectively critiques classical
phenomenology's dependence on the metaphor of vision, and the tradition's
identification of vision and knowledge according to what is, presented to an internally
stable self. The notion of the 'in-visible' points to that which necessarily, according to
phenomenological premises, eludes the grasp of a consciousness which holds or
commands its object by its gaze, and so questions the traditional primacy of the
'spectacle' available to theoretical thought. Derrida takes up this argument of Merleau-
Ponty in his Memoirs of the Blind, in which he works to some extent with the same
premises regarding the in-visible as Merleau-Ponty. The insight in both is that genesis is
always already anterior to the determinations of 'spectacular' consciousness, and is in
this sense 'immanent', conditioned or 'contaminated' by the affective orders inseparable
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from the specific awareness bound up with the life of the subjective body. Merleau-
Ponty's analyses contain an important emphasis on the body, as Leib rather than Korper
as he develops Husserl's own analyses in this direction. However, body and genesis in
Merleau-Ponty is ultimately premised on a problematic notion of continuity in which
genesis is understood in terms of the all-encompassing flesh of being.
Chapter Three discusses the work of Michel Henry and Gilles Deleuze in the capacity
that they account for an adequate notion of immanent genesis, which underwrites the
impasses of classical phenomenology. Henry's work provides an invaluable contribution
to the critique of classical phenomenology in his development of a 'material
phenomenology'. Despite what is in many ways a problematic account of the nature of
self-manifestation, his argument that there are elisions regarding the materiality of a
genesis other than from the viewpoint of transcendental phenomenology, convincingly
illustrates the limitation of classical phenomenology's 'ontological monism', or the
reduction of 'manifestation' to a manifestation for transcendental consciousness, that is,
to act-intentionality and object-manifestation. Deleuze's notion of 'immanence', a 'life',
which eludes representational knowledge according to Cartesian and Kantian premises
taken up by classical phenomenological representation, echoes Henry's insight that a
specific life of 'the subjective body' - sensibility - eludes the subject-object relations of
classical phenomenology. Henry's argument is that the question of genesis must take
account of more than one type of phenomenality or manifestation, and places its premise
with the 'life of the subjective body'. That is, this body informs subjectivity as a singular
situation, 'original transcendental content' or 'Life', irreducible to manifestation on the
classical model. Deleuze's entire philosophy seems to argue for a specific notion of
immanent genesis, a 'non-organic life that burns us', and theorises events of creation
according to a prevalent notion of energetic materiality, a certain sensibility that pertains
to a subjectivity which is 'multiplicitous' insofar as it originates with an orientation of the
body. Deleuze, as well as Henry, points to a 'life' irreducible to the 'world' as it appears
to consciousness or the theoretical spectator. The reorientation by immanent genesis
affiliates with the critiques of Levinas and Derrida. Levinas's take on phenomenological
methodology describes the phenomenological reduction to intentional consciousness as
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'an act in which we consider life in all its concreteness' but not as it is lived, that is,
according to a time conditioned by the corporeal exposure to an other6.
Chapter Four presents in the first part Levinas's philosophy of the face and his
argument for an ethics with regard to the politics of a thought that cannot preserve
otherness in its epistemological relations. The philosophy of the face is based in an
orientation toward a corporeal situation, which always already exposes to otherness as the
non-permanence of the face's form and meaning. I emphasise at this point the distinctive
Levinasian development of non-intentional affectivity, as it pertains in Levinas to the
vulnerability of the situation of being one-for-the-Other and the question put to the
classical will to rationality and universality. Ultimately, the relevance of Levinas's
contention regarding the face and a signification or sense that are not referable to the
representations of subjectivity, is that it speaks of a 'life', or a separation of immanent
genesis from the determinations of egoic consciousness, pertaining to the singular,
subjective body. Classical phenomenology builds its methodology on a reductive view of
the body. The second part discusses Derrida's Memoirs ofthe Blind, the commentary
accompanying a collection of artworks he curated at the Louvre Museum in Paris. In this
work, Derrida takes up the problematic surrounding the metaphor of vision and its
privileged status with regard to knowledge. This work is the first and only in which
Derrida explicitly comments on Merleau-Ponty's work, and the work in question is The
Visible and the Invisible. In agreement with this aspect of Merleau-Ponty's later
philosophy, Derrida addresses the notion of an in-visible life of the visible, 'right on' the
visible, as he says. The point he recognises in Merleau-Ponty is that genesis is not
referable to an originary consciousness but must be traced according to phenomena
whose in-appearance are of another kind. Genesis extends out-with the parameters of
6 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Philosophy, cited in Crithley and Bernasconi, 2002, p. 9. In
his Introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Simon Critchley juxtaposes Levinas's 'defense
of subjectivity' with 'anti-humanists' like (Foucault) and Deleuze. Part of my point in bringing in a
discussion of Deleuze in support of the question of an immanent genesis is to show that, like in Levinas, the
notion of subjectivity in Deleuze is underwritten by a certain 'physics' concerning the life of the subjective
body. I do not see the relevance of the labeling 'anti-humanist'. Although Deleuze describes subjectivity as
multiplicitous, the emphasis is on the singularity of a certain life of the subjective body, which gives rise to
subjectivity and approaches Levinas's notion of 'the other within the same'. See Critchley and Bernasconi,
2002, pp. 19-20.
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conscious determination and phenomenology's 'evidential insight', and does not conform
geometrically or logically to the correlations intuited by the conscious gaze. Not only
that, but genesis outwits epistemological vision. Derrida's commentary on the exhibition
of blind men and visionaries concludes that immanent genesis, as a specific blind point of
view, in-forms epistemological vision as a specific life of the singular body, as its
separation from consciousness.
Chapter Five engages with the art of Henri Michaux. My argument in this respect is that
the specific developments on the impasses of classical phenomenology by the above
writers provide a crucial perspective, the notion of immanent genesis, for understanding
Michaux's work. His work also throws light on the specific sense in which 'immanent
genesis' expresses itself as art. In taking up Derrida's argument regarding the point of
view, I show how Michaux's manner of positioning himself with regard to his art
demonstrates the bodily reality of the 'blind point'. Levinas's descriptions of 'the other
within the same' and a passivity with regard to the other which takes place 'on the
surface of the skin, at the edge of the nerves', demonstrate the manner of exposed
sensibility according to which Michaux's creative experiments are marked7. At times
heightened by use of the hallucinogen mescaline, Michaux's visual works in particular
explore and express the temporality of the body in its vulnerability and affectation. His
work puts into question the presumption of self-presence in the transparent 'now'. The
insight expressed as art in Michaux is that the theoretical spectator is always already
informed by an orientation, which pertains to the subjective body, subjected to the other
within the same or the invisible 'right on' the visible. It is imperative in order to
understand Michaux's work that one turns to the critique of the presumptions of the
tradition of thought that culminate in Husserlian phenomenology and the exposure of its
aporias, the forgetfulness of a signification which exceeds intelligibility and questions
self-presence.
7 Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, quoted in Critchley and Bernasconi, 2002, p. 21.
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The argument of Michel Henry's thesis regarding material phenomenology and 'pathos
and language' points to that missing dimension in classical phenomenology which in
different ways is taken up by Deleuze, Derrida, Michaux and especially Levinas. For
Levinas, ethics is lived in the relation to an other grounded in an orientation of the life of
the subjective body and language in a broad sense. This work aims to account for the
manner in which in various ways, these writers take up the question of 'immanent
genesis' and meet over this question. The question of immanent genesis taken up in these
various ways poses a significant critique of the forgetfulness performed by classical
phenomenology at the cost of considering 'what a body can do' for our understanding of
the singularity of subjectivity. How does subjectivity signify as singularity and what does
this mean? What is really involved in the notion of the subjective body? This work aims
to show how these questions can be reduced to the question of immanent genesis, and
that the question of immanent genesis is a significant challenge to phenomenological
representation. The orientation of this tradition of phenomenological thought represents a




Phenomenology, inaugurated by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) at the outset of the
twentieth century, was introduced as a 'radicalisation of philosophy'. A specific manner
of doing philosophy, emphasised as 'practice' rather than a prefigured system, it was
formally introduced with Husserl's Logical Investigations (1900-1901). The work stated
a need for an encompassing 'objective theory' of knowledge, "the pure phenomenology
of the experiences of thinking and knowing"1. With the Second Edition of 1913 it is clear
that the project concerns an exploration of transcendental subjectivity or 'pure
consciousness' by a transcendental science, phenomenology. Husserl states as the
'exclusive concern' of this science of phenomenology:
[...] experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure generality of their
essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts...This
phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must describe in terms of their
essential concepts and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which
directly make themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have
their roots purely in such essences. Each such statement of essence is an a priori
statement [...]2.
Phenomenology, as conceived in Husserl's project as well as all subsequent variations of
phenomenology, assumed a radical fidelity to experience. However, a concomitant
assumption of access to evidential insights of essential idealities is more problematical
with respect to a comprehensive account of cognition. As the quotation from the Logical
1 Edmund Husserl. Logical Investigations, trans. J. N Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), Vol. 1,
p. 249.
2 Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 249.
18
Investigations states, the fidelity to experience is in Husserl's project inextricable from
the aim of getting 'to the things themselves' through experience. That is, the things
themselves presumed to be ' intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure generality of
their essence'. This more problematic aim remained the focus of Husserl's
phenomenological research. The premises for this aim are what a specific
phenomenological reception of Husserl - Derrida and Levinas particularly - come to
question. I agree to a great extent with their reading of Husserlian phenomenology and
the identification of the aporias that inform phenomenological determinations. Husserlian
- or classical - phenomenology operates with a reductive account of language and
signification which leads to the specific impasses which result from its determinations.
Ultimately, the problem of classical phenomenology is a problem of genesis consequent
of an inadequate account of signification.
Classical philosophy - since ancient Greece - took up phenomena as a starting point of
investigation and, like modern phenomenology, attempted to know their "archai" or
founding possibility. In classical philosophy or the metaphysical tradition, the search for
ultimate principles or essences led to the positing of an absolute ground - God.
According to Husserlian phenomenology the positing of God as the ground of the
appearance of phenomena does not answer the question of the ground of the Being - or
meaning - of being. God - as an absolute being and ground or creator of other beings
bypasses the more primordial question of the constitution of being's Being. The question
of Being or the meaning ofbeing goes beyond the causal question of being and the
grounding of finite beings to a concern with how the Being of world and beings are to be
determined and constituted as Eugen Fink points out in his 1933 Kantstudien essay3.
Phenomenology is concerned with how Being is determined and constituted in and
through transcendental subjectivity. The question is how to theorise or 'know' the
meaning of Being. That is, the focus of phenomenological research becomes a
transcendental subjectivity that poses the question of being; phenomenology bypasses the
otherworldly creator for a subjectivity that founds its Being by constituting it. The idea of
31 will return to this essay.
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constitution is Husserl's response to the question of the possibility of experience. The
idea of constitution in Husserl is complex and problematic and ultimately leads to
unsustainable determinations in its account of the genesis of meaning. Classical
phenomenology ultimately contends that Being cannot be without subjectivity, while
nevertheless this subjectivity cannot be apart from the world or being which it thus in a
double sense constitutes. In line with the general trend of twentieth-century thought, the
focus is subjectivity. However, for classical phenomenology, the study of phenomena
becomes the study of a specific form or view of consciousness in the constitution of its
experience and this specific reduction of 'experience' leads to the aporias in
phenomenology's grounding of its theoretical assumptions.
Positively, the Husserlian exploration of the field of consciousness saw the
phenomenological project as a 'set of infinite tasks' of philosophy. Positively also,
subjectivity was in focus seemingly as an open-ended source of sense and meaning.
Phenomenology, as a descriptive philosophy rather than a philosophy of causal
explanation, was to describe things in their appearance to consciousness. That is,
phenomenological elucidation concerned the manner of appearance of things and events
to a consciousness in direct engagement with them. Accordingly, there is evident a
certain aesthetic aspect to phenomenological philosophy. Experiencing consciousness,
and thus the life of experiencing transcendental subjectivity, becomes the access for a
descriptive 'science of appearance'4. In order to get at the phenomena the science of
phenomenology would claim to access the phenomena from within, so to speak. Thus
follows the presumption of evidential insights of intuition in consciousness and a
correlation of consciousness and ideality5; the ideal object conforms to an intended
4 The phenomenology of the early Husserl has its origins in the work of Franz Brentano, from whom he
also took the term 'phenomenology' - although the term had also been used by Kant and Hegel. Husserl's
project was inspired by Brentano's search for an a priori science concerning 'laws' of mental life, the
description of the given with respect to a Cartesian assumption of the self-evidence of 'inner perception'.
Husserl's project was the inspiration to extend this descriptive psychology - understood by Brentano as a
science identifying universal laws on the basis of the individual empirical instance - to a general
descriptive science of consciousness. Ultimately he envisaged this 'philosophy as descriptive science' to
provide conceptual foundation for 'scientific' knowledge of all kinds. See Dermot Moran, ed. Introduction
to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000). Most of my exposition so far is based on Moran's
Introduction.
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meaning in and through a rational activity of consciousness. The Husserlian life-world6 is
determined by the experience of the world by human subjectivity: the 'relation'
postulates a pre-theoretical life-world as the 'source' for the meaning determinations of
this subjectivity which then is the ultimate source of the Being of this world and being.
The meaning of being is established by a 'performance' or act of intentional subjectivity.
Subjectivity is theorised as a meaning-intending structure and meaning is reduced to
meaning-for-consciousness. The problem, as I see it, lies with the idea of an almost
exclusive determination of the source of meaning through the rational capacity of
cognition or theoretical consciousness in a presumed absolute presence of self7.
The ultimate Being or meaning of being is understood in terms of an achievement of
transcendental/intentional consciousness as an exclusively rational self-present structure.
Thus Being-in or - according to - consciousness is supposed as the constitution of what
is. That the Being of the world is not denied transcendence does not change the fact that
conscious life is what constitutes the transcendent as inseparable from what we must
consider then as a kind of absolute theoretical consciousness as the ultimate - not just
explanatory but constituting - source of reality, 'the world' for consciousness. Husserl
has on occasion described his philosophy as a transcendental idealism. As Levinas and
Derrida both point out it seems that Being for Husserl is being object, and that objectivity
is (to be) known or theorised as objectivity according to a specific presumption of
subjective rationality only8. The relation between subjectivity and object is a cognitive
over ontological relation and I will show, in the following, that such estimation must
exclude important aspects of subjective being. Subjectivity, in classical phenomenology,
is seen as essentially epistemological in nature, and the phenomenological project as
essentially an epistemological one. The task of phenomenology, as a clarification of the
5 The word phenomenon, from the Greek phainomenon, comes in Husserlian phenomenology to carry
significance insofar as its essence is available to conscious intuition.
6 The notion of the life-world in Husserl becomes more prominent in his later analyses.
7
My estimation is here obviously in accordance with a Levinasian reading of Husserl as well as Derrida's
critique of Husserlian self-presence, which I shall return to in the last part of this chapter.
8 See Emmanuel Levinas critique of Husserl in The Theory ofIntuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, trans.
Andre Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
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meaning and Being of being, becomes the clarification of the essential structures of
cognising subjectivity based in assumptions of logic and rational capacity. The focus on
subjectivity marks the phenomenological project to the extent that the cognising capacity
of transcendental subjectivity is the epistemological and ontological starting point. This
work argues that the extent to which this cognising subjectivity is theorised in terms of a
presumption of exclusive notions of rationality and logic, classical phenomenology
propounds a view of cognition which necessarily reduces any understanding of the
significance of embodiment and any notion of sensible being to the point where it
presents a reductive view of cognition. Husserl's phenomenological project is defined in
terms of methodological reductions, which precisely support a reductive view of
cognition, as they cannot sufficiently account for the effects of the body and embodiment
as vital structures of cognition.
I. The reductions of phenomenology: cognition before sensibility
Phenomenology's radical reflection upon transcendental subjectivity is the central
methodological presumption and possibility of ontological determination. Transcendental
reflection, as the methodological point of orientation, is based on a presumption of
determination of transcendent objects by an act of an immanent 'pure consciousness'.
This 'pure consciousness' is responsible for the main paradoxes of classical
phenomenology and provokes the varied responses to phenomenological insight that I
discuss in the next chapters. Let us establish that the methodology furthermore assumes
that the access of phenomenology as 'scientific' approach to the object in its essence - as
grasped by a subjectivity - required specific (re) moves with respect to our attitudes to the
world of objects as well as towards our psychological acts. Specifically, this involved a
practice of reductions of what Husserl termed the 'natural attitude' of everyday
assumption and viewpoint, regarding the construction of knowledge. This viewpoint,
always already there with its culturally marked significances and socially informed
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approaches to the determination of the world involved, according to Husserlian
phenomenology, the positing of a world blurred in its reality or truth by such common
sense transmissions. Accordingly, Husserl argued that real phenomenological insight
could only come about after the performance of various types of 'bracketing' or reduction
of the 'natural attitude' that enabled a retreat from this already 'contaminated' world to a
domain of ideal determinations according to pure transcendental subjectivity. The
purpose of establishing this particular mode of presumed 'access' to phenomena was to
uncover what was presumed to be an essential structure of cognitive acts.
As I have pointed out, according to the aims of phenomenological research the
subjectivity uncovered in terms of the structure of cognitive acts is conceived as
epistemological in orientation; it is conceived as a meaning-intending structure, and
theorised mainly in terms of a project of rational consciousness. In Husserlian
phenomenology, consciousness grasps the world of objects according to what he terms in
Ideas 1 a 'noetic - noematic structure'. Husserlian noesisrefers to an intentional act of
consciousness; the noema is the object as intentionally grasped by consciousness9. That
is, this structure is held to determine the ideal object, as it appears to consciousness in
intuitive evidence. What is is in its presentation to consciousness. ' Before' - and as I see
it, this 'before' represents the key to the misconception - the ontological question of
existence, phenomenological elucidation involves a consideration of the meaning-
correlates of the intentional act; that is, before a determination of the existence of an
object there is a determination of a meaning correlate in the manner of an appearance of
the object for consciousness, or specifically the conscious act10. The 'objective' world is
always already there; the aim of constitutive phenomenology is bound up with the
9 See Edmund Husserl, Ideas 1, § 96, 233. The full title of this work is Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book. Trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht; Kluwer,
1983).
10 Husserl develops the notion of the intentional structure of consciousness from Brentano's retrieval of the
scholastic conception. Attempting to get at an essential nature of psychic acts, Brentano adopts the
conception of the object's intentional inexistence. Refer to Franz Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, trans.
B. Muller (London: Routledge, 1995). Husserl develops the thesis - shed of the metaphysical implications
of Brentano's/ the Scholastics' conception - that all conscious experience (Erlebnis) is 'about something'.
Consciousness is always consciousness of. These comments are informed by my reading of Dermot
Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000).
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assumption that the objective world can be 'proved' or grasped in evidence through the
identification of and by its 'presence' to rational subjectivity. In essence, 'the objective'
in classical phenomenology seems to involve not only the idea of objectivity for
subjectivity, but also an objective for subjectivity. In this sense, phenomenology aims at a
're-construction' of the world according to a generality of essences. Phenomenology aims
at a possible harmonious and universal conception through an ideal abstraction, set
against the uncertainty presented by the contingency, modification and change that
inform material existence. It is precisely the latter aspect of sensible or material being
with which I am concerned. Classical phenomenology brackets off a sensible which, as I
argue, in fact exceeds the intelligible and the structures of rational cognition or
'intuition'. Phenomenology on the Husserlian model thus performs an impasse, a
proposition and an abstraction that are unsustainable.
The development of phenomenology after Husserl shows a tension with respect to the
consideration that Husserlian phenomenology and its particular configuration of the
status and role of consciousness seemed to involve a return to a neo-Kantian idealism.
The latter was, as pointed out in Eugen Fink's essay, precisely the adversary prompting
the phenomenological impetus in philosophy11. Husserl considered phenomenology to
move beyond the impasse of traditional philosophy regarding skepticism and the
existence of the external world. The philosophical issue according to phenomenology
moves beyond the question of premises for belief in the world12 in addressing reasons for
skepticism as opposed to belief. The phenomenological response was formed in terms of
the various reductions. If defined in terms of its object - phenomena - phenomenology
concerns the establishment of grounds for the possibility of appearance or manifestation
of phenomena. For Husserl, this involves a focus on the nature of consciousness in its
actual experiencing, that is, beyond its delineations by common sense or philosophical
11 See Eugen Fink, 'The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism",
in Richard 0. Elveton, trans, and ed., The Philosophy ofHusserl (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).
Hereafter referred to as PPH. Fink's motive in this essay is precisely to point out the difference and
specificity of phenomenology against the developments in critical philosophy.
12 The belief in the world was considered precisely the determining feature of the 'natural attitude', which
'clouded' the 'real issues' thought to be the essentials.
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tradition. Thus, the mode of philosophy concerned with getting to the essences of things
goes through the negative procedure of bracketing all traditional insight of
epistemological abstraction and ideation, which in fact involved all of rationalistic and
idealistic theory13.
Phenomenology must reject the traditional representationalist approach to knowledge, the
Lockean Idea of representation/copy of what is outside the mind. According to Husserl's
phenomenology, experience involves a performance by transcendental subjectivity:
[Experience] is not a mere taking of something alien to consciousness into
consciousness.. .Experience is the performance in which for me, the experiencer,
experienced being "is there", and is there as what it is, with the whole content and
the mode of being that experience itself, by the performance going on in its
intentionality, attributes to it14.
In other words, classical phenomenology, as developed by Husserl, bases its view of
knowledge as irreducibly bound up with the structure of intentional subjectivity.
The doctrine of intentionality, as the constitution of the ideal object or the 'world' by the
intentional structure of consciousness, relies on the problematic premise of givenness of
insights as intuitive self-evidence. When Husserl calls for a science of knowledge that
will take philosophical enquiry 'back to the things themselves'15, this means back to the
things as they appear to consciousness, or to intuition, but rational intuition. Phenomen¬
ology, or the logos of the phenomenon or world discovered through measures of
reduction (PPH 130), finds its motivation in, on the one hand, the formalism of ideal
objects and, on the other, the radicality of subjective intuition. The dependence for
philosophy on the insights of intuition refers, with respect to Husserl, to a specific
intellectual approach, considered to yield a higher form of knowledge of ideal essentials
13 See Moran, ed., 2000.
14 Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969)
233- 234. Quoted in Moran, ed., 2000.
15 Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 252.
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on a par with mathematics and geometry. The importance placed on intuition for the
formation of 'an uncontaminated' knowledge of the things themselves, is part of a wider
critique of philosophical 'common sense' and the attempt to establish philosophical
interrogation as 'scientific'. The primacy of intuition figures in Husserl's work from the
earlier to the later, and the concept of originary presentive intuition - the 'originary
giving' to consciousness - comes to be his 'principle of all principles':
[...] every originary presentive intuition is a legitimising source of cognition, [...]
everything originarily (so to speak in its "personal" actuality) offered to us in
"intuition" is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being [...]16
Intuition (of) and givenness (to) are thus the two central terms informing the classical
phenomenological approach to the relation of cognition and subjectivity. The quotation
from Husserl's Ideas 1 states that the knowing act and the known object are considered in
terms of a correlative constitution by way of the 'apodictic evidence' of rational intuition
or reason. Different modes of givenness of phenomena are irreducibly determined as
different forms of intuition in the formation of knowledge. Givenness sums up the idea of
a dative of experience and, importantly, the supposition of a self-present consciousness.
Positively, phenomenology instates the transcendence of subjectivity through the dictum
that experience is always experience to someone. A manner of experiencing the world
becomes the statement of that world as knowledge of the real, but fails to incorporate the
full significance of that reality.
That is to say that a problem lies with the idea of a constitutive transcendental
subjectivity and the 'appearance' of inevitable paradoxes with regard to the ontological
relation of subjectivity and its material involvement in the world. The phenomen-ology
calls for a complexity of relation between transcendental subjectivity, psychological ego
and material being. The view that the objects of knowledge are correlative to an intuitive
seeing of pure consciousness implies, as I see it, a rationality that cannot as such
16 Edmund Husserl, Ideas I, § 1, p. 44.
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adequately account for the relation. In this area of constitutive phenomenology I believe
Husserl insufficiently theorises the material manifestations of bodily being with respect
to cognition17. As for the theoretical moves made to investigate the actual processes of
the engagement of consciousness with the world, the reduction of the so-called natural
attitude marks Husserlian phenomenology as a move towards the neo-Kantian and
Cartesian positions as the transcendental ego becomes the formal structure in the
constitution of relations of knowledge (independent of existential assumptions). At the
same time, although 'reduced' consciousness is seen as more than a part of the world, the
phenomenology of consciousness becomes that of a consciousness or subjectivity o/the
world. As Eugen Fink pointed out, it 'contains the world' (PPH 100). The negative
procedure of the reduction gives access to a pure consciousness by which is explained the
epistemological as the move from the sensible to the ideal, but the movement does not
consider any effect of the sensible; the sensible is bracketed in the noesis. The
'affirmative' aspect of this mode of philosophy is the 're-construction' of the ontological,
where the noesis as now the ultimate starting-point is theorised in terms of a potentiality
for actualisation - or creation - of the ideal and in this sense, the sensible 'world'.
To the extent that the real focus of Husserlian phenomenology rests in the rigidity of this
structure regarding theoretical idealities related by way of a supposed 'intuition' of self-
present consciousness, we are presented with the following limited view of the nature of
cognition: consciousness intends or constitutes the object in the absolute presence to self
afforded by the act. To the extent that act-intentionality and the manifestation of objects
for consciousness take prime of place in the make up of cognition, classical
phenomenology limits cognition to an intentional and rational project of consciousness.
The problem of this reductive view of cognition as I see it, is a consequence of the idea
that phenomenology as a science is necessitated as coming before and determining its
ontology. The noesis - of epistemological regression - becomes the ontological
guarantor: phenomenology instates in this manner the epistemological approach as basis
for the ontological result. Phenomenology as first philosophy in this sense defines itself
17
Merleau-Ponty's development of phenomenology of course deals with precisely the issue of the body and
material being. I shall discuss his viewpoint in more detail in chapter two.
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in terms of its method, and becomes a sort of non-ontology to the extent that it
methodologically removes itself from determinations of 'ontic' relations, from existence.
Husserlian phenomenology arrives at this rigid demarcation of the nature of
consciousness and cognition through a specific negation. Husserl's phenomenology
comes to the fore as an attempt to avoid 'naturalism', or a psychology of consciousness,
in which consciousness in effect would be dealt with as no more than some part o/the
world18. The presupposition of cognition as essentially epistemological in nature involves
the postulation of consciousness as a type of absolute and - as Derrida points out - self-
present existence19. Cognitive experience [Erlebnis] would in accordance with the
phenomenological project necessarily be theorised as more than a factual occurrence of
nature. In summation, the idea is that the essence of some thing is available to a
consciousness removed from existence or 'nature': the measures of reduction aim to
'remove' existence - or the sensible world - in order to access the essential structures of
an experience ofa certain priority and allow manifestation of intentional content as some
evidential essentiality. The methodological epoche postulates a move from knowledge to
existence, from epistemology to ontology and this is based on the premise of the
accessibility of a 'phenomenological residuum', an absolute potential of rational
subjectivity. The 'pure consciousness' or noesis becomes the rational premise, the
ultimate point of orientation through which can be accessed evidential 'reality', thus an
ultimate origin of the epistemological and ontological. Husserl suggests in Ideas 1 that
with respect to the real world 'pure consciousness' is some pure potency of a constructive
or creative capacity before a process of actualisation20. In other words, what he claims is
that thought is a creative potential of subjectivity.
18 See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).
19 See Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston; Northwestern
University Press, 1978). I shall return to this work in the last part of this chapter.
20 Gilles Deleuze operates with a notion of virtuality and a specific relationship between the virtual and the
actual, which takes up this idea of a creative or constructive capacity of thought. However, for Deleuze the
creative and constructive capacity of a thought is not referable to a transcendental mind or constitutive
consciousness. The world is not there in order then to be represented by transcendental subjective acts on
the world. The 'world' is understood by Deleuze as what is effected or actualized in a movement of life
which is no more than an 'actual-virtual interaction of imaging', according to which 'each flow of life
becomes other in response to what it is not'. What r'sor becomes is this process of experiencing or imaging.
See Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (London: Routledge, 2002) p. 87-88. Deleuze states in Negotiations:
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We direct our glance of apprehension and theoretical inquiry to pure
consciousness in its own absolute Being. It is this which remains over as the
"phenomenological residuum" we were in quest of. [...] We have literally lost
nothing, but we have won the whole of Absolute Being, which properly
conceals in itself all transcendences. (Ideas 1, § 50)
The problem regarding this claim to creative capacity lies with the premise of a prior
bracketing of both sensible and ideal realities. This work argues that these necessarily
always already make up an irruptive (with respect to the schema presented by classical
phenomenology) force involved in any cognitive capacity. Husserl's phenomenology
cannot be said to recognise such forces:
Consciousness, considered in its "purity", must be reckoned as a self-contained
system of Being, as a system of Absolute Being, into which nothing can
penetrate [...] (Ideas 1, § 49, my emphasis).
When Husserl proposes a type of bracketing which in fact involves a postulation of an
essential or 'eidetic' seeing {Ideas 1, § 3, 8) as the basis of an epistemological possibility,
he does so on the presumption of an in principle possibility of separation of essence and
existence. What is contended with the notion of eidetic seeing is the accessibility of a
transcendental 'regarding' of essences, where regarding means grasping - of essence by
essence. The eidetic reduction, on the model of mathematics, involves a removal from
actual existence not only insofar as it claims to grasp not a datum or fact but its essence
as such; it also involves a remove from existence that must leave the continuity of
"There are images, things are themselves images, because images aren't in our brain. The brain's just one
image among others. Images are constantly acting and reacting on each other, producing and consuming.
There's no difference at all between images, things, and motion". Deleuze, quoted in Colebrook, 2002, p.
88. For Deleuze, experience is transcendental; judgment or perception cannot be considered in any way
separate from a sensibiiity immersed in this dynamic of life, which in Deleuze is understood in terms of a
notion of energetic materiality. This 'physics' in which thought is always already involved refers to a
transcendental principle of experience, and this is the meaning of Deleuze's 'transcendental empiricism'.
Genetically, historically and affectively life is the creations that 'traverse us', differences within univocity
(96). The virtual represents the excess of this life in its potential for expression and creation, and of
sensibility, with regard to human cognition, and is as real as the actual.
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signification involved in bodily existence unaccounted. The eidetic science of
phenomenology thus claims to undertake a move from the factual to something more
originary: it sees itself as a 'science of origins' (Ideas 1, § 56, 131). To the extent that this
involves an investigation into how (ideal) meanings are constituted for consciousness, my
claim is that it misses a mark. Not because there are no ideal meanings, but because there
is, as I claim in this work, a dynamic material dimension of priority. There is always
already a prior signification rooted in sensible being, which is an irreducible part of
cognition. What I mean to show in the following, through developments in
phenomenology as represented by Michel Henry and his development of a 'material
phenomenology' particularly, is the extent to which a sensible which exceeds the
intelligible comes into play and puts in question the phenomenological model of
cognition. Whereas the subjectivity of classical phenomenology is thought in terms of
'giving sense', what is not taken into account is the manner in which 'sense', both ideal
and sensible, always informs subjectivity. It is this dimension of embodied subjectivity
that classical phenomenology does not really account for. As a consequence of its
concern being primarily with rational experience, the description of meaning-formation
concerns cognition (Erkenntnis) to the extent that this term means experiences in which
something is grasped as 'known'. The 'creation' and construction involved in Husserlian
cognition can therefore not involve any production of the truly new. As I see it, this is a
consequence of a disregard for the full sense of cognition as involved in physical
existence, a sensible that exceeds the rationally intelligible, and a concomitant reductive
view of signification. As Jaques Derrida has pointed out21, and Husserl admitted, the
issue of signification was never probed to a sufficient extent in Husserlian
phenomenology. Husserl seems to miss the full extent and effect of an originary
signification, which I argue points to a specific sense of embodied being. I shall develop
my argument of the significance of a sensible of bodily or embodied being, and to this
end discuss the work of Michel Henry in terms of his move from classical to a material
phenomenology. The present work rejects the idea of a 're-turn' to the world of sensible
21 See Jacques Derrida, "Genesis and Structure and Phenomenology", in Writing and Difference, trans.
Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1997). See also the Introduction to Speech and Phenomena, and in the text,
p. 100 especially.
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being, as a premise for cognition, and the exclusive basis of this move or argument in
rational consciousness as the ultimate form of intentionality. Classical phenomenology
grounds its argument regarding cognising subjectivity on an exclusive structure, in both
senses of the word, and fails to account for the specific orientations of sensibility, which
precede cognition. The structure is determined as reason, which closes off the genesis22
of the sensible and the materiality of signification.
To sum up, phenomenology is based on a presumption of something seen as more
originaiy than the world of empirical fact; it grounds a 'science' and a logic upon which
'factual sciences' are dependent (Ideas 1, § 8, 18) and concerns a sphere of pure
possibility, a virtual realm of universal law or essence accessible to conceptual and
linguistic determination through seeing/reduction, or in other words: transcendental
reflection. Described as a correlate of a complex act of consciousness (Ideas 1, § 23), the
notion of seeing essences is problematic. The idea of seeing the universal in the
individual and this emphasis on essences reflects Platonic thought, and the impasses of
generality and abstraction, even though Husserl's phenomenology claims to move in a
sphere irreducible to either traditional idealism or empiricism. While removed, as
intentional content, from actuality and 'contingency' or factuality, essences are not
generated, but grasped as correlates of consciousness. That is, as in the eidetic science of
geometry, essential features of a phenomenon - an object manifest to consciousness - are
claimed to be accessible as such for our understanding even if (the question of) actual
existence is bracketed off:
[.. ,]we speak of such absolute data; even if these data are related to objective
actuality via their intentions, their intrinsic character is within them; nothing is
22 This is precisely Derrida's argument in "Genesis and Structure". Derrida points out that, for Husserl, a
structure becomes the limitation of a 'wild genesis': Husserl refuses the possibility of an 'anarchy of the
noema. The limitation is 'the transcendental-eidetic limitation' which ensures the rigor of a rational
movement of meaning. In Derrida's terms, it is the "irruption of the logos, the accession to human
consciousness of the idea of an infinite task of reason". In Writing and Difference, p. 165. Derrida makes a
similar point in his Introduction to Edmund Husserl's Origin ofGeometry, trans. J. P. Leavey (New York:
Nicolas Hays Ltd., 1978). I shall return to this work.
31
assumed concerning the existence or non-existence of actuality23.
The notion of grasping a pure phenomenon or an essence means grasping a noemata or
correlate of consciousness, a meaning-structure: Paradoxically what follows from the
intentional structure is a postulation of actual transcendence of what is grasped in the
immanence of intuitive consciousness, as transcendent or ideal meaning.
The methodological reduction is a return from phenomena to the structures of cognition
in order to re-turn to the world with an essential in-sight. Classical phenomenology
argues that essence is in principle separated from existence; transcendental
consciousness is a consciousness in principle removed from the world. Following Eugen
Fink's interpretation on this point, as he defines the particular sense of the transcendental
in Husserl's phenomenology24, there still remains the problem of what the essence of
subjectivity can be, and the problem of its exclusive determinations of the world, again in
both senses of the word, constitution of essence by essence, or the thematisation of being.
Fink specifies phenomenology's transcendental subjectivity as transcendent but also
immanent to the world. Transcendental subjectivity is immanent to the world to the extent
that it 'contains' the world within itself: intentionality so conceived produces, according
to Fink, a specific conception of the transcendental and a development on Kant. What
follows from the phenomenological argument and methodological premise, according to
Fink, is that the transcendental ego 'contains' the psychological ego25. This new
conception of the transcendental leads Fink to conclude that the phenomenological
problem of origins leads to paradoxes. The paradoxes concern the logic of an origin of
23 Edmund Husserl, The Idea ofPhenomenology, trans. W. P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1964 [1985]) 35. Quoted in Moran, ed. 2000.
24 "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism" is considered an
influential interpretation of Husserl; it is mentioned in Jean-Francois Lyotard's Phenomenology, trans.
Brian Beakley (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991) and is the only commentator on Husserl that Derrida mentions
in "Genesis and Structure".
25 Derrida points to the same 'paradox' resulting from Husserl's 'enigmatic concept' of parallelism, or "if
one may say, incorporation" of phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, which
are both "understood as eidetic disciplines [where] the one inhabits the other, as it were implicitly". The
difficulty is based in Husserl's estimation of 'both' as abstract eidetic elements of certain methodological
premises. Husserl quoted in Speech and Phenomena, p. 12.
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the world that is at once of this world and extra-worldly. This is, as I pointed out above,
an effect of the ontological result being determined by an epistemological (point of)
orientation.
II. The Question of Origins, or the Aporia of Phenomenology
In the late Cartesian Meditiations (1960) Husserl still defines phenomenology in terms of
the problems of traditional epistemology26. Phenomenology concerns the possibility of an
attainment of knowledge as apodictic evidence according to the ideal structures and
formations of consciousness. The Husserlian project of phenomenology establishes
relations regarding genesis and cognition. Eugen Fink's 1933 essay on Husserl shows
that the basic problem of phenomenology is not an epistemological problem, but a
problem of genesis or 'the origin of the world'27. "The Phenomenological Philosophy of
Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism" is a response to Husserl's neo-Kantian
critics, who according to Fink misunderstood the problem or basic question motivating
phenomenology (PPH 94) and consequentially failed to discern the radical opposition
between phenomenology and Kantianism.
The difference between phenomenology and Kantianism, according to Fink, is that
whereas 'Criticism' or critical philosophy attempts to uncover an absolute presumed to be
immanent to the world, phenomenology claims to discover the world as "immanent to the
absolute" (PPH 99) according to a method or way of knowing the origin of the world, the
'phenomenological reduction'. The world is always already there, but as given to and
through transcendental subjectivity. With transcendental phenomenology, the latter
26 See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations. 1960.
27 Husserl authorised Fink's interpretation of his philosophy. See his Preface to Fink's essay in The
Phenomenology ofHusserl, 1970.
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becomes the philosophical starting point as discovered through the measures of reduction
and double constitution. Fink points out that phenomenology's 'transcending of the
world' means that it transcends the "limitedness of the natural attitude from which
mundane philosophies originate" (99). However, what I argue in this work is that
classical phenomenology's project remains in a specific limitedness regarding the relation
of genesis and cognition.
Phenomenology's double constitution, or "the world's becoming in the constitution of
transcendental subjectivity" (130) means that the world, as well as the psychological ego,
appears as immanent to or determined according to this absolute subjectivity, that is, as
"thematic object of a possible knowledge" (99). According to the relations thus forged of
a methodology, which informs a phenomenological epistemology and 'ontology', this
structure is the guarantee of 'real' philosophical insight. Fink compares critical and
phenomenological philosophy over "the question concerning that realm of meaning
which forms the presupposition of all beings" (94) in order to clarify phenomenology's
specific approach to transcendent being vis-a-vis the 'world-problem'. As Fink points
out, in critical philosophy a presupposition of an a priori form of the world is "the
relationship of theoretical validities which are prior to all experience, to the
'transcendental apperception'" (95). That is, the pure form of consciousness corresponds
to a 'constructed' epistemological ego; it is non-ontological, a condition of experience
rather than ofexperience. Thus, for Fink, critical philosophy is world-immanent. Ideal
meanings are abstracted from beings within the world and are thus of the world and ontic
relations (97). The relationship between ideal meanings and theoretical validities on the
one hand and this epistemological ego/pure consciousness on the other, is based on
beings (95), but its method of abstraction and construction results in something which is
not of experience. When Fink claims that phenomenology is concerned with "the origin
of the world" (95), he means with the conditions of possibility for (theoretical)
experience and refers to this difference between phenomenology and critical philosophy:
the former is not world-immanent but world-transcendent; absolute subjectivity, unlike
the empirical ego, is 'originally' world-less. Unlike speculative metaphysics,
phenomenology does not make claim to another world in order to explain this world
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according to a causal principle. Fink points out that when speculative metaphysics
explains transcendence in terms of an abstraction from beings, it is in terms of 'intra-
mundane' relations of being to a being on the model of "ground and consequent, creation
and product" (95-96). I agree with Fink's contention that transcendence in
phenomenology has "an in principle different direction" (99).
For Fink, phenomenology is not motivated by the critical problem of human knowledge;
the reduction is not undertaken as a methodological measure to pursue critical
philosophy's attempt to clarify the correlation of an a priori form of the world and a pure
formal consciousness. Neither is it undertaken as a 'separation' in human consciousness
with respect to transcendent objects, that is, as psychological immanence (118).
According to Fink, the phenomenological reduction, which to him is reducible to the very
idea of phenomenology, allows phenomenology to overcome any ontic relation in its
conception of transcendence as it is the transcending passage from the world to an
absolute: that is, to what is extra-wordly. However, Fink claims that whereas the absolute
is not found within the world, it is not to be considered separate from the world as one
thing being separate from another. Beyond belief and 'speculative presentment',
phenomenology presents the 'world-ground' as object of theoretical knowledge or a
prototypical 'experience' which brings the object into being as 'evidential' according to
the consciousness that contemplates it (97). The carrying out of the reduction as a
passage to the absolute of transcendental consciousness re-claims the world within the
absolute or the founding structure of intentionality. the reduction claims "a transcendence
which once again contains the world within it" (100). The reduction, as radical reflection
upon human subjectivity, 'finds' a 'founding' transcendental subjectivity, which is known
through this reflection, while irreducible to either being or world. The contention of
phenomenology is that the reduction or epoche gives the origin of the world through an
"absolute" which is the access or 'passage' of a transcendental experience/theoretical
thought as such: "This knowledge is intuitive if we understand by this true self-givenness
and not 'intuition' as a human capacity for knowledge opposed to discursive thought"
(126; 83). That is, evidence is postulated "as the basic mode of intentionality in general
(of all kinds of acts)" with the primacy of the supposed intuitable nature of all knowledge
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(83). Fink then continues in a parenthesis: "The 'epistemology' of phenomenological
knowledge is a particular problem within the transcendental theory of method" (126).
The problem is bound up with the provenance of method in phenomenology; the extent to
which method is access to an absolute before ontological and epistemological
determinations. 'Phenomeno/ogy' or the theoretical exhibiting of the logos of the world
discovered or constituted is the reductive 'transcendental acceptance-phenomenon' which
according to this thesis brackets sensibility in an unsustainable manner (130, my
emphasis added to Fink's).
Following Husserl, Fink describes the meaning of absolute life or the transcendental
subject as irreal (127); what determines the manner in which absolute life exists in a
manner contra what is the psychological or ontic, is the clarification of 'the world' of
objects for consciousness by transcendental constitution. Husserl's position concerning
the relationship between ego and world is of some complication, in both senses. Ideas I
presents the view that the ego of the 'transcendental apperception' is constituted through
its constitution of the world. As what it constitutes is considered a fact of the world, so
also is this ego contingent (Ideas 7,104-105); this is so to the extent that it is considered
from the viewpoint of transcendental subjectivity. There is a transparency of access
according to this viewpoint defining theoretical knowledge, which significantly reduces
the effects of sensibility or sensible being. As the phenomenological concern is with the
meaning of being in so far as this denotes how the world came to be as a meaningful
system, the question becomes: how to delimit and differentiate transcendental life from
the psyche of the worldly being? As the latter blurs the reality of the world, that is, the
world of ideal meanings, one inquires "back beyond the worldly and objectivised
intentional stream of life" through the reduction, which "deobjectifies transcendental life"
(PPF1 133) according to a 'clarification' of the 'intentional essence' of evidence
transcendent to 'the world' and 'self-apperception'.
Fink points out that in Ideas 1 intentionality is somewhat indeterminately described: he
coins the term 'act-intentionality'28 and points out how it might be confused with
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psychological intentionality as the former is in fact constituted by transcendental
intentionality and not constituting (133). According to Fink, act-intentional analysis - as
a sort of 'mid-stage' of psychological interpretation concerning an explication of
subjective acts - is a 'level' that must be surpassed in order to view the world through the
level in which psychological interpretations are transcendentally produced. Fink
emphasises a distinction, even 'opposition' between the receptivity of psychological
'intramundane' intentionality and "transcendental intentionality's productive character",
where this productivity is not to be conceived along the lines of an ontic relation (133).
While "this determination of the essence of constitution as a productive creation may
sound [harsh and doctrinaire], it at least indicates the opposite character, a required
being-in-itselfcharacter, to the receptive character of the ontic and mundane (psychical)
life of experience" (134). Thus, phenomenology's fidelity to experience is a removal of
(sensible and affective) existence according to method, while the method nevertheless
claims a transcendental 'life', the "absolute and concrete life which carries the sense of
the world's being totally and concretely within itself" (112). The pretension is that this
absolute life guarantees the meaning(s) or Being of being in their universal and constant
aspect in the face of change and modification: it is an attempt to clarify the how of
meanings, the existence of meanings as ideal validities.
It is problematic, as I see it, that what follows from this is that Being as determined
through intentional constitution is reduced to intelligibility, to a Reason generated
through 'transcendental life'. On Fink's interpretation also, Husserl's constitutive
phenomenology argues that not only knowledge, but also the meaning of known being, is
constituted by consciousness. Even if the double constitution, as a 'Being in
consciousness' is the effect of a transcendental viewpoint, what is clear is that the
generation of meaning or sense is limited to the rigidity of a theoretical structure and the
abstractions of methodology which would not account for any genesis in terms of
28 Fink describes act-intentionality as bound by a context in which the intentional character "of 'subjective
acts' in which the 'world' (as actual transcendental noema) comes to be accepted and the habitualities in
terms of which the having-in-acceptance holds as such", and claims that this explication must be
understood as an "anticipation which becomes intelligible in terms of the fundamental relationship between
the act-intentional explication of transcendental subjectivity and its analysis in terms of constitution" (PPH
132-33).
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embodied being. What is brought to light by the doctrine of phenomenological reduction
is a world dependent on subjectivity (138). My point of contention is not with this
dependence; the problematic aspect of this model of the relation between genesis and
cognition is its lack of determination of the many ways in which experiencing
subjectivity is affected as embodied being beyond a "'subjectivism' which transcends ah
mundane forms of subjectivism" (138). Classical phenomenology fails to account for
these. If following Fink, " [t]he true theme of phenomenology is neither the world, on the
one hand, nor a transcendental subjectivity which is set over and against the world on the
other, but the world's becoming in the constitution of transcendental subjectivity" (130),
there is still a paradox in the separation of transcendental viewpoint and embodied ego. I
would say that this particular type of reflection does not get to the real 'matter of things'.
Fink speaks of "the logical paradox of transcendental determinations" (144). I consider
this a problem of embodiment, as an inadequate account of what this work terms
'sensibility' in reading Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Henry on 'life', with reference to
the subjective body. The Husserlian separation of essence and existence, if only 'in
principle', gives a fragile dynamic to the relation that constitutes material and theoretical
being.
On a positive note these delineations by classical phenomenology offer up a certain
'holism' in its approach to experience; compared with the philosophical tradition, the
relation between the object and subject is not theorised as a simple oppositional structure
of correlates. The phenomenological view of experience is the configuration of a much
more complex relation of consciousness and its outside. Experience comprises a subject -
object relation where the demarcations are not yet made, a kind of beyond or prior to
objectification, idealisation, rationalisation, structures of causality and objective time.
Husserl develops his thought increasingly towards this insight as an effect of his
demarcations and methodology. In his later works the idea of the life-world, the
experience that is a formation of the world, in the double sense of constitution, becomes
more prominent29. Phenomenology provides the insight that objectivity and
consciousness are not easily separated.
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The reception and further development of phenomenology has involved a wide and
varied branching out and divergence from aspects of Husserl's phenomenology. The
divergence is most radically demonstrated in the skepticism as to the value and
possibility of the practice and idea of phenomenological reduction and the rigidity of the
structure of intentionality.
The theoretical determination ofknowledge in Husserlian phenomenology is ultimately
based in the idea of objectivity for intentional subjectivity only. The problem with the
Husserlian project lies not in this relation but in the specific structure of a teleological
reason, which always already animates the act of constitution in which objectivity for
subjectivity is established.
III. Derrida: Phenomenology and Genesis
In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl's thought developed an emphasis on the
fundamental role of passive synthesis, which implies that consciousness does not
constitute its object but rather uncovers it as it receives it. However, as Jacques Derrida
has pointed out, the notion of the transcendent object received by consciousness in
'passivity' involves an infinite regress of genetic processes, as there must always already
have been a constituted object for consciousness to receive30; phenomenological
'beginnings' remain problematic. More importantly, he points out that for Husserl such
infinite historic regression is animated by a universal reason31, which then produces
infinite historic progression. Teleological reason animates a history that becomes
29 Refer to Edmund Husserl's later writings such as The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. D. Carr, (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1970).
30 See Jacques Derrida, '"Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology" in Writing and Difference, trans.
Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978) 154 -168. Hereafter GS.
31 See GS 166-67, especially.
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synonymous with the production of transcendent being. It is in this sense - or on a
parallel logic - that Husserl conceives phenomenology as an infinite task of knowledge.
Derrida describes it as "the eidos of a historicity, and thus of the movement of meaning -
which is necessarily a rational movement" (GS 165). In other words, Husserl's
phenomenology adheres to the idea of the logos as an infinite production by reason. In
Husserl, genesis - also passive genesis - thus has a determinate beginning and end:
Reason unveils itself. Reason, Husserl says, is the logos that produces itself in
History. It traverses being in view of itself, in view of appearing to itself, that is,
as Logos, saying and hearing itself, within the living present of its self-presence
(166).
Phenomenology claims a production of knowledge in terms of evidence and the essence
of transcendent being. Husserlian phenomenology restricts its claim of attention to
phenomena, 'things in themselves', with the claim to an insight into truths of essences of
an a priori character, apart from empirical content. Phenomenology's transcendental
determinations are set in the present, with the metaphysical claim to presence, that is, by
a presence of the object for subjectivity and the self-presence of this subjectivity. Thus
genesis, cognition and their relation in phenomenology are marked by a paradox. The
logical paradox of transcendental determinations is the problem or aporia, which marks
all of Derrida's work. Preceding this problem and irreducibly linked to it, is the problem
of "the origin of the world" or of genesis32. The problem is taken up in Derrida's early
work on Husserl's phenomenology as the question of genesis and structure33. Derrida
criticises Husserl's phenomenology for closing off genesis by structure: it follows that the
critique of phenomenology's teleology of reason is a critique of its archaeology or
32 The phrase is taken from Eugen Fink, "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and
Contemporary Criticism".
33 '"Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology" was first written for a 1959 conference on genesis and
structure but went through several revisions before its inclusion in Derrida's 1967 Writing and Difference.
This prolonged period of revision shows that the work contains a sustainable critique of Husserl's
phenomenology.
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'architectonic'34; the aporia is constitutive and unavoidable. Derrida's '"Genesis and
Structure' and Phenomenology" seems to be a double critique, partly within
phenomenology, and partly a critique conducted outside the phenomenological
framework as a deconstruction of what Derrida sees as its metaphysics of presence.
(a) "Genesis and Structure" and the Problem of Origins
"Genesis and Structure" begins by acknowledging the aims of phenomenological
philosophy: the phenomenologist is described in his intention as
[a] 'true positivist' who attends to the things themselves [and] the originality and
primordiality of meanings. The process of a faithful comprehension or
description, and the continuity of explication must dispel the shadow of a choice
[concerning the question of structure or genesis]. Thus one might say.. .that
Husserl, by his rejection of system and speculative closure, and by virtue of the
style of his thought, is attuned to the historicity of meaning and to the possibility
of its becoming, and is also respectful of that which remains open within
structure. And even when one comes to think that the opening of the structure is
'structural', that is, essential, one already has progressed to an order
heterogeneous to the first one: the difference between the (necessarily) closed
minor structure and the structurality of an opening—(GS 155).
These comments by Derrida are made within phenomenological premises, according to
its intention. Derrida concludes, however that a true genesis is closed off by structure in
34 Derrida claims that Edmund Husserl has an architectonic conception of a historical reason and its role in
the infinite production of knowledge, which inadequately accounts for the effects of language in a broad
sense on the constitution of meaning/knowledge. See Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of
Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavey and ed. David B. Allison (New York: Nicolas Hays Ltd.,
1978).
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Husserl's phenomenology. The deconstructive critique follows from tracing movements
interior to phenomenology, thus supporting the notion that genesis is necessarily closed
off by structure and the necessary impossibility of anything but a both-and approach to
the question of structure and genesis. "Genesis and Structure" accords phenomenology a
status within metaphysics. This is despite the fact that Husserl had always tried to resist a
type of thinking which would be speculative "or 'dialectical'.. .in the sense that Husserl,
at least, always sought to ascribe to this word" (154-5) and that, according to Derrida, the
issue of a choice between two different modes of description - structural or genetic -
would not be in accordance with phenomenological thinking: in phenomenological
description the thing itself determines whether structural or genetic description would be
appropriate35. Despite this initial assessment, set within phenomenological thinking,
Derrida argues: "A debate [between genesis and structure] regulates and gives its rhythm
to the speed of [the] descriptions [of Husserlian phenomenology] ...and [because
incomplete] leaves every major stage of phenomenology unbalanced "(157). Derrida's
argument or "hypothesis" in this essay, is that Husserl responds to this debate between
genesis and structure by "appearing" to "transgress the purely descriptive space and
transcendental pretension of his research towards a metaphysics of history in which the
solid structure of a Telos would permit him to re-appropriate, by making it essential and
by in some way prescribing its horizon36, an untamed genesis which .. .seemed to
accommodate itself less and less to phenomenological apriorism and to transcendental
idealism" (157, my emphasis). Derrida suggests that Husserl thus falls into a sort of
"dialectic" or metaphysics, of a minor structure regulated by a larger historico -
teleological structure: "'...a teleological reason [runs] throughout all historicity' and
particularly 'the unity of the history of the ego'"37. Derrida attempts to ground the
35 GS, p. 155. Derrida states that the question of structure and genesis seems to be neutralised in the idea of
the givens of phenomenological philosophy as "two always complementary operative concepts". The
concepts as such simply fall into the 'given' tensions of phenomenology as " a philosophy of essences
always considered in their objectivity, intangibility, apriority; but by the same token, a philosophy of
experience, of becoming, of the temporal flux of what is lived, which is the ultimate reference; it is also a
philosophy in which the notion of 'transcendental experience' designates the very field of reflection" (155).
36 That is, this telos is considered both essentially belonging to history as its internal movement and
prescribed to it from outside history, by philosophy.
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hypothesis concerning phenomenology and metaphysics through Husserl's later writings
- after Ideas 738 - to the extent that these elucidate "problems of genetic phenomenology"
(164).
Derrida bases his claim of the emergence of a 'dialectic' or metaphysics on Husserl's
descriptions of a teleological reason which animates history, intending a future Idea in the
Kantian sense, that is an infinite Idea, the idea of truth (GS 160):
The presence of Telos or Vorhaben - the infinite theoretical anticipation which
simultaneously is given as an infinite practical task - for phenomenological
consciousness is indicated every time that Husserl speaks of an Idea in the
Kantian sense. The latter is offered within phenomenological self-evidence as
evidence of an essential overflowing of actual and adequate self-evidence.
Perhaps it would appear then that this Idea is the Idea or very project of
phenomenology's source or end (167).
Derrida argues that this correlation between teleological reason and the intention of
idealisation or infinitisation does not make up two poles grounded by adequate self-
evidence. Derrida takes up the question of structure and genesis within phenomenology,
thus going against what seems to be phenomenology's assumption, that this question only
presents itself outside the borders of phenomenology (161). Derrida works within the
phenomenological principle of intuitive self-evidence.
37 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 1970 and
Cartesian Meditations, 1960, both quoted in Writing and Difference, p.165. Derrida mentions here (165)
how Hussserl in the Cartesian Meditations presents genetic description of the ego in terms of a prescription
for a sort of universal genetic phenomenology or 'ultimate genesis'. See Cartesian Meditations, p. 76 -7.
38 Derrida points out that there is, "from the structural analyses of static constitution practiced in Ideen 1
(1913) to the analyses of genetic constitution which follow", not so much a real transition but a progress
"which implies no 'surpassing'... [Husserl's ongoing development of the initial work] leaves intact what
has been uncovered.. .the baring of both the genetic foundations and the original productivity not only
neither shakes nor ruins the superficial structures already unearthed, but also brings eidetic forms once
again to light, that is the 'structural a prioris' - this is Husserl's expression - of genesis itself" (GS, 156).
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Derrida argues that the question of structure and genesis appears to be outside
phenomenological space as phenomenology posits a common root of both operative
concepts of genesis and structure. Husserlian phenomenology operates according to an
attempt to move between "logisising structuralism and psychologistic geneticism (even in
the form of the 'transcendental psychologism' attributed to Kant)" (158). That is, Husserl
wants to maintain on the one hand the autonomy and normative assumption attributed to
logico-mathematical ideality with respect to factual consciousness and, on the other hand,
its original dependence with respect to a concrete subjectivity, conceived generally (158,
my emphases). This is his 'new direction of philosophical attention', and this 'different
direction' concerns the instatement of a "concrete, but non-empirical intentionality"
(158), the constitutive subjectivity of transcendental experience, the 'field' and origin of
transcendental reflection. Importantly, intentionality operates both in terms of activity
and passivity; it is - as intelligibility - a capacity for production as well as revelation. As
seen above, Fink recognised that 'constitution' can be read as 'construction', 'production'
and also 'creation'.
As I have pointed out, I would disagree with the employment of the term 'creation' to the
extent that the structurally bound genesis of classical phenomenology - as it bypasses
sensible being - cannot involve any real production of the new. However, Husserl does
speak in his later works of the act ofsynthesis constituting for consciousness objects as
products: 'new' objects that would grasp something now as a part, now as a
collectivity39. He uses also words such as 'manifesting' and 'exhibiting' in the same
manner as 'constituting'. As this is bound up with the transcendental reduction, eidetic
seeing and the foundation of objectivity, the notion of a unity, an original unity and root
of activity and passivity is, as Derrida recognises, "from quite early on the very
possibility of meaning for Husserl. And this common root will ceaselessly be experienced
as the common root of structure anagenesis" (GS 158). Access to the common root of
activity and passivity is presupposed throughout the reductions, which are meant to
neutralise and critisise 'worldly genesis' or the 'positivism of a science of facts', which
39 Cartesian Meditations, p.77.
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would claim closure in factuality (159). Thus the phenomenological critique claims to
deal with a space prior to the demarcations of structure or genesis. The phenomenological
clarification of objectivity in its foundation is considered primary with respect to the
already implied clarifications of structural and genetic description, which are considered
to be part of a secondary empirical reality: "It is the radicalization of psychology and
history that made the transition to the phenomenological attitude necessary" (161).
Derrida is here still commenting on the issue of structure and genesis according to the
phenomenological project, on the borders of phenomenology; he points out that
according to phenomenology it is considered a parallel - but not a same - problem within
the phenomenological space. Derrida recognises that the phenomenological description
and 'constitutive analyses' of Ideas 1 are "resolutely static and structural in design" (161).
Apart from the attempt to disassociate phenomenological analysis from factual, causal -
that is, historicist and psychologistic - genetic analysis, Ideas 1 is concerned to delineate
the correlation of a formality of objectivity and intuitive consciousness, in general.
Husserl's principle of all principles defines self-evidence as a foundation that is to secure,
according to Derrida, "the ultimate critical and phenomenological jurisdiction, under
which the most ambitious genetic description later will be subsumed" (161). Derrida
approaches the structure-genesis problem in terms of a 'question of closure and opening'.
To the extent that phenomenology, in its investigation of the foundation of objectivity,
deals with the essence of consciousness, it is a structuralism. Derrida focuses on the
difference in Husserlian phenomenology between exact and inexact - or 'anexact'
according to Derrida - essences. Descriptive eidetic phenomenology, although modeled
on a mathematical attempt to delineate idealities, does not attempt to delineate ideal
validities according to mathematics' implied possibility of closure. The domain
delineated by phenomenology is not considered exhaustive; its determinations as regards
the foundation of objectivity are presumed to be infinite. Derrida points out that
phenomenological investigation, which is a morphological and not an 'exact' science,
rather than attempting to produce a finite totality according to objects already delineated,
concerns phenomena or essences of consciousness which cannot be confined to a
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mathematical model of structurally or 'definitude': what is retained in this comparison,
according to Derrida, is in fact
a principled, essential and structural impossibility of closing a structural
phenomenology. It is the infinite opening of what is experienced, which is
designated at several moments of Husserlian analysis by reference to an Idea in
the Kantian sense, that is, the irruption of the infinite into consciousness, which
permits the temporal flux of consciousness just as it unifies the object and the
world by anticipation, and despite an irreducible incompleteness. It is the strange
presence of this Idea which also permits every transition to the limit and the
production of all exactitude (162).
That is, although the Idea permits these unifications - the unification of temporal
consciousness as well as object and world - it produces a rupture or opening, a
discontinuity of consciousness which cannot be reduced to the process of idealisation or
infinitisation that characterises only a modification of the object within the finite totality
presumed by mathematical or 'exact' science.
Derrida elaborates the question of closure or opening by turning to another type of
difference within Husserl's phenomenology, the differences which make up the structure
of transcendental intentionality. According to Ideas 1, intentionality is an original
structure, an 'archi-structure' (162). Derrida delineates the complexity of the structure,
with its double correlation - the noesis and noema, and the morphe-hyle. Derrida's
concern lies with the noema, which as Derrida recognises, is "distinguished in that [it]
does not belong to consciousness in a real way. Within consciousness, in general there is
an agency which does not rea///belong to it" (163). Derrida isolates this as a decisive
theme. As Fink pointed out, the noema is neither of the world nor of consciousness,
really, but of the world for consciousness. The noema's nonbelonging to any region -
even to the 'archi-region', as Derrida points out - makes the noema "the root and very
possibility of objectivity and of meaning. [Whereas it may be] laid bare only on the basis
of intentional consciousness, it does not borrow from intentional consciousness.. .its
46
'material'" (163). For Derrida this 'anarchy of the noema' is the "opening to the 'as such'
of Being and to the determination of the totality of regions in general [and] cannot be
described, stricto sensu and simply, on the basis of a determined regional structure"
(163). According to my argument here, the noema so conceived opens up to the domain
of material being as such, that is, what I have designated as a sensible or sensibility that
exceeds the intelligible. The hyle is seen as a similar opening or rupture in consiousness;
as non-intentional but real, it is a possibility ofreceptivity in experience; "it is the sensate
material ofaffect before any animation by intentional form" (163, my emphases.) The
hyletic element of experience is the receptivity or passivity which allows the emergence
into consciousness of what is other than consciousness. In Ideas 1, Husserl does not
develop the problem of temporal constitution as it is bound up with the hyle. Derrida
concludes that as the interrogation of the hyle "in its pure ingenuity", that is, as temporal
matter, is renounced40, there is a problem as concerns genesis and structure: "if [Husserl]
renounces the examination of the possibilities entitled formless materials and immaterial
forms, if he keeps to the constituted hyle-morphic correlation, it is that his analyses are
still developed (and will they not always be so, in a certain way?) from within a
constituted temporality" (GS 163).
The hyle, for Derrida, is the possibility of genesis itself, genesis irreducible to
consciousness. Derrida argues that to the extent that Husserl refrains from an adequate
development of the notions of alterity and temporality, as these follow the two poles of
opening (the noema and the hyle), he remains within metaphysics. Metaphysics for
Derrida is the metaphysics of presence41. According to Derrida's argument, Husserlian
phenomenology refrains from responding to a necessity for transition to a genetic
constitution that arises out of these considerations of the two poles: "and the new
'transcendental aesthetic' will be deferred always... It is that the constitution of the other
and of time refers phenomenology to a zone in which its 'principle of all principles' (as
we see it, its metaphysical principle: the original self-evidence and presence of the thing
40 Derrida refers specifically to Ideas, third book, chapters 2 and 4.
41 See also Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics", in Writing and Difference, p. 121 in particular.
47
itself) is radically put into question. In any event, the necessity of this transition from the
structural to the genetic is nothing less than the necessity of a break or a conversion" (GS
164). Derrida is concerned to point out what he sees as a tension within Husserl's notion
of evidential intuition or presence. The idea of a telos or reason as the positing of an
origin and end to genesis is disrupted by the hyletic element of experience and the
'anarchy of the noema', and thus from within the structure of transcendental
consciousness. Derrida concludes that there is no intuitive self-evidence for exhaustive
self-presence, because of this opening within the structure. Pure material being provides a
sense or 'signification', which always already disrupts and precludes such closure.
The deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence takes this tension in Husserl's
'metaphysical principle' and concludes that the Idea in the Kantian sense "is offered
within phenomenological self-evidence as evidence of an essential overflowing of actual
and adequate self-evidence" (167). What is left unrecognised is the extent to which a
sensible always already exceeds the intelligible or essential of phenomenological self-
evidence. The Cartesian Meditations shows how evidence is not a-temporal; nor is it a
matter of logic or psychology, but of 'experience':
Thus evidence is a universal mode [that is, feature] of intentionality, related to
the whole field of consciousness. Thanks to evidence, the life of consciousness
has an all-pervasive teleological structure, a pointedness towards reason and
even a pervasive tendency towards it, that is toward the discovery of
correctness... (48).
Derrida asks what it would mean, what significance we might encounter if we asked the
question of genesis and structure in general:
What does the notion of genesis in general, on whose basis the Husserlian
diffraction could come forth and be understood, mean, and what has it always
meant? What does the notion of structure in general, on whose basis Husserl
operates and operates distinctions between empirical, eidetic, and transcendental
dimensions mean, and what has it always meant through its displacements? And
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what is the historico-semantic relationship between genesis and structure in
general? (GS 167)
Such a question involves for Derrida the question of the 'origin of the world'42. To ask
this question of the meaning of the notions of structure and genesis in general "is to
interrogate that which precedes the reduction" (167)); it is that which is before the
distinctions of phenomenological analysis, such as the distinctions between exact and
anexact, real and irreal. The "passage to infinity" is described as the "structurality of the
opening" (164); it is the experience of that which transcends any single experience and is
therefore structured beyond consciousness 'here and now' to open for a consciousness in
general, but the 'opening' is the 'nothing which divides parallels' (164). A "nothing" in
this sense, is a kind of in-between of theory and materiality; it is according to Derrida,
what admits the distance that separates transcendental phenomenology and
phenomenological psychology. The 'nothing' as a name for what is between in a
parallelism, is, as this thesis argues, the space of real genesis, as the production of the
new. As such I see it as 'the invisible in the visible', in a rephrasing of the title of
Maurice Merlau-Ponty's last unfinished work43. For Derrida, parallelism is what
"liberates the space of a transcendental question [and the] nothing is what permits the
transcendental reduction [in phenomenology]. [Paradoxically] the transcendental
reduction is what directs our attention to this nothing in which the totality of meaning and
the meaning of totality permit their origin to appear. That is, according to Fink's
expression, the origin of the world" (164). Constitution in classical phenomenology does
involve an infinity according to the Cartesian Meditations, but the irruption into
consciousness of what is other is always already the movement of reason, the ego
"existent for himself in continuous evidence, .. .constantly constituting himself as
existing, ...the flowing cogito44". Synthesis is fundamentally identification; identity is
essentially the intentional effect produced by the synthesis of consciousness itself.
42 Derrida explicitly quotes Fink, although the phrase appears in a different immediate context in the essay.
43 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1968 [1964]). I shall return to this point in chapter two.
44 Husserl quoted from Cartesian Meditations in Writing and Difference, p. 323. My emphasis.
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Objective meaning is immanent objective meaning, constituted by a constitutive
movement of reason, whether passively or actively45.
The cogito-cogitatum is also the genesis of the ego, according to classical
phenomenology. The sense of origin cannot be the beginning of something new, if we
follow the schemas of classical phenomenology. The phenomenological notion of origin
is irreducibly bound up with recognisability; intentionality is, in a sense, the problem of a
reductive recognisability. Derrida comments in Edmund Husserl's Origin ofGeometry:
An Introduction, that with respect to (geometrical) sense what is always determined first
is "the general conditions of its Objectivity and of the Objectivity of ideal objectivities"
(64). This means:
The sense of the constituting act can only be deciphered in the web of the
constituted object. And this necessity is not an external fate, but an essential
necessity of intentionality. The primordial sense of every intentional act is only
its final sense, i.e., the constitution of an object (in the broadest sense of these
terms). That is why only a teleology can open up a passage, a way back toward
the beginnings. If the sense of geometrical sense is Objectivity or the intention of
Objectivity, if geometry is the exemplary of being scientific, and if history is the
highest and most revelatory possibility of a universal history (the concept of
which would not exist without it), then the sense of sense in general is here
determined as object, as some thing that is available in general and first for a
regard or gaze (64).
Derrida recognises that for phenomenology, "the object in general is the final category of
everything that can appear [and] sense-production must have first presented itself as
evidence in the personal consciousness" (64). Insofar as the object is what remains the
same through time, both the origin and sense are reduced to a geometrical schematism.
That is, " [t]he worldly image of gaze would not be the unnoticed model of the theoretical
45 Cartesian Meditations, pp. 77- 81.
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attitude of pure consciousness but, on the contrary, would borrow its sense from that
attitude" (64, my emphases added to Derrida's)
According to Fink, 'being' or objectivity means being for consciousness. Phenomenology
always retains the idea of correlation as defining the relationship of world and
consciousness; the world is always retained as horizon and in this sense is always thought
as a 'pregiven', with the subject 'containing', so to speak, all the meanings of this being
for consciousness. Subjectivity, which in phenomenology is both subject and object of an
investigation concerning the foundation of objectivity, might attempt to deal with world
and object as other than consciousness, but limited by a 'geometrism' of constitutive
correlation, does not take into account the genesis which informs its own manifestation as
subjectivity always already affected by objectivity. It cannot do so, because the
dimension of sensible being is theorised only as for subjectivity, not o/subjectivity as the
latter's affection by materiality. This latter dimension would be outside the framework of
classical phenomenology. Bodily being is not thought beyond the intentional structure.
Husserl does develop the notion of intentionality into different 'types', and thus attempts
accounts of embodied meaning-intending structures outside the sphere of rational
consciousness. It is my contention, however, that as the focus remains within the
limitations of the sphere of rational awareness with respect to intentionality, classical
phenomenology does not sufficiently account for the order of embodied existence that
always already disrupts or irrupts into self-awareness and thus informs conscious
awareness. An awareness and self-awareness of, and by, an always already embodied
subjectivity, provides a notion of continuity with respect to how existence relates to
"essence". This continuity is not determined by what is recognisable to consciousness.
Derrida's consideration of genesis in classical phenomenology states that
[PJhenomenology cannot and may not describe anything but the intentional
modifications of the eidos ego in general. [In the earlier works] the genealogy of
logic kept to the realm of cogitata and the acts of the ego as if to its proper
existence and life, and these were read only on the basis of noematic signs and
results (165).
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When the Cartesian Meditations states that it is a question again of returning to the
cogito-cogitatum relation in order to comprehend the genesis of the ego, Derrida points
out that apart from the activity-passivity problem, "this genetic description of the ego will
encounter limits, which we would be tempted to call definitive, but which Husserl
considers provisional, as they derive from the fact that phenomenology is only at its
beginnings"46. Both Derrida and Husserl here refer to the idea not only of 'ultimate
genesis'47 but to the idea of a 'universal genetic phenomenology' (GS 165). There are
two points to be made here that are of specific interest to the development of this thesis.
The first point is that the genetic descriptions of classical phenomenology necessarily
encounter limits. Derrida raises a concern which points directly to the idea of a structure
of genesis and constitution which must exclude a sensible for an intelligible. The
epistemological concept of evidence that defines the structure of cogito-cogitatum
prompts a move to a concept of experience, which Derrida reads in Husserl's discussions
of temporality and alterity, and is also seen in his Speech and Phenomena. The
deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence in the latter work on Husserl is based in an
experience oflanguage. Within "Genesis and Structure" Derrida points towards the
direction of language - that
[i]n emerging from itself, hearing oneself speak constitutes itself as the history of
reason through the detour of writing. Thus it differs from itself in order to
reappropriate itself. The Origin of Geometry describes the necessity of this
exposition of reason in a worldly inscription. An exposition indispensable to the
constitution of truth and the ideality of objects, but which is also the danger to
meaning from what is outside the sign (166).
In Speech and Phenomena Derrida develops the idea that in order to be and to be infinite,
sense must pass through an inscription. Thus the Idea in the Kantian sense must for
46 Cartesian Meditations, pp. 76-77. Quoted in GS p. 165.
47 Cartesian Meditations, p. 76.
52
Derrida be constituted through signification. For Derrida this concerns an elaboration of
the significance of writing. For the purposes of this work, this allows a move towards a
discussion of a sensible, which exceeds the intelligible, and a specific notion of
continuity with regard to theory and materiality. Derrida points to an internal necessity of
language to experience and thought, and thus attempts to theorise what I see as a certain
in-between of theory and materiality48.
The second point concerns the problematic notion of 'ultimate genesis' as this is bound
up, for Husserl, with the idea of a 'universal phenomenology'. Derrida quotes the
Cartesian Meditations in a footnote:
Since the monadically concrete ego includes also the whole of actual and
potential conscious life, it is clear that the problem of explicating this monadic
ego phenomenologically (the problem of the constitution for himself) must
include all constitutional problems without exception. Consequently, the
phenomenology of this self-constitution coincides with phenomenology as a
whole49.
This raises the problem of the relation between phenomenological object and
phenomenological analysis. One aspect of this problem is that of the methodological
assumptions, according to which ontology is determined by epistemology. Another aspect
is pointed out by Derrida in the question of how affirmations of evidence and self-
evidence, "made necessary by and in phenomenology itself, [may] be totally certain
within phenomenology, [as] it does not only concern phenomena that are experienced and
self-evident" (GS 165)50.
48 Derrida speaks in his work on Levinas and Husserl about the contamination of the phenomenon by the
sign. See "Violence and Metaphysics" in Writing and Difference, p. 129.
49 Edmund Husserl in Cartesian Meditations, p. 68. Quoted in Writing and Difference, p. 323.
50 These are the points which inform Michel Henry's critique in "Material Phenomenology and Language,
or Pathos and Language", 1999.1 will discuss this essay in chapter two.
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Derrida argues, with respect to the 'irruption of the logos', or the "accession to human
consciousness of the idea of an infinite task of reason"(165), that "these ruptures, which
at the same time are unveilings, (and also coverings up, for the origin dissimulates itself
immediately beneath the new domain of uncovered or produced objectivity) are always
already indicated" (165). This is what is meant by 'the structurality of the opening', or
that which 'differs from itself in order to re-appropriate itself'. Derrida points to the
inability of classical phenomenology to indicate that which escapes the structures of the
cogito-cogitatum, and the reason-evidence correlation, which ultimately defines the
phenomenological framework. This inability to indicate its other, the sensible of material
genesis, is what makes a notion such as 'ultimate genesis' inadequate, and thus a paradox
or aporia within the phenomenological framework. The sensible or 'sensibility', on my
view, is the indication of a sensible which exceeds the intelligible, where the latter is
based on the presumption of the exhaustive rational capacity of constitutive subjectivity.
In the next section I will elaborate this argument through a consideration of Derrida's
notion of the contamination of the phenomenon by the sign, as it is developed through his
notions of the trace and differance.
(b) Contamination rather than Continuity: Derrida on Phenomenology,
Language and Signification
This thesis argues that the phenomenological approach is constituted by an element or
awareness of continuity in different degrees through its various developments. The
aspects of classical phenomenology that I engage with are approached in terms of the
importance I place in a specific notion of continuity with respect to cognition and the
epistemological and ontological formation of subjectivity. My argument is that classical
phenomenology cannot account for an adequate notion of continuity, and this is because
of its neglect of affective and sensible genesis. An adequate notion of continuity provides
the point of transition for a consideration of materiality with respect to aspects of
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phenomenological thinking and the development of a notion of a sensible, which exceeds
the intelligible with respect to cognition. This section investigates Derrida's Speech and
Phenomena51 to the extent that it involves a development from the question of genesis to
the question of the sign or signification. It furthers thereby a consideration of
phenomenological issues in terms of the question of materiality and cognition, that is,
Derrida raises the question of contamination. My argument is that Derrida's notion of
contamination, as a specific development on phenomenological continuity, shows the
impasse in classical phenomenology and provides a way out of it.
The thesis of Speech and Phenomena is stated in "Violence and Metaphysics" also, as
follows: "the phenomenon supposes originary contamination by the sign"52.1 see this as
the recognition of a prior materiality, of language and signification in a broad sense, and
argue that Derrida approaches a notion of a sensible, which exceeds the intelligible. The
concern here is with what may be termed a prior 'phenomenality', following Henry, a
condition and conditioning of phenomenal manifestation and constitution by intentional
subjectivity and phenomenal analysis. This priority - in both senses of the word,
according to this thesis - of a material signification as it informs phenomenality, is
evident in Derrida's elaboration of signification in the face of phenomenological analysis.
Speech and Phenomena concerns the very nature of phenomenology; it is a critique of its
presupposition: the idea of correlative presence, as regards the relations of subject and
object of, and in, phenomenal analysis. Derrida emphasises, with phenomenology,
experience as the event of the livingpresent, he does not deny the foundational
presupposition of presence. Derrida concerns himself, however, with the irruption into
presence of something other, and in this respect, with the extent to which Husserlian
phenomenology broaches the themes of non-presence: alterity and temporality. Speech
and Phenomena asks the question of the sign within this context of alterity and
temporality; the larger context is the 'metaphysics of presence'. Derrida thus attempts to
51 Hereafter quoted as SP.
52 "Violence and Metaphysics" in Writing and Difference, p. 129.
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pose the question of its outside, from inside the presumptions of the metaphysics of
presence.
When Derrida approaches the question of the essence of the phenomenological project53,
his focus is on the 'essential distinction' with which Husserl's Logical Investigations
opens: the distinction ofexpression and indication in the sign. The focus of Husserlian
phenomenological analysis is "the authentic mode of ideality"54. Presence, understood in
terms of the living present, is "the ultimate form of ideality" and "the founding concept of
phenomenology as metaphysics":
Presence has always been and will always be, to infinity, the form in which -
we can say this apodictically - the infinite diversity of content will be produced.
The opposition - which inaugurates metaphysics - between form and matter finds
in the concrete ideality of the living present its ultimate and radical justification.
(6, my emphases)
Presence, on Derrida's conception, is "the absolute proximity of self-identity, the object
being in front ofas available for repetition" and "the ideal form of self-presence of
transcendental life, whose ideal identity allows idealiterthe repetition to infinity" (99).
The aporia which Derrida speaks of with respect to phenomenology concerns presence
and iterability. Iterability provides the distinction between ideality/essence and factuality:
whereas a fact must be considered as a singularity, ideality is what may be infinitely
repeated. However, this means that ideality is beyond the grasp of the reality of intuition,
even if intuition here is understood according to Fink's interpretation as 'true self-
givenness'. It is in this sense that Being is being object in Husserlian phenomenology, it
is why - ideally - the objective can within the phenomenological framework be said to
'substitute' the subjective (100), and this is why cognition is ultimately considered in
53 Writing and Difference, p. 22.
54 As Derrida points out in this respect, while Husserl describes the results of phenomenology as
metaphysics in § 60 of the Cartesian Meditations, he distinguishes a 'degenerate' metaphysics (Platonism)
as "blindness before the authentic mode of ideality" (SP, 6).
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epistemological terms at the expense of ontology, especially ontology considered in terms
of material formation. It is in this sense that classical phenomenology crucially overlooks
the fact that cognition is bound up with a sensible of embodied existence, which exceeds
the intelligible. Ideality works on the assumption that - ideally - we can substitute
objective content, supposed to be univocal, for the equivocal expressions of indication or
the indexical. In the first chapter of Speech and Phenomena, Derrida says:
[A]nalysis will therefore advance in this separation between existence and essence
[or de facto and dejure], reality and intentional function... [W]e would be
tempted to say that this separation, which defines the very space of
phenomenology, does not exist prior to the question of language, nor does it enter
into it, so to speak, as into an already bounded domain or as one problem among
others; it is discovered in and through the possibility of language. And its dejure
import, the right to a distinction between fact and intention, depends entirely on
language and, in language, on the validity of a radical distinction between
indication and expression (21).
Language is the condition of possibility for a distinction between essence or 'in principle'
and fact. Furthermore, language considered dejure, as this condition, depends on the
validity of a distinction between indication and expression, which according to Husserl is
an ideal or in principle distinction. The latter distinction is based on the distinction of fact
and essence that it was meant to justify. We require language to differentiate singular fact
from ideal, but language is always already ideal. The paradox is that a condition of
possibility must thus be seen to depend on that which it conditions. This is the paradox or
aporia of differance. Derrida's notion of difference is usually approached in terms of its
sense of difference and delay but here, as at later points in Speech and Phenomena, it is
defined in terms of this distinction between essence/ideality and fact. The aporia regards
iterability, as the possibility of differentiation between ideality and fact and it regards
presence, as its impossibility, in fact:
[A] 11 of what is thought purely in this concept [of presence], being by the same
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blow determined as ideality, the living present is in fact really, actually deferred.
This differance is the difference between ideality and non-ideality (99).
What this aporia points to is that the difference here cannot be guaranteed as an
opposition; because a form or ideality can never be given as such, we cannot really say
that there is a difference between form and content. That is, the distinction cannot be
maintained as an opposition because iterability concerns what is 'in principle' and not
really, the content of intuition. As long as the condition can be seen to depend on that
which it conditions, we are left with a paradox with respect to transcendental
determinations. This takes up again the problem concerning the Idea in a Kantian sense:
As the ideal is always thought by Husserl in the form of an Idea in the
Kantian sense, [the] substitution of ideality for nonidentity, of objectivity
for non-objectivity, is infinitely deferred (100).
The notion of ideality is based in the possibility of difference between the notion of an
infinite and a finite; as infinity is given according to a finite intuition, infinity as such is
not given, and not presentable. Iterability is the impossibility of being present/in
presence; the 'in principle' is not present as such. The process towards the experience of
this aporia is the process of deconstruction, the institution of a "a kind of insecurity
[within the metaphysics of presence] to open it up to the outside. This can only be done
from a certain inside" (57 n6). The experience of differance or this aporia is thus an
opening towards an outside of phenomenological analysis. Derrida asks: " what does
presence mean, taken as differance ad infinitum?" (101). Derrida comments that
Husserlian phenomenology does not adequately account for sense and signification:
[Husserl does not make] ... a theme of the 'diacritical' work of difference in the
constitution of sense and signs... [and ultimately] the whole phenomenological
discourse is .. .caught up within the schema of a metaphysics of presence which
relentlessly exhausts itself in trying to make difference derivative (101).
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According to Derrida's estimation of phenomenology's reliance on presence, the answer
to the question of the meaning of 'to infinity' is that the movement or purpose, the
presumption of telos, would be "the unity of the concept, of the logos, and consciousness
in a voice without difference" (102). The priority of signification is what would disrupt
this identity and presence, what would signal an outside: the trace or the sensible.
According to Derrida, difference is prior: when Derrida talks of how life must be itself
and its other (empiricity as the possibility of death), this concept of life concerns that
which precedes the reductions of phenomenology, whether transcendental or eidetic.
Derrida's "ultra-transcendental concept of life" refers precisely to the claim to a priority
of difference, as not derived. The concept consists in a heterogeneity between
transcendental life and empirical life, differentiated by "the nothing" (10-12), rather than
thought in terms of ontic difference. This concept of life is central to the argument of
Speech and Phenomena-.
[T]he unity of these two parallels, which relates one to the other, does not let itself
be distributed by them and dividing itselfjoins finally the transcendental to its
other; this unity is life. [This life] is thus the name for what precedes the reduction
and escapes finally from all the distributions that the reduction makes appear. But
this is because it is its own distribution and it own opposition to its other. By
determining 'living' in this way, we come to designate the insecurity of the
discourse (14-15, my emphases).
When Derrida says that life or 'the psyche' is "the self-relation, whether or not in the
form of consciousness" (14), this refers to the voice as what hears itself. This self-relation
is a "unity" but nevertheless a relation. The self-relation, as demonstrated in the voice, is
not identical because - and this is crucially in line with what comes out of Michel
Henry's material phenomenology - it also involves something other, the materiality of its
possibility. The sense bound up with the voice is materially embodied. However, within
phenomenological thought, "the voice would be this spiritual flesh that continues to
speak and be present to itself - to hear itself - in the absence of the world" (16). The
'phenomen-ological voice' rests in the dependency between logos/voice and
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phenomenon55. As phenomenology joins "the signified concept to the signifying 'phonic
complex' ...and a perhaps naive treatment of the concept 'word' [phenomenology] has
left unresolved the tension of [its] two major motifs: the purity of formalism and the
radicality of intuitionism" (16).
The aporia of classical phenomenology is, according to Derrida, precisely the result of
life's 'self-distributions', precedent with respect to phenomenology's reductions. Life's
self-distribution is also the precedent in the positive sense of bringing about the
contaminations on which the argument of Speech and Phenomena is based.
To the extent that life is not just itself, but also its other, this means other as "taken, that
is, contaminated" (20). Life is itself and other than itself, that is, always already taken by
'non-presence'56; it is (in)-formed by alterity and temporalisation. In the following I will
take up some of Derrida's comments on alterity and temporalisation in phenomenology,
as these themes relate to the notions of indication and expression and the larger issue of
contamination and continuity57.
Husserl's argument in the Logical Investigations regarding indication and expression runs
as follows: "solitary mental life" proves that expression without indication is possible (SP
48). The aim is to isolate expression by determining indication as exterior to expression,
whereas Derrida argues that expression is always contaminated by indication. There is
always already contamination; the relation is here external to its terms. The relation is in
a sense a passage, and as I have already intimated in my reading of Derrida above, the
passage is "the nothing" or continuity between parallels.
Husserl attempts to support the presumption of the separability of expression and
indication through two arguments, which Derrida sums up as follows:
55 The original French title of this work by Derrida is Le Voixetle Phenomene, (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1967); the translation could have retained the word voice from the French.
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'Non-presence' is not to be understood as a negative absence (SP, 62 - 63) but as that which do not come
in under correlative presence, that is, consciousness and evidence.
57 A fuller discussion of Husserl and temporality I deem outside the scope of this thesis, but see The
Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill. (London: Indiana University Press,
1964)
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In interior discourse...I am indicating nothing to myself. I can at most imagine
myself doing so; I can only represent myself as manifesting something to myself.
This, however, is only representation and imagination.
In inward speech I communicate nothing to myself because there is no need of it.
.. .The self-communication of the self, could not take place because it would make
no sense... because there would be no finality to it. The existence of mental [or
psychic] acts does not have to be indicated (let us recall that in general only an
existence can be indicated) because it is immediately present to the subject in the
present moment (48).
Both arguments, according to Derrida, concern the status of representation in language,
representation in the various senses one would encounter in dealing with Husserlian
phenomenology. That includes representation as Vorstellung, the general sense of pure
representation or ideality; and as Vergegenwartigung, that is, 'repetition or reproduction
of presentation', or as what replaces 'another Vorstellung (Representation,
Reprasentant)' (49). Derrida points out that the first argument seems to apply the
"essential distinction", in terms of a "simple exteriority" between the real or factual and
the ideality of representation to language (49). Derrida asks whether such distinctions
may be applied to language, and proceeds to show that language would resist it:
There is every reason to believe that representation and reality are not merely
added together in language [as suggested by Husserl's argument], for the simple
reason that it is impossible in principle to rigorously distinguish them.. .Language
in general - and language alone - is this (49-50).
For Derrida, the sign in general - signification - must be understood as an event: it is
both iterability - a "formal identity" - and "necessarily always other" than this identity,
that is, it escapes presence as Vor-stellung. There is a link between repetition and alterity,
which Husserl's Vor-stellung as well as the other modifications of representation must
miss. Representation as Vorstellung in Husserl refers only to expression and not
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signification in general (50). This definition of signification in general - representation
"is implied by any sign whatsoever" (50) - means that the distinction between
representative and imaginary language is put in question . The sign in general is re¬
presentational and accordingly there is a "wearing away" of the difference between
reality and representation, simple presence and representation in "both expression and
indicative communication" (51). Derrida questions the motive for the maintenance of a
difference here. Here lies his main concern regarding signification and the metaphysics of
phenomenology:
Does not the maintaining of this difference - in the history of metaphysics and for
Husserl - answer to the desire to save presence and to reduce or derive the sign,
and with it all powers of repetition? Which comes to living in the effect - the
assured, consolidated, constituted effect of repetition and representation, of the
difference which removes presence (51).
The elimination of the primordiality of signification is what constitutes a philosophy
based on intuition in presence; signification becomes derivative as constituted effect
rather than real genesis. If "within the sign the difference does not take place between
reality and representation, [that is] the gesture that confirms this difference is the very
obliteration of the sign" (51), this means that what is suggested here is a concept of
signification and representation thought outside the logic implied by Vorstellung and
presence. Derrida's claim is that "against Husserl's express intention", the Vorstellung
itself, and as such, depends on the possibility of re-presentation (Vergegenwartigung),
[t]he presence of the present is derived from repetition and not the reverse" (52). The
move made by phenomenology makes "the origin of presence and ideality steal itself
away in the very presence and ideality that it makes possible" (55). What I mean by a
'renewal' of the concept of signification and representation, outside the logic of
Vorstellung and presence, is that being is also informed by a signification, or the
'invisible' of the present-to-consciousness: the 'in-presence' of materiality in signs. This
dynamism of a coming-into-presence, bound up with the materiality of signification, is
not the constituted temporalisation of phenomenology's view of cognition. Presence
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understood as the correlation of radical intuition and pure form (53) "subordinates a
reflection on the sign to a logic" (7). What Derrida points to, if signification is thought in
terms of an 'interweaving' of indication and expression, is the possibility of seeing
language outside this particular delimitation of language, which sees the essence of
language - the sign - in terms of a use of language as logic and the presentation of truth
(9). What is implied in this broader concept of language/sign is an indiscernibility of
language and rational consciousness. If, following Derrida, there is always already
contamination, then there is no pure expression and no pure presence-to-self; thus, the
difference between consciousness and language on the phenomenological model is put in
question. Derrida says that the distinction between expression and indication is "more
functional than substantial"; it is not ontically conceived (20). It is the same problematic
that is shown in case of the 'anarchy of the noema', and Derrida's interpretation of the
implications of the parallelism of transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological
psychology. What Derrida's critique of the phenomenological concept of the sign sets out
to do is summed up as follows:
What is at issue is to make the original and non-empirical space of non-
foundation appear over the irreducible void on the basis of which the
security of presence in the metaphysical form of ideality is decided and raised
up (7).
If the voice that hears itself seems to work as what preserves ideality and presence-to-
self, Derrida's comments on signification point to an other dimension of material
significance which always already disturbs the idea of correlation of language and
consciousness, as that of conscious thought and evidence.
The second of Husserl's arguments as summarised by Derrida above states clearly that
the idea of self-manifestation through indicative signification is useless considering the
immediacy of self-presence or self-identity: "For the acts in question are themselves
experienced by us at that very moment (im selben Augenblick)" {Logical Investigations,
quoted in SP 49). This 'actual now' of presence is, according to Derrida, a reference
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throughout Husserl's writings58 to "evidence itself" and "absolute beginning" or
principium (62). Derrida quotes from Ideas 1, "the actual now is necessarily something
punctual (ein Punktuelles) and remains so, a form that persists through continuous
change ofmatter" (62); it is "the primal form of consciousness" (63). The 'actual now', as
foundational in classical phenomenology, is what Derrida questions. According to the
present work also the self-presence of the 'actual now' cannot be a 'beginning' or actual
origin; it is a secondary abstraction, which bypasses a sensible considered prior to
thought. It also bypasses any consideration of the dynamic of bodily being involved in
any 'sense of self, as a genesis irreducible to the manifestations of constitutive
consciousness. Self-manifestation refers to this sense of self, and thus refers to a
bodily/affective or material dimension of cognition. According to the argument of
classical phenomenology, there is no 'purpose' to the indicative sign regarding the
manifestation of the self to the self, because the moment of presence-to-self does not
contain alterity or difference; the identity of presence as self-presence "not only involves
the enigma of a being appearing in absolute proximity to oneself, it also designates the
temporal essence of this proximity - which does not dispel the enigma.. .the present of
the self-present would be as indivisible as the blink of an eye" (59). Firstly, the notion of
purposiveness betrays an all-pervasive intelligibility of thought reduced to
phenomenology's intentional schema. Existence is, according to phenomenology, mainly
to be thought in terms of a directedness of rational orientation. However, existence is
more than thought and, as the present work argues, primarily or always already more than
thought. Existence is first of all sensible being, and the affectations or material
manifestations of the sensible in intelligible being cannot be accounted for through the
rational constructions of intentional analysis and teleology. My contention is that the
sensible of thought-being is always already its animation. Phenomenology's contention
that there is no alterity involved in the actual now of self-presence, fails to recognise the
sense in which material being is the irruption of difference into consciousness, the
making aware of a sensible, which is other than and exceeds the intelligible contained in
rational thought. The body/affection - and material being as such - is its own
58 Derrida discusses briefly the Lectures on Inner Time Consciousness (SP 61).
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signification. The sensible exceeding the intelligible refers to the irruption into
consciousness of materiality understood as non-conscious and non-present (to rational
thought or intentional being). My engagement with Derrida's critique of classical
phenomenology here is based in the opening he points to in terms of thinking a sensible
which exceeds the intelligible. "Auto-affection", as Derrida describes the voice, can be
thought as 'pure' according to the correlation of a formality of ideality and the radicality
of intuition. This would be the sense of voice Derrida attributes to phenomen-ology, as
the implication of voice and logos. However, what Derrida argues according to his
notions of the 'trace' and 'difference', is that there is a sense in which voice is 'impure'.
A sensible or affective Being exceeds Being as object-for-consciousness.
Derrida quotes Ideas 1:
Every experience generally is an experience according to the mode of "being
Present". It belongs to its very essence that it should be able to reflect upon that
same essence in which it is necessarily characterised as being certain and present.
(§ 3, quoted in SP 58).
Derrida points out that "within philosophy59" - as represented by classical
phenomenology - the present-now is beyond objection, it defines the "very element of
evidence and conscious or philosophical thought" (62). However, in questioning this
privilege of presence-to-consciousness "we begin to get at the core of consciousness itself
from a region that lies elsewhere than philosophy... [it is] a procedure that would remove
every possible security and ground from discourse" (62). Derrida broaches this question
trough the concept of the sign and signification:
Signs would be foreign to this self-presence, which is the ground of presence in
general. It is because signs are foreign to the self-presence of the living present
that they may be [said to be]60 foreign to presence in general in (what is currently
59
Philosophy is for Derrida synonymous with 'philosophy of presence'.
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styled) intuition or perception (58).
Signification exceeds the metaphysics of the idea as representation - Vorstellung (63). It
exceeds the logic of the metaphysical contrast between form (idea) and matter "as a
contrast between act and potency ("the actual now is necessarily something punctual and
remains so, a form that persists through continuous change ofmatter")" (Ideas 1, § 81,
quoted in SP 63). The problem of phenomenology, according to Derrida is this:
Phenomenology confronts every position centered on non-consciousness that
can approach what is ultimately at stake: the concept of time. It is no accident that
The Phenomenology ofInternal Time-Consciousness both confirms the
dominance of the present and rejects the "after-event" of the becoming-conscious
of an "unconscious content" which is the structure of temporality implied
throughout Freuds's texts (63).
The sections of The Phenomenology ofInternal Time-Consciousness quoted in Derrida's
Speech and Phenomena, show that retention, for Husserl, is a constitutive part of the
present; it is furthermore determined as a 'non-perception' (63-65). According to Derrida,
these two factors regarding time indicate that the present now is " composed continually
with a non-presence and a non-perception" (64). Thus, the "im selben Augenblick",
understood as the indivisibility and identity of a pure presence or immediacy is
undermined; it is undermined by a prior signification. It is this that Derrida refers to as
the contamination of the phenomenon by the sign.
In section 17 of The Phenomenology ofInternal Time-Consciousness, Husserl seems to
claim that perception and "its opposite" cannot be thought of in terms of a continuity: "if
we call perception the act in which all 'origination' lies, which constitutes
originarily...then primary remembrance is perception.. .only in it is the past constituted,
i.e not in a representative, but in a presentative way" (quoted in SP, 64). The notion of
direct and immediate presentation in this statement in Husserl, disallows any notion of
60 The quotation modifies the original. I have replaced Derrida's 'called' with 'said to be', as the notion of
signs being named foreign seems to go against the reality of their informing existence as material being, or
a Being of materiality.
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continuity - understood in terms of contamination - regarding retention and makes of the
past a non-present as an unreal present. However, as Derrida points out, section 16 seems
to imply precisely a certain continuity:
If we relate [this notion of] perception to the differences of the givenness with
which temporal objects make their appearance, then the antithesis ofperception
is primary remembrance, which appears here, and primary expectation (retention
and protention), whereby perception and non-perception continually pass over
into one another (quoted in SP 65) .
Husserl seems to undermine his statement in section 17; with respect to a continuity or
admittance of alterity - "non-presence and non-evidence into the blink of the instant"
(65);
There is a duration of the blink of the eye, and it closes the eye. This alterity is
even the condition ofpresence, of presentation and therefore of Vorstellung in
general; it precedes all the dissociations which could be produced in presence, in
Vorstellung (65, my emphases).
Without elaborating on all the issues relating to perception and time in Husserl, it is
relevant for the argument of this work that there remains the problematic of the non-
presence of a not-now. The insight, which paradoxically is premised on Husserl's own
theory of time, is of a constitutive alterity, an always already there of otherness and
alterity in presence: "If .. .we now consider the constitutive phenomena, we find a flux,
and every phase of this flux is a continuity ofshading" (quoted in SP 66). The argument
concerning the exclusion of the indicative sign with respect to self-manifestation thus
seems to be undermined in Husserl's Phenomenology ofInternal Time-Consciousness.
I will return to the idea of a dynamic materiality in my discussion in chapter three of
Gilles Deleuze's critique of cognition and subjectivity, which resonates with many of the
points raised here. For now, let me conclude by emphasising the importance of this
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recognition, by Derrida, of an alterity 'within duration'; there is a heterogeneity of
relation between non-perception or retention and perception, but importantly this
heterogeneity is also conceived as a continuity. These notions of heterogeneity and
continuity are what inform Derrida's notions of the trace and difference. These notions
will also be elaborated in chapter two, and will underwrite the arguments made by Michel
Henry for a material phenomenology.
The other point I would emphasise regarding Derrida's comment above, is that of alterity
as a condition of presence, of presentation and Vorstellung in general. This insight raises
the problem of a discrepancy between the phenomenological analysis and its object. It
raises the problem of cognition and the paradox of transcendental determinations.
Chapter two argues that the insights provided by Michel Henry's specific move out of
classical phenomenology, and his problematisation of the issue of method as it has
'distorted' its object, come a long way towards solving this aporia of phenomenology.
Alterity, as conceived by Derrida in terms of a primary signification, involves the
reinstatement of an origin more primordial than phenomenology's 'idea of' origin, a
before of the "axiomatic principium of phenomenology itself" (66). Derrida's concepts
of the 'trace' and differance refer to an alterity that is there, that conditions experience,
including the experience of self-manifestation. This alterity may also be called a memory
which informs every perception and presentation, and thus every manifestation. The
concept of alterity questions the logic which underlies Husserl's argument concerning
origins; when Husserl thematises the transcendental as heterogeneous to the world, he
demonstrates, according to Derrida, a certain "disdain for language" that consists in a
separation of speech and thought. When Husserl thematises indication as exterior to
expression, when he isolates a 'pure expression', he shows a disregard for the reality of
signification - that is, for the movement of differance that is brought about by the trace.
On Derrida's view:
[Recognising] that the problem of the relationship [between retention and re¬
presentation] is none other than that of the history of "life" and of life's becoming
conscious, we should be able to say a priori that their common root - the
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possibility of re-petition in its most general form, that is, the constitution of a
trace in the most universal sense - is a possibility which not only must inhabit the
pure actuality of the now but must constitute it through the very movement of
difference it introduces. Such a trace is - if we can employ this language without
immediately contradicting it or crossing it out as we proceed - more "primordial"
than what is phenomenologically primordial (67).
This alterity is thus always already a sort of outside of pure presence, in presentation as
re-presentation. What is at stake for Derrida, in the notion of contamination, is precisely
to show how the ontological differences made on the basis of phenomenological
methodology, are 'interwoven'. Contamination means that outside and inside are
interwoven and not constituted by what constitutive consciousness intuits in reflection.
As we have seen with regard to the noema and ideality, or what separates the relation
from the ontic duplication of the Platonic idea, differentiation is based on a 'primary'
interweaving. Derrida talks of a 'certain outside', an outside or alterity which is neither
purely outside not purely inside:
[In Husserl] meaning would isolate the concentrated purity of its expressiveness
just at that moment when the relation to a certain outside is suspended (22).
This 'outside' brought into view by signification is what I intend by the notion of a
sensible or sensibility which exceeds the intelligible. I read Derrida as referring to a
sensible which interrupts and exceeds the intelligible when he claims at the end of Speech
and Phenomena that "contrary to the assurance it [and phenomenology as always a
phenomenology of perception] gives us...'the look' [le regard, Blick] cannot 'abide'
(104). The alterity which contaminates perception and presence to self, is described by
Derrida as a "dialectic":
Does not this "dialectic - in every sense of the term and before any speculative
subsumption of this concept - open up living to difference [differance], and
constitute, in the pure immanence of the experience, the divergence involved in
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indicative communication and even significance in general.. .and signification in
general, for Husserl not only intends to exclude signification from "solitary
mental life", he will consider language in general, the element of logos, in its
expressive form itself, as a secondary event, superadded to a primordial and pre-
expressive stratum of sense. Expressive language itself would be something
supervenient upon the absolute silence of the self-relationship. (69, my
emphases).
My emphases in this quotation point to the development from classical phenomenology
that I am concerned with in the writings of Michel Henry. Henry's essay "Material
Phenomenology and Language, or Pathos and Language" (1999), is a critique of major
tenets of classical phenomenology with regard to cognition. On my view, his theorising
of a 'pure phenomenality' as the event 'before' the phenomenological or philosophical
proposition provides insights akin to the kind of critique of cognition and the type of
theorising Gilles Deleuze also engages in. On a similar logic to that of the Deleuzian
'plane of immanence', he emphasises the idea of the phenomenon's possibility as it
resides in a primary affectation of self and the idea of pathos as the effectuation of the
phenomenon and language. The point for Deleuze - and Henry - is that the dichotomies
of thought, such as the idea of presence based in a prior absence, an inside constituted in
'relation to' an isolated outside, and a self on the premise of an other, are structures
which cannot account for the emergence of the real or the relation of language and
phenomena. According to Deleuze, these cannot sufficiently theorise a sense of
continuity and connection across the diverse areas of cognition, gesture, pathos and
affectivity.
What Derrida argues in Speech and Phenomena is that there can be no real separation of
perception and the sign, silence and voice; contamination means that there is an
interweaving between these (15; 60). When Derrida develops what he terms the 'ultra-
transcendental' concept of life, it refers to a recognition that according to contamination -
the logic that lies below Husserl's ambiguous thematisations of retention - there is what
is "refractory to any category [of philosophy as metaphysics]" (13). This 'life' is
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'inexpressible' because, according to Derrida, language is equivocal and metaphorical,
"analogy through and through" (13). Derrida's ultra-transcendental concept of life is
conceived as a development of Husserl's notions of parallels: it is conceived as
heterogeneous and external to the world, but at the same time implies a sameness, which
is not identity, between transcendental and empirical life. The 'heterogeneity' is what
makes possible the transcendental notion of "explication", that is, the possibility of
language being "deployed freely within truth" (12).
Henry, in a move that is similar to the one made by Deleuze, as a critique of philosophy's
portents to 'truth', reverses the sense of 'a phenomenology of language'. On Henry's
view, "language belongs to the internal conditions of [phenomenology's] process of
elucidation" (Henry, 1999). Henry's proposition regarding a pure phenomenality, as the
question bypassed in classical phenomenology, is that of phenomenality as an internal
condition of both phenomenon and language. Henry's point is similar to Derrida's when
the latter claims, in Speech and Phenomena, that "language guards the difference which
guards language" (14) and that what is heterogeneous to language is always already
"archived" there (15). In order to "point the finger at the invisible" (23) - this is
indication - language must be seen to produce the very difference with the exterior or
truth, which makes language possible. What is suggested is that what is heterogeneous to
language is always already in language. Ultimately, there is no sense in the idea of an
expressive language 'super-added' to a pre-expressive and primordial stratum of sense.
Derrida's concept of signification - in terms of the movement of differance introduced by




I. The Intentional Problematic
The reception of Husserl in the French tradition that I focus on, criticises classical
phenomenology for its adherence to the primacy of intentionality, specifically what Fink,
in his Kantstudien essay terms act-intentionality. For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the
problematic is precisely that of the ultimate referral back of any phenomenon to its
constitution by an intentional agency. His later works, particularly The Visible and the
Invisible (1968) take up the question of this primacy of intentional consciousness as the
basis for classical phenomenological analysis.
"The whole Husserlian analysis is blocked by the framework of acts which imposes upon
it the philosophy of consciousness"1. The Visible and the Invisible is a critique of
classical phenomenology as a 'philosophy of consciousness'. It is a critique of
Husserlian intellectualist phenomenology and its imbrication of the relation of rational
consciousness and world. Ultimately it calls into question the notion of intentionality, and
'intentional analysis' insofar as it shows phenomenology to be dominated by the relation
of rational adequation. However, The Visible and the Invisible as well as the essay "The
Philosopher and His Shadow"2, show that Merleau-Ponty does not renounce
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1968), p. 244. References to this text will be marked VI.
2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and His Shadow" in Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964)
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intentionality as such, but wishes to resuscitate an "unthought thought" of the late
Husserl: a latent ox' fungierende' intentionality of Being rather than consciousness.
Merleau-Ponty's late thought involves a reconsideration of ontology, dissociated from the
appropriative tenets of Husserlian phenomenology, which emphasises the logical analysis
of the directedness of consciousness and the doctrine of essential adequation and
apodictic evidence. Against Husserl's attempt at a sustained separation between, on the
one hand an empirical/psychological analysis of subjectivity and, on the other, a
transcendental one, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is based on the insight that the
transcendental-logical and the empirical-factual are interrelated. Merleau-Ponty's
phenomenology attempts to open up, in a Heideggerian vein, the question of being3.
Merleau-Ponty's critique of what Derrida designates as 'metaphysics of presence' begins
with the reinsertion of embodied subjectivity in being, recognising, as does Heidegger
and Derrida, that the 'metaphysics of presence' leaves Being beyond question. To the
extent that the Husserlian 'now' of pure presence is determined according to the
'visibility' afforded by a transcendental point of view, its 'origin' remains within the
provisions of constitutional logic. Thus the phenomenological beginning, in its search for
the origins of meaning in constitutive subjectivity, prompts a reorientation in the thought
of Merleau-Ponty, as well as Derrida, with respect to the meaning of being. In response to
the impasse of the separation of empirical contingency according to the reductions by
transcendental logic, Merleau-Ponty proposes a reopening of the question of being in
terms of a 'perceptual logic'; the reorientation is a departure from Husserlian
phenomenology to the extent that it removes the theme of the 'now' from its relation to
the standpoint of transcendental subjectivity4. Merleau-Ponty's attempt to open up (an)
3 However, Merleau-Ponty's opening up of the question of being is based on what he terms a 'perceptual
logic', which takes the analysis beyond Heideggerian being- in-the-world. The specific imbrication of
subjectivity and Being/being in Merleau-Ponty, will be further clarified.
4 In the previous chapter I pointed out the ways in which Derrida finds in Husserl's Phenomenology of
Internal Time-Consciousness the recognition in paragraph 16 that the 'now' is never fully present. See
chapter one of this thesis, p. 24 and 25. See also Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology ofInternal Time-
Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill (London: Indiana University Press, 1964) section 16 and 17. Derrida
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ontology within the phenomenological parameters of a latent or operative intentionality,
shifts the focus to embodiment, as a 'dimensionality' in being which resists constitutional
analysis according to a transcendental viewpoint:
[It is thus] not compatible with 'phenomenology,' that is, with an ontology that
obliges whatever is not nothing to present itself to the consciousness across
Abschattungen and as deriving from an originating donation which is an act, i.e
one Erlebnis among others (VI 244).
The passage above is taken from the Working Notes following the main text of the
unfinished Visible and Invisible, under the heading "Indestructible past, and intentional
analytic - and ontology", from April 1960. Merleau-Ponty presents here the idea of a
'past that has never been present'. He criticises the presumption of simultaneity in the
Husserlian conception of intentional analysis, the supposed transparence of the 'now' as a
source of a time given according to a logic of serialisation:
the idea of time as a 'series of Erlebnisse'. There is [in Husserl] an architectonic
past. [...] What is the intentional analysis worth in regard to it? It gives us: every
past sinngemass has been present, i.e its past being has been founded in
presence—And certainly, that is so true [of?] it that it is stillpresent (243).
It is here that Merleau-Ponty points to that which, he argues, eludes the 'intentional
analytic'. He thereby critisises the Husserlian idea of 'simultaneity', "which is meta-
intentional (cf. Fink article on the Nachlass)" (243):
The intentional analytic assumes a place of absolute contemplation from which
the intentional explicitation is made, and which could embrace present, past, and
even openness toward the future - [Against the Husserlian Ablaufsphanomen
which contains 'simultaneity', what eludes the intentional analytic] ... is the order
points out that Husserl in section 16 admits to a "non-presence and non-evidence into the blink of the
instant" (SP 65).
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of the "consciousness" of significations, and in this order there is no past-present
"simultaneity," there is the evidence of their divergence (243, my emphasis).
Merleau-Ponty suggests here that there is a relatively anonymous operative intentionality
of Being, which in Husserl remains inadequately accounted for as it precisely eludes
phenomenological thematism; it eludes reduction to the "'perspectives' of the
'consciousness'"(243). The passage above puts the term consciousness in inverted
commas; the order of awareness of 'significations' is something other than the Husserlian
cognitive consciousness understood as a (cor-) relation of determination or denomination.
The various forms of operative intentionality are in Husserl5 understood in terms of a
constitution of sense with respect to the world subjected to phenomenological reflection.
Operative intentionalities are not conceived as acts of cognition, but are nevertheless
conceived in terms of a submission to the reflection of rational consciousness as the
ultimate ordering sense-bestowing principle of the Husserlian 'lifeworld'. What Merleau-
Ponty attempts to work out of Husserl's intentionality of the reduction is a perceptual
logos or teleology of Being, rather than consciousness. However, Merleau-Ponty retains
the notion of operative intentionality; the performative constitution survives his critique
of Husserl's idealism. Dispensing with the act of noesis, sense-giving is now performed
by the body, or the intertwining of a world-body, conceived in terms of the body's
movement and a more general dynamic of Being.
The value of the 'noema' for Derrida, as the irreal correlate of consciousness, is 'lost' in
Merleau-Ponty's ontology. The correlation or reciprocity, which in Merleau-Ponty is
primarily understood in ontological terms, rather than by methodological 'transfer' or
projection, is refigured in terms of a prior 'unity' of Being and being. The point for
Merleau-Ponty is to secure a transcendence of Being as world, in a relation of priority
with respect to transcendental consciousness. There is, for Merleau-Ponty a lived world
always already there, a unity of B/being before its positing by knowledge through an act
5 See the works after Ideas 1, especially Ideas 11, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1989) and The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to
Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) for an
elaboration of Husserl's notion of the lifeworld.
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of conscious 'identification'. However, in order to secure this transcendence, and a
certain opacity of the world with respect to idealist and rational logic and the reduction of
subjectivity to the transparence of consciousness, the displacement to the body is further
grounded in a rather problematic 'dimensionality' of body-world unity. Merleau-Ponty
refers to this as "indirect ontology": "My 'indirect' method (being in the beings) is alone
conformed with being - 'negative philosophy' like negative theology'"6.
The parallel with Derrida's project here is evident in the concern with conjectures that
mark the aporias of classical assumptions of cognitive transparence, such as Husserl's
self-identical structure of correlation between cognising and cognised. Merleau-Ponty's
'indirect ontology' raises the question of ontological dualisms; the oppositional concepts
regarding cognition and perception according to classical phenomenology are rewritten
through conjectures "for which classical philosophy has no name" (VI 141). Merleau-
Ponty works with a figurative language to indicate a dimensionality bypassed in
phenomenological concepts. When Merleau-Ponty argues against his statements in earlier
works (where he still works with the "consciousness-object distinction as starting point
for analysis")7, that "the tacit cogito is impossible" (WN 171), this highlights two main
points of his late thought. The first is that his late philosophy recognises a connection
between thought and language, which accounts for the linguistic constitution of the 'tacit
cogito'. The second insight is that there is, on the other hand, "a world of silence, the
perceived world... an order where there are non-language significations, but they are
accordingly positive. There is for example no absolute flux of Erlebnisse, there are fields
and a field of fields, with a style and a typicality" (171). Merleau-Ponty designates flesh
as "this interiorly worked over mass, [which] has no name in any philosophy" and further
'aesthetisises' ontology noting: "We must not think the flesh as starting from substances,
6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Working Notes, following the Visible and Invisible, p. 179. Hereafter WN.
7
Merleau-Ponty states in the Visible and the Invisible: "The problems in Ph.P are insoluble because I start
there from the consciousness-object distinction" (VI 253). In the Visible and the Invisible the subject is no
longer conceived as an embodied consciousness, and the body is not the mediator for a being-in-the-world.
Instead, the late work conceives "the sensible world as this perceptual logic, this system of equivalences...
And this logic is neither produced by our psychophysical constitution, nor produced by our categorical
equipment, but lifted from a world whose inner framework our categories, our constitution, our
'subjectivity' render explicit" (247-8).
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from body and spirit - for then it would be the union of contradictories - but we must
think it... as an element, as the concrete emblem of a general manner of being" (147, my
emphasis).
What is clear in these statements is a concern with the very processes of the emergence of
meaning rooted in a notion of embodiment. However, what is also clear is that Merleau-
Ponty's displacement of intentionality dispenses with the dimension of signification
afforded by the concept of the 'noema' for a neutralisation of the difference between the
lived body and the world. Meaningfulness or Being is considered in Merleau-Ponty in
terms of an ontological continuity, which is nevertheless an eca/78 or distance, what is
characterised as the specific logic of perceptual being: "But this divergence is not a void,
it is filled precisely by the flesh as the place of emergence of a vision, a passivity that
bears an activity-" (WN 272). What is highlighted by Merleau-Ponty's ontology is a
dynamism referring to an affective dimension of Being, which is not reducible to the
grasp of the eidos of Husserlian phenomenology, and furthermore dispenses with the
possibility of an ontological void, the notion of a self-presence based in absence.
Merleau-Ponty refutes the purity of self-present consciousness. The valuable element of
Merleau-Ponty's reworking of Husserl's operative intentionality is the opening to what
he terms the invisible in the visible, or the in-visible: the very disruption of Cartesian-
and Husserlian schematism of a transparence of position towards origin. "The invisible"
refers to such disruption to the extent that, according to Merleau-Ponty, it is "what,
relative to the visible, could nevertheless not be seen as a thing ([but] the existentials of
the visible, its dimensions, its non-figurative inner framework)" (257).
Merleau-Ponty teams the notion of Being as body-world with the notion of 'silent
speech': he proposes that symbolic expression - or thought - as well as creative
expression, "continues an effort of articulation which is the Being of every being" (168).
The title of the essay "Indirect Speech and the Voices of Silence" (1964) shows the
concern with a dimension of Being 'anterior to' consciousness. The idea of silent and
8 Ecart translates as separation and distance.
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indirect speech refers to a notion of Being as teleology and transcendence. That is, there
is for Merleau-Ponty in B/being an intentional instance, a material source of
transcendence and directedness. This directedness or source of transcendence is other
than consciousness: "It is Being that speaks within us and not we who speak of Being"
(VI 214). Merleau-Ponty ultimately refers consciousness and subjectivity to the
dimension of Being, as a 'source': an energy or force, which informs consciousness
'from below'. In the language of the discourse of psychoanalysis, there is 'unconscious
before conscious manifestation'. Merleau-Ponty's 'in-visible' refers to a Being or
teleology, which imposes manifestation, becoming-conscious, coming to presence and
articulation9. Teleology here refers to a certain directedness of the materiality of our
being, a corpo-real, as always already informing any manifestation, whether of subject or
object. This corpo-real is that which, according to Derrida, can never be presented, but
nevertheless marks any presence as the conditions of presence. Such condition(ing) is
better described as affectivity. Affectivity refers to the meaning of the materiality of
human being or subjectivity. In a move which recalls Heidegger, man or subjectivity
becomes in Merleau-Ponty's ontology the realisation of Being. The "order of the
'consciousness' of significations", in which "there is no past-present 'simultaneity', there
is the evidence of their divergence—" (243), is the reference in Merleau-Ponty to a
"reciprocal intentional reference, which marks the limit of the intentional analytic" (244),
as
the point where it becomes a philosophy of transcendence. [However] we
encounter this ineinander each time the intentional reference is no longer that
9
Merleau-Ponty's critique of intellectualism attempts through this attribution of teleology to Being to put
in question the notion of intentional constitution as pertaining to consciousness. Michel Henry interprets
Merleau-Ponty as enabling a re-elevation of Being in its excess to reason and consciousness, and interprets
his thought on the body - "the body unites us directly with things through its own ontogenesis" - as doing
so by a notion of unconscious constitution. Henry also attributes this notion to Schelling and speaks of
immanence as the Night, an invisible by which the visible is constituted. For Henry, who would take
account of the non-conscious, but doesn't speak of the unconscious with regard to his own
'phenomenology of the invisible' or 'revelation', would use the word 'conditioned' rather than
'constituted'. See Michel Henry, The Essence ofManifestation, trans. Girard Etzkorn (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) pp. 395-96.
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from a Sinngebung to a Sinngebung that motivates it but from a "noema" to a
"noema" (244).
For Merleau-Ponty, as well as for Derrida, the significance of the noema is the power of
signification according to its non-belonging to the 'contents' of consciousness: what
Derrida describes as the "anarchy of the noema"10. The noema represents a force of
signification which eludes - because always in excess of - determination and motivation
by the perspectives of consciousness. In Derrida the noema is the anarchic instance, a
signification, which refutes the primacy of act-intentionality and thus the phenomenology
of primordial 'presence'. For Merleau-Ponty the noema is the element or 'elemental' -
and no longer an irreal instance - and refutes the primacy of act-intentionality while,
however, referring to the primacy of Being as "flesh":
Here it is indeed the past that adheres to the present and not the consciousness of
the past that adheres to the consciousness of the present: the "vertical" past
contains in itself the exigency to have been perceived, far from the consciousness
of having perceived bearing that of the past. The past is no longer here a
"modification" or modalisation of the Bewiisstsein von.. .Conversely it is the
Bewiisstsein von, the having perceived that is born of massive Being. I have
perceived it since it was.... It is necessary to take up again and develop the
fungierende or latent intentionality which is the intentionality within being... It is
necessary to take as primary, not the consciousness and its Ablaufsphanomen with
its distinct intentional threads, but the vortex which this Ablaufsphanomen
schematizes, the spatialising-temporalising vortex (which is flesh and not
consciousness facing a noema) (244).
Merleau-Ponty's latent or operative intentionality refers to a 'reversibility' in, or of,
B/being. Beyond any simple direction of consciousness towards world or noema there is,
10
Jacques Derrida, "'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology" in Writing and Difference (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1978) p. 163
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as he argues in the Visible and Invisible, an "intentional reference which is not only from
the past ["subordinated"] to the factual, empirical present, but also and inversely from the
factual present to a dimensional present or Welt or Being, where the past is
"simultaneous" with the present in the narrow sense" (244). The word 'simultaneous' is
put in brackets. Like Derrida Merleau-Ponty is concerned to expose the 'illusion' of a
pure presence in terms of a 'consciousness facing a noema':
Husserl's error is to have described the interlocking [of pasts, through the
retention] starting from a Prasensfeld considered as without thickness, as
immanent consciousness. [What is lost here is] the time of the body, taximeter
time of the corporeal schema (173).
(a) Considerations of Materiality and Human Embodiment
When Merleau-Ponty claims that "I am my body", and that as embodied subjectivity I am
"a field of Being" (240), what he means is that human being is in itself openness toward
Being11. Contrary to the late Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty sees man - the human being - as
the ultimate reference point, but 'man' is here a refractory category of the specific
imbrication of Being/being that he terms flesh. That is to say that there would be no time
or space independent of me, as my body, but this body is reducible to the flesh of the
world-body. Time and space are not given meaning "conceived as a series of events in
themselves" (205), as a serialisation grasped by immanent consciousness. Merleau-Ponty
critisises Husserl's identification of a fundamental serial constitution with time-
consciousness12.
11 Merleau-Ponty states in The Visible and the Invisible that the unconscious is to be understood as
"articulations of our field", the unconscious is unconscious "by the fact that it is not an object, but it is that
through which objects are possible... It is the Urgemeinschaftung of our intentional life, the [bitemporal]
Ineinander of the others in us and us in them [...]" (180).
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Against Husserl's focus on the transcendental ego's powers of constitution, and the
seriality of time-consciousness as the condition of subjectivity's experience, Merleau-
Ponty argues that bodily subjectivity is Being insofar as it is considered an event of time,
a momentary or transitory articulation of a transcendence. Merleau-Ponty's equation of
the bodily subject with "the very conception of perceptual being and Offenheit" (186),
posits a transcendence of Being, which is to say that "there is" something that escapes the
kind of linearity from which Husserlian noesis is abstracted. According to the Visible and
the Invisible it is a "non-knowing of the beginning which is not nothing, and which is not
reflective truth either, and which also must be accounted for" (VI 49). The focus of
Merleau-Ponty's late thought regarding phenomenality and ontology is the question of
what conditions knowledge. For Merleau-Ponty, the reduction involves something other
than the turn by idealism to pure consciousness13. The conjectures of the phenomenal
world, according to Merleau-Ponty's ontological move, make of the ontological dualism
evident in the terms subjective and objective, secondary differentiations. According to
this view perception, like comprehension, is not a matter of " [constitution] in intellectual
immanence... but [apprehension] by coexistence" (188, my emphasis). In fact,
perception as a 'there is', or an Opening of Being, is not to be understood as a function of
an act of consciousness, but in terms of a chiasm or 'intertwining': flesh. The notion of
intertwining attempts to name that which Husserl fails to adequately theorise by the
notion of horizon' which, if we "take the word strictly" (148), is irreducible to a plane of
pure visibility or generality. Merleau-Ponty's development of horizon as intertwining
refers to an excess of sensible being. The notion gestures toward a disruption of the
intentional prejudice of the visible for consciousness by the world as flesh, and of the
abstraction of vision by a materiality of my bodily being. This 'chiasm' makes up the
ontological foundation for the emergence of visibility, as conditioned by embodiment. A
sensible is thus always in excess of the grasp of consciousness. Flesh, as the "element" of
being, is thought of in terms of a non-figurative 'intertwining', not as a pure givenness to
12 See especially Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R
Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1931), § 81 and Phenomenology ofInternal Time-Consciousness.
13 This is stated already in the Phenomenology ofPerception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1962)
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consciousness. According to Merleau-Ponty, "the body and the distances participate in
the same corporeality and visibility in general, which reigns between them and it, and
even beyond the horizon..." (149). A latency of Being, which Merleau-Ponty terms the
flesh, is the in-visible: a condition o/visibility and manifestation.
Husserl's intentionality of logical internal time-consciousness is countered by Merleau-
Ponty's notion of an operative intentionality of Being, which passes through the
materiality of bodily being. The significance afforded by the passage through materiality
is, in Merleau-Ponty, not reducible to a conception of the body as a connecting link
between transparent consciousness - conceived as an absolute - and the world.
In Ideas 1, Husserl emphasises the connection between the hyletic stratum - that is,
impressional matter - and the body14. However, according to § 53 of Ideas I, the
connection to the body is bracketed by the location of the 'hyle' as a real component of
transparent consciousness rather than located according to a bodily intentional reference.
Husserl's writings after Ideas 1 represent some advance towards a more adequate
phenomenology of the body. Merleau-Ponty picks up the problematic with his
development of the Husserlian concept of operative intentionality.
The opening up of the question of ontology in the Visible and the Invisible refers to the
postulation of an intentional reference left unaccounted for by Husserl's retentional
intentionality. Merleau-Ponty's critique of the 'metaphysics of presence' argues that the
directedness and two-dimensionality of the intentional prejudice leaves out an originary
dimension of bodily being; the opening up of the question of being in Merleau-Ponty is a
reorientation in thought with regard to its beginnings. In the Visible and Invisible, the
concept of body attains further dimensionality as bound up with the 'verticality' termed
flesh. The body as flesh is determined by reversibility or ecart, that is, the 'spatialising-
temporalising vortex' of Being. The problem with Husserl's abstraction into serialised
temporality is, according to Merleau-Ponty, that it cannot take account of the effects of
"the 'contents' on time, which passes 'more quickly' or 'less quickly', of Zeitmaterie on
14 See Edmund Husserl, Ideas 1, § 53.
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Zeitform" (184). Merleau-Ponty poses here the question of a temporality necessarily
elusive with regard to reflective consciousness, "time as chiasm" (266), constitutive of
itself, "always seen from the point of view of someone who is ofit" (184). Merleau-Ponty
suggests a disruption of linear, serial temporality that attests to a dimensionality prior to
noesis: thus a disruption of the notion of a purely self-present consciousness. The "time
of the body" raises the question of the 'unconscious' or a materiality which informs
consciousness as sensible Being. The differentiation of sensing-sensible is a derivation
from an original undivided Being, the ' flesh of the world'. While Merleau-Ponty's notion
of flesh is problematic on account of the figurative generality it proposes with regard to
subjectivity and B/being15, it does note a dimensionality of sensible Being which is lost
in the analyses of classical phenomenology. While Being is considered 'undivided', it
comprises an unlimited source of transcendence. Merleau-Ponty formulates this source of
transcendence as the anteriority of a past that is not only retained by a subjectivity but,
reversibly, effects that subjectivity, as "pre-noesis". Husserl's schematism of the
transparency of 'pure' consciousness versus retention and act is broken up to a greater
degree than in Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'sedimentation' - as the past, the
'unconscious', and language.
Merleau-Ponty's conception of intentionality is bound up with this emphasis on the
priority - in both senses - of the perceptual world and the temporality of the body.
According to these terms the conception is a departure from Husserl's brief
considerations of 'operative intentionality'. Although Fink, in his note to Husserl's late
15 Against Heidegger's emphasis on Being over beings, Merleau-Ponty's notion of the in-visible is a sort of
mixture of Husserlian experience according to the former's development of the notion of operative
intentionality and the Bergsonian notion of elan vital. Life, for Merleau-Ponty, refers to the notion of
Being/being in a problematic imbrication. Knowing and known are considered absolutely linked. However,
the importance of his development of the Heideggerian problematic of B/being and the question of being is
his emphasis on a corpo-real. To this extent the imbrication of knowing and known can be understood in
terms of a meaning pertaining to the materiality of human being, a meaningful relation of body to sensible
being as such. In The Visible and the Invisible he describes the "Being of this being" as precisely this: "the
invisible o/this world, that which inhabits it, and renders it visible, its own and interior possibility" (151).
Regarding the relation to Husserlian phenomenology Merleau-Ponty, in opposition to Husserl, considers
the 'contamination' of the pre-philosophical and philosophical 'attitudes' as what the phenomenological
reduction bears witness to positively speaking. As Levinas, as well as Heidegger, point out, the so-called
transcendental position (of philosophy) cannot be based on the notion of a prior theoretical position as the
originary starting point.
83
Crisis of European Sciences, suggests that the various forms of intentionality - that is,
beyond psychological intentionality and the noetic-noematic correlation - are in fact what
breaks the appearance of immediate self-presence of consciousness to itself16, Husserl's
phenomenology nevertheless does not really investigate the dimension of opacity which
marks factual embodied subjectivity. Despite Husserl's late investigations into 'passive
synthesis', any broaching of pre-reflective or pre-noetic experience would have to abort
in face of the capacity of transcendental reflection to fixate experience. The anteriority of
this experience would be subsumed under the abstraction of a rational time-space
schema. Merleau-Ponty argues that the reflective act refers to identification in terms of
disengagement:
[...] from the things, perception, world and the perception of the world, by
submitting them to a systematic variation, the intelligible nuclei that resist, and to
proceed from one intelligible nucleus to the next in a way that is not belied by
experience but gives us only its universal contours (VI 46, my emphasis).
The Husserlian effort to fix experience according to "essential invariants" (46) must,
according to Merleau-Ponty, miss a transcendence of Being not reducible to what is
determined as the truth of eidetic reflection. The insight that informs Merleau-Ponty's
critique on this point is that of the impossibility of the full present, as something in itself.
For Merleau-Ponty the temporal 'now' is an abstraction from real time or the time of the
body, which does not have any fullness of meaning in any sense other than its inscription
within relations of relative difference. Merleau-Ponty uses the term chiasm for the
"figurative simultaneity" of "the presence and latency behind each of all the others [the
'nows']" (113): the meaning of the latency of operative intentionality is that of
sedimentation of 'temporal contents'; the in-visible of pre-reflective experience. This
'content of form' refers to that element of Being which Husserlian phenomenology
cannot theorise; it is the 'unconscious before conscious manifestation', in which there is
not yet the fixation by the gaze of "a serial space and time nor the pure idea of series, but
16 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Find again
details. See also Eugen Fink's 1933 essay on Husserl, as discussed in the previous chapter.
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... a time and a space that exist by piling up, by proliferation, by encroachment..." (115).
Merleau-Ponty wishes to point out, if not to pinpoint, a dimensionality of experience
irreducible to Husserlian logic.
Merleau-Ponty's critique of the Husserlian sense of horizon is close to the terms of
Levinas's critique in Totality and Infinity (1969). Levinas's critique, like Merleau-
Ponty's, concerns the extent to which the Husserlian notion of intentionality remains
bound up with reflexivity according to the directedness of consciousness (VI 148-49). On
Levinas's estimation also, the Husserlian analysis of intentionality does not adequately
account for the emergence of Being in being:
The notion held under the direct gaze of the thought that defines it nevertheless
reveals itself implanted, unbeknownst to this naive thought, in horizons
unsuspected by this thought. These horizons endow it with meaning - such is the
essential teaching of Husserl. What does it matter if in Husserlian phenomenology
taken to the letter these unsuspected horizons are in their turn interpreted as
thoughts intending objects ...17
The objective for Levinas as well as for Merleau-Ponty lies with a necessary excess with
respect to the intentional delimitation by consciousness. Unlike Husserl's reduction of the
emergence of meaning to the workings of "inner consciousness" or the representational
intentionality of a transcendental ego Levinas, as well as Merleau-Ponty, emphasise a
dimension irreducible even to the division between reflexive and pre-reflexive: an
undifferentiable emergence irreducible to consciousness. Merleau-Ponty states:
"Reflexivity must be understood by the body, by the relation to self of the body...The I,
really, is nobody, is the anonymous; it must be so, prior to all objectification, in order to
be the Operator, or the one to whom all this occurs...the named I, the I named {Le Je
denomme, le denomme Je), is an object. The primary I, of which this one is the
objectification, is the unknown to whom everything appeals, before whom...there is
17 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Duquesne University Press, 1969) p.
28.
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something. It is therefore negativity" (WN 246). Both refer to a depth of Being, an in¬
visible irreducible to the main tenets of phenomenology's act-intentionality and the
manifestation of the object in eidetic reflection. The turn by classical phenomenology to
'the things themselves' as a turn to the positivity of evidence, necessarily misses the
origin of signification, which is inseparable from the sensible, affective dimension of
embodied subjectivity. Although Levinas, like Merleau-Ponty, thus theorises a sort of
phenomenology of the in-visible, Levinas does not consider the invisible or the non-
apparent18 in terms of the radical continuity expressed in Merleau-Ponty's 'flesh of the
world'. For Levinas, the origin of signification is thought in terms of the responsiveness
and responsibility to an absolutely Other (.Autrui). The basis for any origin of
signification is therefore a 'non-figural' absolute Difference.
In anticipation of the next section, which treats the relation between Merleau-Ponty and
Derrida with regard to the notion of ecart, I want to comment on Derrida's thought on the
origin of signification in his Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction19. In
the Introduction, Derrida takes up the question of sense or sens (meaning), over and
against that of essence in philosophy. Language and the question of difference come to
the forefront for Derrida with respect to thinking genesis. Following Fink's assertion of
genesis as the problem or motivation of phenomenology, Derrida's discussion of
phenomenology and genesis with regard to Husserl's Crisis and Origin of Geometry is
concerned to demonstrate "the primordial Difference of the absolute Origin" (IOG 153,
my emphasis). Derrida starts with separation, or "impure" difference, what is designated
by Differance. In "Violence and Metaphysics" he makes the point that "[p]ure difference
is not absolutely different (from nondifference). Hegel's critique of the concept of pure
difference is for us here, doubtless, the most uncircumventable theme. Hegel thought
absolute difference, and showed that it can be pure only by being impure"20. As I showed
18 It is precisely this dimension of phenomenality, which is the concern of Michel Henry's work on self-
manifestation.
19
Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin ofGeometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavey (New
York: Nicolas Hays, Ltd. 1978). Hereafter referred to as IOG.
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in chapter one, with respect to Speech and Phenomena especially, the notion of
contamination is at the root of Derrida's thought of difference/differance. The originary
differance refers to what Derrida in paragraph 7 calls a "subjectless transcendental field"
(IOG 88), the originary separation which he understands as life's self-distributions, what
he comes to call l'ecriture in his later works, and which is productive of subjectivity and
self-awareness. The point he makes is that genesis must be understood in terms of an
originary contamination. Derrida stresses the manner in which the self-presence of
intuitive consciousness is always already informed, so to speak, by a separation and
'dialectic' irreducible to contradiction.
While the Introduction recognises that for Husserl the origin of geometry or the " unique
historicity of the ideal object" (IOG 44) includes receptivity with regard to intuition21, it is
nevertheless production in the sense of constitution22 according to the abstraction of the
pure 'now'. A geometrical objectivity constituted as ideality comes to existence through
an "experience" and signifies as such in this experience or reduction.
Derrida states towards the end of the Introduction that "the absolute is passage" (149),
and refers to the separation in which other remains other, not absorbed into the same or
the unity of self-presence by synthesis. Derrida's argument in the Introduction is that
thought calls for a re-conception of the transcendental as "a certain outside" which
disrupts and engages the intuition of self-presence. As I discussed in chapter one, Derrida
points to this necessity of a certain outside in Husserl's own writing on temporality,
alterity and inter-subjectivity. Derrida expresses Levinas's influence on this point, later in
"Violence and Metaphysics": the latter's recognition of a 'second Husserl' other than the
Husserl of 'presence'.
When Derrida comments on Husserl's orientation in The Origin of Geometry as
Ruckfrage- translated as 'return inquiry' - he points out that "[R]iickfrage... is asked on
20 Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphyics", in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London:
Routledge, 1978) p. 320, n91.
21 See chapter one and recall Husserl on passive synthesis.
22 See the Introduction, p. 40. Derrida uses the word production translating Husserl's Leistung.
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the basis of a first posting. From a received and already readable document, the
possibility is offered me of asking again, and in return, about the originary and final
intention of what has been given to me by tradition" (50). This means that there is an
originary contamination by history or a sms/ible23 that always already informs reduction
and methodological origin. "There must always already have been a fact of a history of
geometry, so that the reduction can be performed. I must already have a naive knowledge
of geometry and must not begin at its origin. Here the method's juridical certainty
overrides the factual necessity of history" (38). Derrida wishes here to assert a necessary
delay with respect to the question of genesis and ideal objectivity, and relates it to what
he calls a tendrillic movement (33); that is, the notion of contamination is understood
according to 'dialectic' without synthesis. There is a given and a receptivity that cannot
be understood in terms of Husserlian phenomenology's "given [that is, intuited] as an
object", "before us and for us" (83).
Contamination has always already happened according to such a dialectic.
According to Derrida, Husserl's notion of objective ideality and his privileging of the
mathematical object are problematical because of the manner in which they are bound up
with a notion of a pure or transcendental language, that is, the reduction of language to a
logic. Derrida asserts that for Husserl "the model of language is the objective language of
science" (82). This is language according to the notion that across culture and tradition,
'translation in principle is an always possible task' because "language, tradition and
history exist only insofar as objects break the surface"(82). Derrida's assertion is that it is
impossible to speak of the object without passing through culture, as history and
temporality24. The factuality of the latter always already informs the ideality of the
23
By se/ts/ible I wish to convey, in addition to the double meaning of sens as "sense" and "direction", a
sensible referring to an affective dimension or positioning with regard to sense.
24 In chapter 7 of Speech and Phenomena, Derrida comments on the 'impotence' of the 'language of
consciousness' or univocal language. As much as consciousness cannot be maintained as the purity of the
living present, language cannot be maintained in univocity. Language must be equivocal (IOG 102).
However, in order to make sense for consciousness language must nevertheless be univocal. Thus it is the
notion of necessary impossibility with respect to language. As a phenomenological absolute, the living
present cannot be exited (136). Nevertheless, the notion of impotence implies that consciousness is the very
movement that strives to move beyond its limits. The impotence with respect to the maintenance of the
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object. The privilege by Husserl of the mathematical object as the ideality of a Vor-
stellung - that which is what it appears to be for intuitive consciousness - informs
Derrida's critical approach to 'presence' and the sense of being as presence or
phenomenon for a 'pure consciousness' in Speech and Phenomena25. Within the
determination of being as presence, ideality as the possibility of repetition refers to
signification or 'the problem of the sign' in Derrida's reading of Husserl. The problem in
Husserl regarding signification is, according to Derrida, his lack of investigation into the
meaning of the sign in general, that is, the constitutive priority of language in the
generation of objects, cultural or natural, and meaning to consciousness
The mathematical object is always available to a pure regard, the constitutive Blick of the
Husserlian Augenblick. Despite the constellation of Augen and Blick here, that is, the
physical eye and the gaze, the time of the body eludes the delimitation in the
'Augenblick', the purity of the 'now'. What Derrida takes up in the Introduction and
develops further in Speech and Phenomena, is the "incompleteness" of the Husserlian
living present. Derrida's insight is that paradoxically, despite and because of the
reductions, the originary escapes the reductive analysis and the Ruckfrage. What Derrida
refers to in this respect is a se/75/ible as the excess in lived embodied subjectivity that
makes it impossible to determine which is the origin, the factual or the essential. The
"tendrillic" movement refers to a dialectic that escapes totalisation. That is, because the
origin has always already disappeared from view (or the Vor-stellung), any structure of
genesis is incomplete according to a living present. According to Derrida's reading of
Husserl, a "preobjective and pre-exact temporality" and a "polemical unity of appearing
and disappearing [informs the living present according to a]... discursive and dialectical
intersubjectivity of Time with itself" (152). That is, alterity always already informs the
present and the presence of the Husserlian origin. For Derrida, difference is
transcendental. The Husserlian living present necessitates delay. According to Derrida, it
living present, the 'impossibility' of consciousness remaining enclosed within itself, is also the necessity of
movement. In a 'dialectic' without synthesis consciousness, in phenomenology, is the movement within the
finite towards the infinite (138). This notion of an in-stable totality, the openness or excess of the sensible
implied in Derrida's difference, takes the critique to a notion of immanent genesis or genesis and
temporality outside the constellations of eidetic consciousness.
25 See SP, p. 53 in particular. Refer back to chapter one of this work also.
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does so because the living present's 'auto-temporalisation' is related to intersubjectivity
(152). That is, to perceive this present as presence, I must have already anticipated its
remaining beyond my own present, and therefore as 'there' for others. Derrida speaks of
the discursive and dialectical intersubjectivity of Time with itself "in the infinite
multiplicity and infinite implication of its absolute origins" and makes the claim that
[it] justifies every other intersubjectivity in general and makes the polemical unity
of appearing and disappearing irreducible. Here delay is the philosophical
absolute, because the beginning of methodic reflection [can be only the]
implication of another absolute origin, prior to it and possible in general (152,
citation modified).
In the dialectical movement of time, alterity is always there as possibility. In Speech and
Phenomena, Derrida speaks of an alterity or a duration in the Husserlian 'now' "which
closes the eye" and " [t]his alterity is even the condition of presence, of presentation and
therefore of Vorstellung in general" (SP 65). The recognition of alterity or heterogeneity
is the recognition of another past present or another origin always already there in
retention, and so has an anterior effect on consciousness. Since this movement of time
refers to the movement of intersubjectivity, the origin - as absolutely other - involves
absence or 'dis-appearance'. In other words, the living present comes out of a "non-
identity" with itself "and from the possibility of a retentional trace" so that " [t]he self of
the living present is primordially a trace" (IOG 85).
Derrida's notion of 'necessary impossibility' asserts that whereas the self-presence of
consciousness in the living present is necessary for meaning as appearance to
consciousness, this consciousness cannot be maintained in terms of a purity or unity of
the present-now. Phenomenology makes appear, but according to the Introduction, "its
logos can never appear as such, can never be given in a philosophy of seeing, but can
only be heard or understood through the visible" (141). This is so because of the "alterity
of the absolute origin" which "structurally appears in my living present" (152). This
conception of the trace is presented in the Introduction as what "announces itself", or
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what "heralds". That is, it is not presentable. According to Derrida, "rest in the simple
maintenance of one Living present" (153) is impossible. The "impossibility" is the
impossibility of the maintenance of the simultaneity of openness to a ser?s/ible and
unification in the purity of the Husserlian Augenblick. Derrida describes it as the "pure
and interminable disquietude of thought working to 'reduce' Difference by exceeding
factual infinity toward the infinity of its sense and of its value, that is, while maintaining
Difference" (153). This 'impossibility' is thus at the origin of appearance. What
conditions appearance is what is factually non-apparent: what is transcendental or "said
under the concept of 'transcendental'" would be Difference (153).
(b) Ecart, Expression and Embodiment
With the notion of a latent intentionality, and the continuity implied in the temporal
reversibility of the vortex, Merleau-Pony departs from Derrida, for whom the divergence
of the ecart - "from a noema to a noema" - does not account for the absolute divergence
of 'the outside', that is, temporality. However, Merleau-Ponty's notion of receptivity with
regard to the constitution of consciousness does recognise the separation of an outside of
consciousness. In a Working Note from May 1959, he makes this clear:
What is the receptive element of absolute consciousness? Husserl is right to say
that it is not I who constitute time... But the term "receptivity" is improper
precisely because it evokes a Self distinct from the present and who receives it -
It must be understood simply by opposition to spontaneous acts...(WN 190).
The statement of Derrida's that there is no "outside text" refers to the insight that there is
no translation of a referential reality into language understood as the transparence of the
intentional correlation, or the present-now. Language, on Derrida's account, transcends
the structure of time consciousness. It is in excess of the possibilities of consciousness
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and the rational time-space schema. The sensAble names a signification in general, that is,
the inscriptions of a sensible as well as a "writing" (1'ecriture) that exceeds intentional
subjectivity. However, when Merleau-Ponty criticises Husserl's fixation of experience
according to "essential invariants" (46) he points to a 'phenomenon' of sense - sens - not
given as present before me according to my intentional present but rather the otherness of
what informs or affects me through the temporality of my embodiment. A se/?s/ible is
traced or read by me in my living corporeality. Merleau-Ponty's emphasis with respect to
sense - sens - is the corpo-real, an experience of alterity in terms of corpo-real affection.
Merleau-Ponty's notion of reversibility is important to the extent that it emphasises this
affectivity in terms of corporeality, and a se/7s/ible or force of signification anterior to the
reflections of apodictic intuition. In "The Philosopher and His Shadow" he says:
There are certainly more things in the world and in us than what is perceptible in
the narrow sense of the term. Sensible being is not only things but also everything
sketched out there, even virtually, everything which leaves its trace there,
everything that figures there, even as a divergence and a certain absence.... A
perceiving body that I see is also a certain absence that is hollowed out and
tactfully dealt with behind that body by its behavior (Signs 171-2).
Merleau-Ponty speaks of the "trace" of the other as a "certain absence", and describes the
virtual "hollows" of sensibility and behavior in a manner close to Derrida's insights of
the force of language and signification, an outside always already informing a self as
embodied being. For Merleau-Ponty language and inter-subjectivity play an important
role in any understanding of the emergence of sense - sens.
When Merleau-Ponty in The Visible speaks of 'the total situation", he refers to a
temporality in which the subject is produced. Merleau-Ponty's notion of a "time of the
body... of the corporeal schema" refers to the anterior effects on consciousness that are in
excess of intentional constitution. Merleau-Ponty understands this anteriority of bodily
effect as other than "a 'modification' or modalisation of the Bewusstsein
von.. .Conversely it is the Bewusstsein von, the having perceived that is borne by the past
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as massive Being" (VI 244). Merleau-Ponty's ' Sinngemass' or massive Being refers to a
'thickness' of Being in the sense of absolute continuity, a 'sensible intelligible'. By
contrast, Derrida argues for a separation of the relation between sensible and intelligible.
In Derrida, the production of subjectivity happens according to the structure of 'the
discursive and dialectical intersubjectivity of time with itself'. Differance, as "primordial
nonself-presence" (SP 87) must be thought according to the structure of supplement.
Derrida's refutation of the pure immediacy of the Husserlian present rests upon the
latter's exclusion of the sign in its full sense as sensAble (89). According to Derrida, the
indication by the trace signifies an otherness with regard to living presence. Subjectivity,
for Derrida, would be an effect of differance. subjectivity is constituted through an
originary division from itself. Speech and Phenomena and the Introduction come together
here over the concern with the unreflective, history, and the manner in which meaning -
as temporality and alterity - produces subjectivity.
When in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty describes the relation between
embodiment and time, he claims that embodiment, or the "corporeal schema" is
temporality, and "is the foundation of space and of time" (VI 191). The inseparability of
embodiment and time in Merleau-Ponty is particular and important in so far as he links
embodiment to a notion of absence and the unpresentable, the notion of a facticity that is
necessarily missed by the noetic act and noetic memory, re-collection. The Visible and
the Invisible speaks of an effaced performance by the body, termed ecart, an "originating
presentation of the unpresentable" (203). An anteriority must be accounted for with
respect to vision and perception, meaning and time. That is, anteriority is a latency of
embodied being, which has real pre-noetic effects, in its absence or exclusion in the acts
of Husserlian philosophy of consciousness. The Husserlian intelligible cannot, according
to Merleau-Ponty, be separated in its isolated expression from the se/7s/ible of embodied
being.
Merleau-Ponty's notion of the 'body schema' demonstrates the inseparability of time and
embodiment, as well as awareness of the effects of its "operative but not thematised
meaning" (WN 191) as always already informing any "Bewusstsein von" or noetic vision.
Language, and specifically 1'ecriture in Derrida, effaces itself in the manner of a body
that carries the effects of traces of time and content on the form of the living present.
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Language carries the Zeitmaterie that Merleau-Ponty describes, the content of the form
that disrupts the purity of any formalisation.
However, by contrast to Derrida, Merleau-Ponty's vortex of the body-schema is flesh,
that is, a Sinngemass or operative intentionality of B/being that leaves us with the radical
continuity of an all-embodied B/being. Although the notion of flesh enables an
understanding of the effects and disruption of the noetic living present by a specific
temporality of the body akin to that of the relation of time and language in Derrida, the
radical continuity implied by the flesh implies an absolute position which perhaps blurs
rather than accounts for a transcendent instance in the B/being of beings. The question I
pose regarding the notion of flesh is whether it can account for a real differentiation of
the sensible and the intelligible. Merleau-Ponty's notion of reversibility, despite the
effects of alterity, temporality and the corpo-real, is bound up with an ecart that only
'approaches' a real "separation" or "openness", as the excess of sense in any impression,
perception and act of 'knowledge'. Merleau-Ponty's analyses conceptualise the positivity
of things as excess of sens according to being understood first and foremost as corpo-real
being. Perceptual sens is inseparable from ecart in the analyses of Merleau-Ponty, and he
speaks about understanding perception in terms of differentiation:
Understand that the "to be conscious"= to have a figure on a ground... the
figure-ground distinction introduces a third term between the "subject" and the
"object". It is that separation {ecart) first of all that is the perceptual meaning"
(WN 197).
In Merleau-Ponty's well-known example of reversibility of 'the touched hand touching'
as a matter of sens, 'reversibility' is something that is "always imminent and never
realized in fact" (VI 147). He continues to say: "my flesh and that of the world therefore
involve clear zones, clearings, about which pivot their opaque zones" (148). In this notion
of "opaque zones", of an absence the trace of which conditions presence, Merleau-Ponty
is very close to Derrida. What is valuable in both their analyses is that the emergence of
subjectivity is conceived as a certain positioning, or as affectivity. Presence to self is
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conditioned by what is other than presence. An otherness in-forms or affects me, my
sight, but is constitutive of my emergence as a Self. Though the notion of flesh is meant
to question ontological oppositions, it is not entirely circular. Merleau-Ponty emphasises
the difference between the figure and ground or horizon as where sens emerges (197).
Moreover, alterity in Merleau-Ponty is not "given" to consciousness in any simple sense;
it is traced as an absence represented by the other's corpo-reality. Our orientation as
corporeal beings is towards a sens inseparable from the corpo-reality of an other.
However, Merleau-Ponty's ecart is perhaps - with respect to Derrida - not an adequate
divergence.
Merleau- Ponty says in "The Philosopher and his Shadow" that "...each one of us [is]
pregnant with the others and confirmed by them in his body", and continues:
This baroque world is not a concession of mind to nature; for although meaning is
everywhere figurative, it is meaning which is at issue everywhere. This renewal of
the world is also mind's renewal, a rediscovery of that brute mind which is
untamed by any culture anew [...]. From then on the irrelative is not nature in
itself, nor the system of absolute consciousness' apprehensions, nor man either,
but that "teleology" Husserl speaks about which is written and thought about in
parentheses - that jointing and framing of Being which is being realized through
man (Signs, 181, my emphasis).
Merleau-Ponty's use of 'teleology' or fungierende (operative) intentionality refers to a
genesis of Being, without the absolute divergence implied in the Derridean notion of
Differance. Merleau-Ponty's resuscitation of intentionality involves a notion of continuity
which for Derrida would precisely strip power from signification as the absolute
divergence of the 'anarchy of the noema'26. For Derrida, it is not Being itself which is the
teleology of consciousness. However, the Derridean critique would agree that
26 Refer to chapter one for the meaning of this expression in Derrida. See also "Genesis and Structure", p.
163. The noema as transcendent instance in being, which remains the same through time, cannot be
identified with any continuous life.
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consciousness receives signification, as an imposition constitutive of transcendental
consciousness. Derrida and Merleau-Ponty both break with the notion of an essence that
rests in consciousness, in representation. In other words, they refute the notion of
constitution of the object according to a supposed fullness of representation, as this
'fullness' gives Being as abstraction or translation of a self-present 'being of thought'.
The criticism is directed by Derrida, as well as by Merleau-Ponty, towards the
delimitation that is set by an approach to experience according to a pure consciousness.
The problem of Husserl's theory of intuition, the assumption that perception is intuition
of essential features of the object and that the meaning of the perceived is conceived as a
presentation of its own essence, is its 'exclusion' of a sensible dimension of signification
and genesis.
Derrida conceives generation of meaning in terms of a disruption into consciousness; this
disruption is the indication of the otherness of signification with respect to consciousness.
Derrida as well as Merleau-Ponty criticises the Cartesian heritage of classical
phenomenology's notion of a positive being of thought separable from a dimension of
materiality. However, Derrida's thought does not comply with the ontological
propositions of Merleau-Ponty's late work.
Merleau-Ponty states that "concepts such as 'subject', consciousness, 'self-
consciousness', 'mind...involve the idea of a res cogitans, of a positive being of
thought—whence there results the immanence in the unreflected of the results of
reflection" (VI 104). Merleau-Ponty's critique of 'the primacy of essence' locates the
problem of Husserl's positive intuition or recognition of eidos as its basis in the
assumption that Being is its resistance to nothingness; and thus characterised by a
negation. That is, whatever is for thought is. In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-
Ponty argues that the coupling of Being-for-thought and being-object prevents an
understanding of perception and sensible Being:
The thing defined [in terms of its identifiable nucleus, but without power of its
own, the thing-object, as the In-itself] is not the thing of our experience, it is the
image we obtain of it by projecting it into a universe where experience would not
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settle on anything, where the spectator would abandon the spectacle—in short, by
confronting it with the possibility of nothingness (215, translation modified).
.. .in order to reduce an experience to its essence, we should have to achieve a
distance from it that would put it entirely under our gaze [Husserlian Vorstellung],
with all the implications of sensoriality or thought that come into play in it, bring
it and bring ourselves wholly to the transparency of the imaginary, think it
without the support of any ground... (149-50).
Derrida as well as Merleau-Ponty criticises the consequence of the phenomenological
reduction in terms of this delimitation of Being as what is in fact not nothing and its
recourse to a principle of sufficient reason. Merleau-Ponty attempts to 'begin with Being'
in terms of 'concrete existence' effected by the reduction, but in terms of the intertwining
of the perceiving-perceived of perceptual presence; that is, conditioned presence implies
a negativity which is not thought in terms of nothingness. Negativity, in Merleau-Ponty's
ontology, is a name for the in-visible, or the idea of Being's presence thought in terms of
an inherent distance: "It is a question of a negation-reference ... or separation (ecart)
...common to all the invisibles because the visible has been defined as dimensionality of
Being, i.e as universal, and because therefore everything that is not a part of it is
necessarily enveloped in it and is but a modality of the same transcendence" (WN 247).
Working Notes of May 1960 consider the sensible and the visible as the "occasion to say
what nothingness is—Nothingness is nothing more or less than the invisible" (258), but
since the "visible is not an objective positive, the invisible cannot be a negation in the
logical sense" (257). Merleau-Ponty identifies as a "total philosophical error" the thought
that determines the visible in terms of " objective presence (or the idea of this presence)
(visual picture)... this entails the idea of the quale as in itself [when] the quale is always
a certain type of latency" (258). The consequence of Merleau-Ponty's critique is the form
of 'indirect ontology' which claims as its "essential notion" that of flesh, "which is the
sensible in the twofold sense of what one senses and what senses... one cannot posit one
sole sensible without positing as torn from my flesh... and my flesh itself is one of the
sensibles in which an inscription of all the others is made" (259-60). For Merleau-Ponty,
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the notion of 'fold' implied here "means that my body is made of the same flesh as the
world":
Flesh of the world described... as segregation, dimensionality, continuation,
latency, encroachment...refer us to the perceiving-perceived Einfiihlung, for they
mean that we are already in the being thus described, that we are ofit, that
between (my emphasis) it and us there is Einfuhlung (248).
Dimensionality, according to Merleau-Ponty, refers to a "mute experience of a mute
meaning"; an experience or meaning which puts into question the notion of constitution
and what he terms the "ontology of the object" (249), or the constitutive source of
perception in consciousness. Merleau-Ponty refers to a "felt [senti] at the same time the
culmination of subjectivity and the culmination of materiality, they are in a relation of
transgression or of overlapping—This also means: my body is not only one perceived
among others, it is the measurement (mesurant) of all, Nullpunkt of all the dimensions of
the world" (248). The problem with Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of dimensionality, lie
with the notion of Nullpunkt, as it presupposes an absorption or absolute generality with
regard to the envelopment of subjectivity in B/being. It detracts from the singularity or
specificity of alterity with respect to the emergence of sens.
For Merleau-Ponty, the 'starting point' is a "zero of being which is not nothingness"
(260); 'nothing' is, according to Merleau-Ponty, a distance between identicals. According
to Derrida, on the other hand, 'nothing' designates a difference between parallels. The
metaphor of the fold as description of an in-visible cannot for Derrida be thought in terms
of an ecart, as the notion indicates a separation which is not quite absolute divergence.
The reason I bring together Merleau-Ponty and Derrida over this notion of ecart is that I
want to show that they both accomplish analyses which enable an orientation in thought
with regard to the materiality of the conditions of meaning, that emphasises the
anteriority of an affective corpo-real. I anticipate with this comparison what I find
valuable in Levinas's analyses of inter-subjectivity and the meaning of Alterity27.
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Merleau-Ponty's teleology of Being, the notion of the general extension of a perceptual
logic of the sensible world, involves a notion of continuity that Derrida would consider to
be a detraction from signification and the differential structure of life and experience as
these inform any act of consciousness. Both Derrida and Merleau-Ponty point to an
anteriority with regard to the constitutional ego, a contamination by alterity that refutes
the notion of a pure self-presence. However, for Derrida, there is no absolute continuity
between the existence of subjectivity and the transcendence of alterity or the noematic
instance. Merleau-Ponty's latent intentionality and the 'mis'placement of ecart as what, I
believe, Derrida would consider an inadequate divergence, displaces and 'neutralises' the
'violence' of the Otherness or the 'anarchy' of the noema. In Speech and Phenomena
Derrida emphasises an irreducible difference between existence in this sense and the
transcendent instance which Merleau-Ponty's displacement of intentional emergence
does not recognise. I conclude that the displacement of intentionality to flesh obscures
rather than supports the notion of alterity with respect to the emergence of sens.
(b) Language and Non-presence: Body beyond 'Flesh'.
Derrida's reading of Emmanuel Levinas in "Violence and Metaphysics" shows the
'metaphysics of presence' as precisely the 'consequence' of the way in which
phenomenology is the ceaseless working over of the "themes of non-presence" which it
resists as well as introduces28. Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh and the implication of
continuity remove this difference between pre-intentional existence and the
transcendence of the Different or Alterity, in a similar manner to Heidegger in Being and
Time. Whereas Heidegger positions transcendence in an interiority of Being, rather than
in the subject, Merleau-Ponty joins Being and subject as the common flesh of the world.
271 discuss Levinas on ethics and alterity in chapter four.
28
Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics" in Writing and Difference, p. 121.
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In the discussion of the relation of painting and language in "Indirect Language and the
Voices of Silence", Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that meanings are inseparable from the
medium of expression: Ideality "already streams forth along the articulations of the
aesthesiological body"29. It is the notion of 'medium' that is problematic when for
Merleau-Ponty there is no transcendence in the sense of an absolute divergence. Both
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 'conflate' the transcendence of Alterity and existence as
being-in-the-world.
Derrida's Speech and Phenomena critisises Husserl's attempt at bracketing indication in
order to 'free' expression - or the linguistic sign - in terms of an "existential
constitution". Expression, for Husserl, as the "solitary mental life" of a "language without
communication" (SP 42), must be freed from indication, which opens the mind to a
movement of "thought from something to something else"(42); that is, thought passes
through alterity30. According to Derrida, this movement of thought is the 'consequence'
of an absolute divergence, the fact that the transcendent instance is difference. Derrida
points out that the threat of indication for Husserl is precisely the threat to the
directedness of transcendence, as indication refers to the re-involvement of language in
"everything that falls subject to the 'reductions'"(30).
Levinas considers the directedness of Husserlian intuitionism to reduce the matter of
meaning to manner, or signification in a broad sense to meaning by ego-consciousness,
recognising that "any consideration of method [is more than] a purely formal logic and
[goes] deep into ... [the] conception of being"31. Derrida takes up this point in his
critique of Husserl in terms of a metaphysics of presence32, and over the specific attempt
29 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence", in Signs, trans. Richard
McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 152.
30 As demonstrated by Derrida's Speech and Phenomena in chapter one, 'expression' refers to private
meaningful experience. 'Indication' is its structural linguistic externalization.
31 Emmanuel Levinas, The Theory ofIntuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. Andre Orianne
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963 [1930]), iiv.
32 In general. See Writing and Difference, 118, especially. See also chapter one of this work.
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in Husserl to separate signification in general from self-present expression. In indication
phenomenality is inseparable from materiality: the matter of existence is the threat to the
formality of a 'pure' expression. According to Derrida, a pure expression is a
contradiction in terms. For Derrida, the paradox of transcendental determinations extends
to the impossible figuration of expression in terms of the appropriation or 'neutralisation'
involved in Husserl's rewriting of "Korper als Leib"33. The "body of the signifier" (77),
or the materiality of signification, is irreducible to pure meaning/expression. Derrida's
language here indicates a contamination of thought by body.
Merleau-Ponty is closest to Derrida's critique when in the Working Notes he elaborates
on what he intends by the connection between, not only thought and language, but
between perception and expression of the perception34:
The taking possession of the world of silence, such as the description of the
human body effects it... is the world articulated, evaluated to the Wesen,
spoken— the description of the perceptual logos is a usage of logos prophorikos.
Can this rending characteristic of reflection (which, wishing to return to itself,
leaves itself) come to an end? There would be needed a silence that envelops the
speech anew, after one has come to recognize that speech enveloped the alleged
silence of the psychological coincidence. What will this silence be? As the
reduction finally is not for Husserl a transcendental immanence, but the disclosing
of the Weltthesis, this silence will not be the contrary of language (WN 179).
Merleau-Ponty here follows Fink's evaluation of the reduction in terms of the question of
genesis, as does Derrida. That is, the reduction strips away all derived and interpreted
33 That is, the differentiation of the physical material body and the 'living body'. See IOG pp. 97-98
especially. See also, SP pp. 81-82.
34
Merleau-Ponty also recognises that there is no pure expression. Merleau-Ponty speaks of a self-
movement in terms of expression. "... henceforth movement, touch, vision, applying themselves to the
other and to themselves, return toward their source and, in the patient and silent labor of desire, begin the
paradox of expression" (VI 144). Ultimately, what is emphasised in Merleau-Ponty regarding expression
and body is that the "body contributes more than it receives" (144). Problematically this is attained by the
"body in general" (143), the coupling with the flesh of the world.
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aspects of experience in order to consider experience as it comes into being. This would
be the genetic reduction as opposed to the eidetic reduction, which strives to attain what
is essential to experience rather than its emergence. According to Merleau-Ponty's
development of the notion of genesis with respect to perception and expression, and the
'perceptual logic' of the sensible world, the origin of signification is thought in terms of
an openness of bodily being upon the world, but furthermore and more problematically,
as a givenness of transcendence as perceptual being. Merleau-Ponty's description of a
genesis beyond constitutive subjectivity accords with Derrida's criticism of
phenomenological tenets to a certain point. Merleau-Ponty describes a primordial
anonymity of bodily being:
He who thinks, perceives etc. is... negativity as openness, by the body to the
world—Reflexivity must be understood by the body, by the relation to self of the
body, of speech. The speaking-listening duality remains at the heart of the I, its
negativity is but the hollow between speaking and hearing, the point where their
equivalence is formed—The body negative or language negative is the subject
(246).
In "The Sensible World and the World of Expression" from his Lectures at the College
de France, Merleau-Ponty notes how in intuitionism's determination of objective Being,
"[t]he meaning of an object is given only as a systematic deformation of our universe of
experience, without our ever being able to name its operative principle"35. In other
words, signification and sensible genesis, both being names for the force of a certain
outside, are obscure:
Every perception is the perception of something solely by way of being at the
same time the relative imperception of a horizon or background which it implies
but does not thematise. Perceptual consciousness is therefore indirect or even
inverted in relation to an ideal of adequation which it presumes but never
35 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Sensible World and Expression", in Themes from the Lectures at the
College de France 1952-1960, p. 4.
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encounters directly... There is truly a reversal [...] when one passes from the
sensible world in which we are caught, to a world of expression, where we seek to
capture significations to serve our purpose, although this reversal and the
"retrogressive movement" of truth are solicited by a perceptual anticipation.
Properly speaking, the expression which language makes possible resumes and
amplifies another expression which is revealed in the "archaeology" of the
perceived world36.
In Speech and Phenomena Derrida argues that there is no real separation of perception
from signification, silence and voice: his notion of contamination refers precisely to an
interweaving (SP 15)37. The 'problem of the sign' refers to the separation of indication
and expression in Husserl, and Derrida's argument as to their inseparability, the
contamination of the latter by the former. For Derrida, this does not refer to an absolute
continuity of sensible and intelligible being. The positing of presence through expression
is required for there to be meaning, but this presence is informed or conditioned -
contaminated - by what is radically other than itself. Contamination refers to the alterity
of an outside or necessary externalisation that always already comes to make up the
present-now.
Contamination as what, according to Derrida, underlies Husserl's ambiguity regarding
retention, does not however lend itself to Merleau-Ponty's conception of 'reversal'. What
is at stake in the notion of contamination is to show that the ontological differences
posited according to phenomenological methodology are 'interwoven'; what follows for
Derrida is that indication involves an alterity or a "certain outside" which is neither
purely inside nor purely outside. Derrida's 'ultra-transcendental' concept of life38 implies
a notion of the 'life' of silence noted by Merleau-Ponty, as 'inexpressible' according to
the analogical and equivocal character of language (SP 13). Merleau-Ponty recognises
this relation of expression and perception. The 'in-visible' - what, according to Derrida's
36 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Themes from the Lectures, 4.
37 See also chapter one of this work.
38 See chapter one.
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critique of philosophy as metaphysics, is indicated-refers to 'something like' "the body-
negative or language-negative duality [which] is the subject" (VI 246). However,
Merleau-Ponty states, that "the expression which language makes possible resumes and
amplifies another expression which is revealed in the 'archaeology' of the perceived
world"; there is no 'difference' for Merleau-Ponty between the 'language' of perception
and equivocal language proper. This difference is precisely what Derrida makes claim to
when he states "language guards the difference which guards language" and notes that
what is heterogeneous to language is always already archived there (SP 14-15). Derrida's
notion of differance and trace imply the impossibility of a fullness or continuity of an
'originary' movement of expression conceived as flesh.
The in-visible, as investigated by Merleau-Ponty's Visible and Invisible, concerns the
body as the unconscious before the conscious, and in this sense refers to a notion of a
primordial anonymity with regard to consciousness, and claims that 'reflexivity be
understood by the body'. Merleau-Ponty's body is the elaboration of the Husserlian body
as Leib rather than Korper. While the displacement of focus to the body puts in question
the presumption of transparence on the part of Husserlian eidetic analysis and the claim
to the pure presence of constitutive consciousness, the understanding of the bodily
dimension of subjectivity as bound up with worldly being in terms of a 'flesh of the
world' obscures more than clarifies a non-conscious dimension of subjectivity's affective
life. My argument is that neither Husserl's nor Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology
adequately broach the idea of an affective dimension of bodily subjectivity in terms of the
non-conscious and emotive dimensions of subjectivity. The doctrine of constitution,
whether placed primarily with consciousness or displaced in terms of bodily Being and
an ontology that questions dualisms, cannot lay-out the Otherness of signification and
sense.
When Merleau-Ponty develops the notion that "every visible develops a ground which is
not visible in the sense the figure is" (WN 246), this opens up the dimension of
signification referred to by Derrida and Levinas. 'The thing itself eludes Husserlian
intuition. What follows in Merleau-Ponty's statement of the in-visible particularly
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resonates with what Levinas refers to as the emergence of subjectivity: "[which] even in
what is figural or figurative in it, is not an objective quale, an in Itself surveyed from
above"; the point is that "to see is always to see more than one sees" (246-7).
I believe Merleau-Ponty's 'dimensionality' referring to a 'silent fabric' of existence
'which is not contrary to language' - and which accounts for a creation of modes of
expression before the 'objectification of the named I' - offers a similar understanding of
a sensible dimension of lived being and signification as Deleuze's designation of a
dimension of virtuality with respect to the production of sense.
Derrida's critique, in Speech and Phenomena, of the notion of a plenitude of presence,
opens the question of language with respect to the being that is always in surplus of the
ideal nature of the sign on Husserl's account. Merleau-Ponty's critisism of Husserlian
eidetics extends to his views on language and expression: eidetic phenomenology
considers language in terms of logic. Merleau-Ponty, as well as Derrida, rejects the
formality of signification according to a system of translation in which the object is
directly referable to consciousness. According to the deconstruction of the "plenitude of
presence", "the thing itself always escapes" (SP 104).
Merleau-Ponty's "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence"39 theorises language
according to a development of Saussurrean diacritics40. Signs, according to Merleau-
Ponty, constitute a particular sort of unity in terms of their mutual dependence and
differentiation according to a logic of 'interweaving'. Merleau-Ponty's transposition of
the metaphorical language of his ontology undermines the logic of Saussurean
structuralism. While delimited by the formality of linguistics, signs are here described as
productive of meaning to the extent that they are woven together according to a
production of the "opaque fabric" of language (IL 41). In Indirect Language, Merleau-
Ponty emphasises the 'between of' words and phonemes as made up of "threads of
39 Hereafter IL.
40 See Ferdinand Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sehehaye, trans.
Wade Baskin (New York: McGrawHill, 1966)
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silence" and the 'fold of speech', which together make up a totality (46); what is
suggested is a language other than the language made up of equivocal signs.
Merleau-Ponty approaches the question of an "origin of language'" and this leads him to
a consideration of "the act of expression"41. As the 'agency' of an "allusive, indirect"
language, Merleau-Ponty construes the body-subject according to the aforementioned
'negativity as openness to the world'. Conceived neither in terms of passivity nor quite as
an agency, in the Working Notes Merleau-Ponty describes "the body-negative or the
language-negative [as] the subject—the body, language as alter ego" (WN 246). The
departure from the Saussurian language system is evident. For Merleau-Ponty expression
is what happens as an event "in the intercourse of signs" (IL 45). As generated by the
threads of silence, which envelops them as an opaque fabric (46), acts of expression are
inextricable from an ontological proposition: expression is understood in terms of a
bodily reflexivity.
Expressive language in Merleau-Ponty is an "originating operation": "Let us begin by
understanding that there is a tacit language and that painting speaks in this way" (47).
Merleau-Ponty speaks of the bodily gesture of a painter's brushstroke as what makes a
painting "that which it was in the process of becoming" (45). Conferring to the painting
the emergence of expression, this statement must be linked to what he says about the
speaking subject as "nobody, the anonymous" rather than a 'consciousness of', and "the
body, language as alter ego" in the Working Notes. According to the Visible and the
Invisible "perception [is] a divergence [ecart] by relation to a level, that is, the idea of the
primordial Being, of the Convention of conventions, of the Speech before speech" (VI
201). Merleau-Ponty's concern, in describing language in terms of a "phonematic
system", is to point out a dimensionality that Derrida would characterise as
"inexpressible"; it is to "point the finger at the invisible" (SP 23). According to Merleau-
Ponty, as in painting, the visible (work) is "but the trace of a total movement of Speech"
(VI 211). The development upon Saussurian diacritics amounts to the proposition of a
41
Merleau-Ponty makes a point which recalls Gilles Deleuze's notion of the 'paradox of expression' in the
Logic ofSense, that expressions exist as what is expressed and do not exist outside the expressed (VI144).
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perceptual logic; perception is a "diacritical, relative, oppositional system" according to
which the sensible as such is silence, is ungraspable (213-14) in light of conscious
motivation. There is no perception understood in terms of the purity of phenomenological
intuition.
Derrida's approach to the question of the origins of language also emphasises language as
diacritical; difference is a "condition of signification"42. Merleau-Ponty's approach to the
question of language and its origins amounts to a type of 'expressionism', it emphasises
the 'origin' as a mode ofexpression - a certain virtuality or inscription of a sensible; in
other words, a generation of the 'silence' of the 'fabric' of existence. For Derrida
inscription is at the origin of a creation that, like Merleau-Ponty's expression, puts in
question phenomenology's attribution of the fullness of presence to the signified correlate
of intuitive consciousness. Insofar as inscription is thought in terms of a creation prior to
a name and agency of subjectivity, as that which precisely tends to substitute itself for its
own origin, it disrupts metaphysical ideality, and testifies to "the essential possibility of
non-intuition"43.
Merleau-Ponty's acknowledgement of the inscribed character of existence, in terms of a
'perceptual logic' informing the notion of the in-visible, converges with Derrida on this
point: "The I, really, is nobody, is anonymous...prior to all objectification, denomination,
in order to be the Operator, or the one to whom all this occurs. The named I, the I
named...is an object... an objectification" (WN 246). Ultimately, what is indicated by
these estimations regarding the origins of language, by Merleau-Ponty as well as Derrida,
is that thought occurs according to a process of differentiation of sensible being. To sum
up, both critiques concern the resuscitation of a primordial dimension of signification, of
the sensible from which thought emerges:
42
Jacques Derrida, "Difference", in Margins ofPhilosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982) p. 10
43 Jacques Derrida, OfGrammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1976) p. 40
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The living present springs forth out of this non-identity with itself and from the
possibility of a retentional trace. It is always a trace. This trace cannot be thought
out on the basis of a simple present whose life would be within itself; the self of
the living present is primordially a trace... Being-primordial must be thought on
the basis of the trace (SP 85).
II. Michel Henry and Material Phenomenology
Merleau-Ponty's recognition at the time of The Visible and the Invisible that " [t]he
problems posed in Ph.P are insoluble because I start there from the ' consciousness'-
'object' distinction" (VI 200), reflects the rejection of the classical philosophy of
consciousness which is the starting point for Michel Henry and his development of a
'material phenomenology'.
Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy, if considered as a project to overcome a 'philosophy of
consciousness', intellectualist conceptuality and a philosophical rationalism whether
idealist or realist, questions the very categories of a Husserlian phenomenology, linguistic
and conceptual. He suggests in The Visible and the Invisible that "we do not allow
ourselves to introduce into our description concepts issued from reflection, whether
psychological or transcendental...[but] must, at the beginning, eschew notions such as
'acts of consciousness' ...'matter', 'form', and even 'image' and 'perception"'(VI 157-
8). Like Derrida, he notes the complexity of the issue of language but, like the former,
deals with transcendental philosophy 'from the inside', linguistically and conceptually.
While Derrida as well as Merleau-Ponty reject rationalism as the presumption of
universalism on the part of reason or constitutive consciousness, both critiques operate
according to an attempt to show the limits of reason and to expand upon the concept in
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order that it may accommodate a certain 'opacity of the fact', of sensible existence44. The
rejection of a rationalist conception of reason is a reaction to the postulation of an
evidential correlation of truth between reason and reality, the Husserlian rational
consciousness, which holds the lay-out of this reality within itself45.
Derrida and Merleau-Ponty's critique of the philosophy of consciousness, however, does
not - as with Heidegger's departure from Husserlian phenomenology - reject either the
notion of consciousness or subjectivity. The critique of the privilege of representational
consciousness attempts to open up an understanding of a sensible that is always in excess
of the delimitation of Husserl's Being according to rational postulation, or 'knowledge'.
While these critiques amount to a rejection of a particular sense of subjectivism, a focus
on subjectivity is evident: "[T]he thought of subjectivity [la pensee du subjectify is one of
these solids that philosophy will have to digest..."46. Any thought of an anteriority of
self-consciousness "owes [the] idea of and taste for primordial ontology to just this self-
consciousness. There are some ideas which make it impossible for us to return to a time
prior to their existence, even and especially if we have moved beyond them, and
subjectivity is one of them"47. The notion of subjectivity, supported by Derrida as well as
Merleau-Ponty, rejects the reduction of the transcendent to the immanent on the
Husserlian model. Both critiques share a Heideggerian concern with a being irreducible
to consciousness. However, contrary to Heidegger's propositions regarding what is
commonly interpreted as a 'Being without beings', Merleau-Ponty's move regarding
'indirect ontology' is based on the subjectivity of beings: "My 'indirect method' (being in
the beings) is alone conformed with being" (VI 179). By positioning subjective being in
the center of the philosophical interrogation, as well as of the ontological considerations,
Merleau-Ponty repeats phenomenology's fidelity to subjective experience. However, he
44 See also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense, trans. Hubert L. Dreufus and Patricia A. Dreufus
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964)
45 Refer to Edmund Husserl, Ideas 1, § 53 and 54.
46 See G.B Madison, The Phenomenology ofMerleau-Ponty (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981) p. 303.
47
Merleau-Ponty, "Everywhere and Nowhere", in Signs trans. Richard McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1964) p. 154.
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does this in order to ascertain the limits of this 'experience' by that which exceeds
transcendental reflection. Merleau-Ponty's insight is that a sensible dimension of
experience exceeds the idea formed by reflective and reflexive consciousness. Being or
being is, in Merleau-Ponty, thought according to a certain 'absence' to consciousness,
irreducible to the classical 'experience' of the relation of subject and world, as an
inessential 'source' of transcendence. The insight, which he shares with Derrida, is that
absence is part of and a function of presence, and the other way round. The problematic
notion of the flesh in Merleau-Ponty does not detract from the importance of his thought
on the body: that "our body is a being of two leaves, from one side a thing among things
and otherwise what sees them and touches them" and its "double belongingness to the
order of 'object' and the order of the 'subject'... teaches us that each calls for the other"
(137).
However, the notion in Merleau-Ponty of an "intentionality within Being" (VI 244) -
while it puts into question the consequence of the Husserlian analysis, that being is being
object - is problematic. The notion of an intentionality thus displaced to bodily existence,
as a de-intellectualisation of the notion - nevertheless raises the question of the meaning
of the notion with regard to pre-reflective being. The notion must, I believe, "forego in
advance the understanding of the sensible"48; it does not adequately meet it. According to
Derrida, the pre-reflective dimension of signification must be understood in terms of its
otherness. My argument is that the notion of an operative intentionality obscures more
than clarifies the dimension of pre- or non-reflective being and the issue of self-
awareness. Henry's "Material Phenomenology and Language"49 raises the question of
otherness in terms of a reconsideration of phenomenality and a concomitant reorientation
regarding the meaning of self-awareness: My argument is that the real 'object' of
investigation is the relation between otherness and self-awareness.
48
Merleau-Ponty, in The Visible and the Invisible, arguing against "the bifurcation of subject and object",
(137)
49 Michel Henry, "Material phenomenology and language (or, pathos and language)" in Continental
Philosophy Review 32, trans. Leonard Lawlor, 343 - 365, 1999. Hereafter PL.
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According to Henry, the main problem of classical phenomenology lies with its
methodology, and the central notion of reduction. Merleau-Ponty's insight is that of the
"incompleteness of the reduction" (VI 178). For Merleau-Ponty the meaning of the
reduction is this, the impossibility of a complete reflection and transparence with respect
to the materiality of our being. The reduction as such points to the excess of the sensible
as the opacity of the fact, "the reduction itself [is] the rediscovery of vertical being"
(178). Thus, Merleau-Ponty's elaboration of the reduction considers its significance in
terms of its testament to the excess of sensible Being which eludes it, and to the approach
to ontology as 'indirect'. Bodily being is the 'in-between' that always already qualifies
any 'access' to Being. According to Henry's critique of classical transcendental
phenomenology, the phenomenological reduction demonstrates the impasses of a
reduction of what he terms Life to an object of the world. The methodological move from
the empirical world to the transcendental concept of the world as the condition of
possibility of the appearance of the former, amounts to a reduction of the affective reality
of life. The experience of 'transcendental life' is inadequately approached. The
accomplishment of the doctrine of constitution involves, for Henry, a misconception of
the conditions of possibility for manifestation. The conditions of possibility for the
appearing of Life cannot be thought in terms of the objectivation performed by the
transcendental-intentional subject of classical phenomenology. According to Henry,
manifestation cannot be reduced to the manifestation of the world objectified. Henry
raises the question of an affective experience in terms of phenomenality as the condition
of possibility for appearance or manifestation.
(a) Pathos, Language and Phenomenology
Michel Henry's development from classical phenomenology amounts to a critique of
several of its major tenets. In "Material Phenomenology and Language" (1999), Henry
points out that a self-conscious thematisation of phenomenology establishes the object of
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phenomenology as phenomenality in that "phenomenality constitutes our access to the
phenomenon" (PL 344): The question of method is reducible to an " openness of a path
leading to the phenomenon; it allows us to apprehend the phenomenon and to know it"
(344). In face of Husserl's sustained preoccupation with the centrality of the method,
Henry emphasises the priority - in both senses - of the question of phenomenality; "the
method remains so dependent on phenomenality that its possibility as well as its many
difficulties are based on it" (344). Henry notes how Heidegger, in section seven of Being
and Time, points out that phenomenality, to the extent that it is the possibility of an
access to phenomena, constitutes the possibility of language, and it is with this assertion
that the interest and direction of the following lie. Phenomenality is what allows the
encounter between phenomena and our apprehension. According to Henry, this is so,
because they show themselves to us, we can speak of them, name them, refer
ourselves to them in this nomination, describe them, produce on their subject the
many predications out of which our knowledge and our discourses are
simultaneously composed... [appearing thus constitutes the incontrovertible
condition of every conceivable language... by discovering first of all
everything that this language speaks about at the same time as what it is saying
about it and will be able to say about it (344).
According to Henry's thesis we are left with a different, reversed sense of a
'phenomenology of language'. Language can no longer be considered as object according
to the approach of phenomenological analysis or elucidation: "language belongs on the
contrary to the internal conditions of this process of elucidation" (345); it finds its
possibility in phenomenality.
This question of pure phenomenality has, as Henry points out, been left aside as
phenomenology developed historically from Husserl. According to classical
phenomenology, being is determined in terms of an appearance to a subjectivity reduced
to the transcendental Ego. The paradox of transcendental determination, as noted by Fink
and then Derrida, problematically leaves open the question of the principle of the
subordination of ontology to phenomenology (345). Henry's argument is that this leads to
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the "phenomenological indetermination of the principle of phenomenology... [a]
disastrous confusion of the appearing of the world with the essence of all conceivable
appearing overtakes phenomenology as a whole and notably its theory of language since
the latter is based on appearing" (346). Henry's critique is directed against what he terms
"the ontological monism" of classical phenomenology, the presumption that there be only
one type of phenomenality, or mode of manifestation50. The point Henry makes here is
based on the same recognition of an excess of Being with regard to the transcendental
determinations of classical phenomenology. Henry's critique repeats the reservations of
Merleau-Ponty as well as Derrida when he notes the main problem of Husserlian
phenomenology: its intuitionism and doctrine of intentionality. Henry quotes Husserl's
'principle of principles' as the exhibit of "the full scope of [the] confusion" (346). When
Husserl states in § 24 of Ideas 1 that "every originary donative intuition is an in principle
source of knowledge", what is implied in this constellation is an identifiable structure of
consciousness as intentional and thematic. The emergence of phenomenality is thought
according to the "power to institute in the condition of being a phenomenon" (346).
Henry notes that what follows is a subordination of language to "phenomenality
understood as distancing", and "although it is still the original making things be seen in
perception, intentionality is... limited to signifying them in language... Dissociated from
perception, composed of meanings, intentional language is still, however, subordinated
to, entirely dependent on, one sole conception of phenomenality" (346). Henry points out
that, with regard to intentionality, the 'monstration' - the appearance, the 'bringing to
light' according to the Greek concept of phainomenon - is identified in terms of this
appearance, and an 'outside' thus constituted. For Henry "this advent of the outside from
the outside constitutes the phenomenalisation of phenomenality" (347).
Henry notes the reductive elaboration in Husserl as well as Heidegger of appearing as the
appearing of the 'outside of the world', of a reality that is only in its self-exteriority and
so stripped of substance. The formality of the intentional correlation, as well as the
50
Henry's overall work is centered on the issue of self-manifestation, as what disrupts the misconception of
"ontological monism". His argument is that there is more than one type of phenomenality or manifestation
and that "self-manifestation is the essence of manifestation". See Michel Henry, The Essence of
Manifestation, trans. Girard Etzkorn (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1973), 3.1 shall return to this point.
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Heideggerian redirection and attempt to think 'Being without beings', demonstrate the
incapacity of appearing to posit the reality unconcealed by it. Henry's elaboration of the
notion of (un) concealment and 'monstration' with regard to language, notes that what is
insufficiently taken into account is the nature of an event before the propositions of
commonsense analysis or science: language as a "capacity for making us see what it
designates by naming it before pursuing the analysis of it" (345). The things to which
propositions refer, 'show themselves' to us, but "also these propositions themselves must
be able to show themselves, and they can do so only in a monstration proper to language
[...] The primitive Saying is never therefore on the side of what is said, that is, on the
side of what is shown; it is what shows" (345). The event proposed by Henry refers to the
notion of an in-between of theory and materiality. Henry's understanding of
phenomenality considers phenomenality as an anterior condition of phenomenon and
language and problematises the classical priority of the correlative determinations of
intentional consciousness. According to Henry,
all systems of language (beyond their diversity, beyond the diversity of their
structures and their own rules) refer to a prior possibility of speaking and hearing
which is no longer a phenomenon but precisely the phenomenon's possibility -
since only by adventing in the phenomenal condition is anything, regardless of
what it is, susceptible of being said (345).
Henry's conception of a prior phenomenality as an 'internal condition' of the
phenomenon and language may be understood in terms of a relation of virtuality and
actuality as described by Gilles Deleuze. Phenomenality understood in terms of a virtual
capacity is the phenomenon's potential, a condition of manifestation thought in terms of a
power to make manifest, a capacity of signification independent of intentional analysis or
the advent of meaning according to an intuition of consciousness. Heidegger's On the
Way to Language, notes that logos is the saying which in showing lets beings and Being
appear as the advent into presence of what is present. What is contained in this
constellation is the identification of the monstration or 'unconcealment 'and an 'originary
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language'51. Henry's reading of Heidegger refutes the latter's "assimilation of saying to
the appearing of the world"(PL 347): that is, the reciprocal presupposition of appearing
and speech, according to the Greek sense of appearing, as coming to light, phainomenon
- being in terms of vision. Henry makes the point that the reduction performed by a
notion of language in which the unconcealment is different from the unconcealed - the
originary truth and what is true in Heidegger's terms - involves an indifference or 'loss
of' material being; the words of this language thus founded are indifferent to and
different from the referent. The sole conception of language according to classical
phenomenology concerns a signification in which reality, Being or the world as such is
intended; as such this language is marked by an incapacity, based on what Henry
designates as a prior ontological 'insufficiency' (348). The separation of inside and
outside is thought according to the intentional correlation; the 'incapacity' that relates
difference and indifference is here, as Henry points out, only a consequence of this
insufficiency (349). The paradox in the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger
concerns the phenomenal appearing which provides being, while nevertheless what
appears is not given existence by the appearing since the latter is only unconcealment;
thus there is no ontological dependency, there is no creation involved. The word of
classical phenomenology presents a nomination by means of which that which it names is
offered in pseudo-presence, as 'unbeing' (350). The absence of the world as named by
the word is caused by the mode of appearing, by phenomenality, on which language
depends. Presence is thus based in primary absence, on a principle of irreality, memory -
what is always there but never present.
What this suggests, according to Henry, is room for a language different from the
traditional phenomenological language of experience, and the presence of absence. Henry
uses the word 'revelation' (351) for the appearing of 'life' - which is ultimately thought
in terms of bodily being - and argues a dissociation of the two modes, and avoidance of
the phenomenological reduction of all conceivable appearing to the appearing of the
'world'. Recall that Merleau-Ponty's critique of the language of classical phenomenology
51 Martin Heidegger in On The Way To Language, trans. P.D Hertz (New York: Harper's & Row)
according to Henry's essay.
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points out that the determination of objective Being, according to Husserlian intuition,
gives the meaning of an object 'only as a systematic deformation of our universe of
experience, without our ever being able to name its operative principle'. Merleau-Ponty's
insight is that perceptual consciousness is 'indirect or inverted' with respect to the ideal
of Husserlian adequation "which it presumes but never encounter directly"52. When
Merleau-Ponty refers the expression made possible by language to an expression
revealed in the 'archaeology of the perceived world', his themes converge with those of
Henry.
When Henry speaks of revelation and the 'appearance' of life these terms indicate a
dimension of manifestation irreducible to visibility and the gaze of thematic
consciousness. The inverted commas reflect the paradox that this appearance is a non¬
appearance, strictly speaking; it refers to an affective dimension of subjectivity's self-
manifestation. Henry argues a dissociation of two modes of appearing, that of the world
of phenomena for consciousness and that of a different phenomenality, which concerns
affective life. His argument is directed against the phenomenological reduction of all
conceivable appearing to the appearing of the world: "The first feature of the revelation
of the world is that it is a self-revelation" (PL 351), which avoiding tautology involves
original and absolute generation. What is suggested is a conception of 'life' in terms of an
experience of the affective dimension of subjectivity, an unfolding of affective life
"[increasing] itself, enriching itself with its own substance by being submerged into it",
as a virtual but real process of immanence, the infinite movement in which,
life comes to itself, pulls itself in against itself and plays with itself, producing its
own essence insofar as this essence consists in and is complete in this self-
enjoyment. Thus the process in which life reveals itself to itself is identical with
the process of its generation insofar as this is understood as its self-generation
(352).
52 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Themes from the Lectures, 4.
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Henry is here still considering the connection between appearing and language. What is
clear at this point is that if the nature of language is dependent on the mode of appearing,
then what is described here as a different phenomenalisation, "namely life itself grasped
in its pure phenomenological essence as self-revelation (352), involves "another
language than the language of the world, constructed out of noematic meanings
designating only the irreality of the referents, in other words different from the language
to which we generally limit the concept of language" (353). The essence of this new
language is drawn from its mode of phenomenalisation as self-revelation without going
via the difference of the world as the outside or visibility; it 'speaks itself. This may
seem to be at odds with what Derrida says of language in Speech and Phenomena, but I
believe there is only an apparent discrepancy between the two approaches to the language
of phenomenology. Derrida would not disagree with the statement that "the way life
reveals itself is the way it speaks" (353); what 'material phenomenology' discovers is a
'Speech', which is thus its own 'verb'. Henry's propositions concerning a material
phenomenology concern precisely the resuscitation of a primordial signifying dimension,
of a sensible from which thought emerges. That is, material phenomenology makes claim
to what is named a 'speech of life' in the face of an assumed 'impotence' of what is
designated as the 'language of the world'; a self-affection, self-donation of self-
generation which puts in question any notion of a general other53, as it actualises itself as
phenomenological material/ity. According to the methodological presuppositions of
classical phenomenology 'access' to the 'things themselves' is defined by the appearing,
or unconcealment: The distantiation implied here eludes anything but an other in general,
a generality of the things 'themselves'. Henry's notion of affective manifestation points
out that 'a transcendental and pure affectivity' is the phenomenological material made
reductive by the methodology of classical phenomenology, the pathos which is thus also
its possibility and potential, its mode of revelation. As in Gilles Deleuze, pathos indicates
in Henry the force of affective being that constitutes the 'relation between' content and
form. Content and form are thought according to reciprocal presupposition. Pathos makes
53 This is an important implication of Deleuze's notion of the relationship between virtual-actual, language
and expression - that there is no other in general. See chapter one, n20.
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the how of revelation become its content (353), the content of form, or an in-between of
thought and materiality.
Henry's propositions amount to a renewal of the question of language; they attempt to
move beyond a linguistic intentionality, which always already presupposes a negation
and a concomitant loss. The specific connection of the question of language with the
question of phenomenality suggested here - the appearing in which that which is spoken
of is made to be seen - is what allows another speech to come into question; the 'speech
of life' in which 'reality says itself (352), in which beyond the difference and
indifference where the world is other, what is spoken of involves at the same time the
generation of subjectivity as inseparable from the speech: affectivity. Deleuze expresses a
parallel line of thought in Difference and Repetition:
We do not contemplate ourselves, but we exist in contemplating - that is to say, in
contracting that from which we come... [w]e must always first contemplate
something else... in order to be filled with an image of ourselves54.
The presupposition of a 'phenomenology of language' shows a relation, not only between
language and a mode of phenomenalisation, but also between the two languages as
proposed by a material phenomenology, and presumes a relationship between two modes
of phenomenalisation, as their difference can only really be thought on the basis of the
difference of the latter (357). According to Henry's argument, linguistic intentionality, as
it intends transcendent meaning, can relate to such meaning only through an anteriority of
sensible being thought in terms of a self-donation or pathos, "the epiphanies of our flesh"
(355). Thus the making see of linguistic intentionality, is already the presupposition of
the revelation of the self-affecting 'verb' - the latter devoid of intentionality and seeing.
Intentionality is thus not foundational; the founding relationship between the two
languages shows intentionality as produced. This is the important reorientation made by
Henry's critique of the classical conception of intentionality. The determinations of a
54 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994 [1964]),
74 - 75. My emphasis. Hereafter DR.
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subject - object relation according to classical phenomenology are shown to be derived
or secondary with respect to a prior self-affection indissociable from sensible being. The
presupposition of a duplicity of appearing allows a differentiation between life's
expressions as immanent to life on the one hand and, on the other hand, the intentionality
of the relation of life and its noematic designations. This approach to the question of
language and embodiment proposes that it is not language as we traditionally know it
which gives 'access to' reality; it is not language as presented through classical
phenomenology's transcendental reflection of the phenomenologically reduced meaning-
sphere. Material phenomenology does not set out to uncover life by act-intentionality and
object-manifestation. 'Life' adventing to itself is its own capacity, not something set in
motion or revealed by philosophical reflection. "We are always already in life; always
already life is given to us by giving us to ourselves in the pathos of our speech" (PL 364).
Speech or language is, on this account, not understood metaphorically, but refers to this
virtual but real dimension of affective unfolding, of "the pathetic flesh of our living
corporeality" (361) for one. Henry's development of phenomenological material, sets out
to "reduce the illusion of ordinary language in which the meaning delivered
...(whether... conceptual or practical) seem to come exclusively from the world and
seem to find a sufficient explanation in the world" (361). That is, the reduction of world
through Cartesian and phenomenological philosophy.
(b) Otherness and Self-Awareness; thinking the In-visible
Henry's critique of the 'ontological monism' of classical phenomenology, asks for a
reconsideration of its project. Defined by its object - phenomenality - the 'project' of
phenomenology is an investigation into the conditions of possibility for appearance or
manifestation. Henry's radicalisation of phenomenology assigns to being - or rather
sensible being - a mode of existence other than one determined by the visibility of 'the
world'. There are other forms of manifestation than the "the visible"; according to Henry
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this is what classical phenomenology failed to see. Henry's development from classical
phenomenology attempts to take phenomenology beyond its focus on object
manifestation and act-intentionality. Henry's critique aligns with Derrida's critique in his
consideration of the condition for manifestation or appearance in terms of invisibility.
Derrida argues that the condition of manifestation cannot be grasped in intuition. It eludes
objectification by reflection, by vision. The condition is invisible in the sense that it
eludes the transparence of Husserlian presence. However, the condition is not merely
absent. According to Henry it is not a negation of manifestation, but something that
manifests itself in a manner different from the visible. According to Derrida and Levinas,
it must be thought in terms of a trace (or arche-trace), as a mode of existence or being
which conditions visibility55. The trace designates, in Derrida as well as Levinas, an
anteriority with respect to the presence it is taken to be the trace of according to classical
metaphysical thought. The investigation of such an anteriority is the focus of Henry's
work, not as a negation of phenomenality. According to The Essence ofManifestation56 it
refers to a fundamental kind of manifestation of Being, the manifestation of the in¬
visible, a 'phenomenon' in the sense of a 'revelation':
The manifestation of Being, far from being... a simple consequence of the
methodological work of clarification of phenomenology, is rather its condition,
as it is the condition of all possible manifestation of any being in general. The
manifestation of Being, therefore, [realizes itself] ... in the 'already' of its
primitive condition which, as such is absolute [...], as is the 'already' of this
effective pure manifestation which makes all subsequent steps possible.
Henceforth, Being manifests itself prior to all work of clarification (EM 137, my
emphases).
Henry radicalises Husserl's lifeworld, by developing the concept in terms of originary
pathos. Pathos is the transcendental condition for the manifestation of the world of
55 See Jaques Derrida, "Difference" in Margins ofPhilosophy and Levinas, Discovering Existence with
Husserl, trans. Richard Cohen and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998).
56 Hereafter EM.
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phenomena according to representation and reference, reason and intentionality; it is the
immanent anteriority of an original awareness. Intentionality is secondary and illusory
with respect to the presumption of constitution. The notion of disclosure with respect to
transcendent being is an illusory effect of the original pathos. For Henry, the reduction of
the world is the reduction to this anteriority, the reduction of the eidos of transcendent
being to the 'essence' of transcendental subjectivity, based in a positioning for and as
affectivity. For Henry, the originary, the 'new', happens according to a life inseparable
from the subjective body57.
According to Henry, the problem with classical phenomenology is its claim to the self-
transcendent nature of appearance, the monistic claim of manifestation as only of - to.
The claim that appearance always involves a genitive and a dative is problematic. My
argument is that it is problematic in so far as an appearance always refers to something
different from itself in a manner which instates the idea of a general other, an
appearance is always an appearance of something for someone, in general. Furthermore,
according to classical phenomenology appearance can only be given as object appearance
to the extent that it refers to other appearances. The implication of this approach is an
idea of general consensus or commonsense - precisely what was thought avoided by the
return to 'the things themselves' according to phenomenological methodology. This state
of analysis has, according to Henry, left phenomenology with a dilemma regarding
subjectivity. Should the appearance of subjectivity be considered along the same lines?
To what extent can there be an appearance or manifestation of subjectivity? Can it be
negotiated along the lines of the genitive-dative structure?
Henry conceives of an originary manifestation that cannot be thought of in terms of the
transcendence, horizon or 'ecstasis' of object manifestation. The manifestation of Being,
insofar as it can be said to belong to sensible being, is anterior to the work of clarification
that posits the visibility of objects of the world; it eludes reflective thematisation. The
pathos of Being is thought in terms of a force ofbeing, an excess of sensible Life directed
571 will take up the development of Henry's thought on the subjective body in chapter three. His
conception of the subjective body provides the means for an understanding of Levinas and Michaux's
work, which is central to this work's thesis concerning the development of Husserlian phenomenology for
affective reality and immanent genesis.
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towards articulation or ontological conception, not conceptuality. Henry's attempt to
redirect phenomenology towards a manifestation thought in terms of its invisibility is an
attempt to direct it away from an analysis which effects an 'identity of thought and
Being': the adequation pertaining to 'knowledge' as the "conception of a common Being
of the subjectivity of the subject and the objectivity of the object" (94), in the sense that
the latter is 'unconcealed' in a direct extension of the former. Henry's notion of
subjectivity is, like Levinas's Other, thought in terms of a an ontological dimension
which eludes the possessive grasp of vision58. Henry describes the invisible revelation or
the self-manifestation of subjectivity in the following terms:
It is a 'phenomenon' in the sense of 'revelation'... The original ontological
presence, which eludes the general conditions of Being, is that of the ego itself.
The phenomenal Being of the ego is one with the original revelation which is
accomplished in a sphere of radical immanence. The reality of the foundation
rests upon the phenomenal character of the latter, but insofar as this characteristic
flows from a... determined mode of revelation... the reality of the ontological
possibility is the Being of the Ego (41, my emphasis).
The foundation is not something obscure, neither is it light which becomes
perceivable only when it shines upon the thing which bathes in its light, nor is it
the thing itself as a "transcendent phenomenon", but it is an immanent revelation
which is a presence to itself, even though such a presence remains "invisible" (41,
my emphasis).
Henry's critique of Heidegger's On the Way to Language, concerns the sense in which
Heidegger's equivocation of 'originary truth' and the world as the "outside of itself"
(348), ultimately implies a 'Being without beings'. The other kind of phenomenality,
58 As will be taken up in chapter four, the point raised in Levinas's conception of the absolutely Other is
that its significance is never exhausted according to a perception correlative to understanding; this is what
he wants to say with his notion of the uncontainable or ungraspable aspect of the other person's face, as not
'of the world' determined by cognition or Husserlian intuition. Levinas's notion of 'face' refers to a
different type of manifestation/conception of phenomenality, it is what reveals itself in an original
'expressivity'.
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proposed by Henry, concerns a dimension of subjective being other than 'the visible',
although described as the ego. What Henry suggests is an orientation of subjectivity for
or according to itself as affectivity. The embodied positioning of subjective being is
inseparable from its effectuation, its affectivity. The excess of sensible being is precisely
what lends Being or meaning to being. The manifestation of subjectivity eludes reflective
theorising; to this extent Henry characterises this lack of 'exteriority' as invisible.
Material phenomenology attempts to think invisible affection and effectuation in terms of
an absolute immanence of sensible being. Henry's notion of the invisible as originary
manifestation puts in question the framework of classical phenomenology according to
which Being is ultimately being object and from which non-presence is excluded as
simple exteriority. Henry's thought aligns itself with Deleuze's on this point: in the
suggestion of a radical immanence as a condition for thinking the emergence of
subjectivity and sensible being. In Henry, the self-manifestation of subjectivity is
understood as immediate, and as a passive event; this is what is meant here by orientation
or positioning: an emergence in and according to sensible being. Henry states in The
Essence ofManifestation:
Affectivity reveals the absolute in its totality because it is nothing other than its
perfect adherence to self, nothing other than its coincidence with self, because it is
the auto-affection of Being in the absolute unity of its radical immanence (858-
59).
Appearance on the classical model, that is, according to the meaning of phainomenon, is
inseparable from transcendence. To the extent that one may speak of an appearance of
subjectivity, as a phenomenon of phenomenological analysis, one must think the
manifestation of transcendental subjectivity. However, subjectivity as transcendental does
not itself appear. Henry points to the impasse of classical phenomenology in that without
manifestation there is no phenomenon for phenomenological analysis. That is, there is no
transcendental phenomenology. Henry asks how the ecstatic act is grounded. The
reflective methodology of phenomenological analysis is undermined by its ontological
monism. According to Henry, the possibility of phenomenological analysis and ecstatic
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act is based in an anterior dimension of self-manifestation, altogether different from
object- manifestation. In other words, Henry's argument is that an adequate analysis of
self-manifestation realises some foundation for the phenomenological project of an
analysis of the condition of possibility for appearance or manifestation.
For Henry, self-manifestation or self-awareness involves not only a realisation of an I that
acts; an anterior condition is awareness as the process of experiencing, in its interiority or
affectivity. As this involves a clarification of the conditions under which subjectivity is
aware of itself rather than a self in possession of experience, the question of self-
awareness eludes the structures of consciousness. Henry suggests that subjectivity, as
experience, is a 'revelation' to itself; there is a certain passivity involved, a given-ness of
subjectivity inseparable from a notion of manifestation. The experience of an object is
considered the very access to the object or its manifestation in so far as this experience is
conceived in terms of affectivity, as well as the constitution of subjectivity, as self-
awareness. Henry speaks of self-awareness in terms of a given-ness, a certain passivity of
affective life. Renunciation of 'self is thought in terms of the primacy of self-affection,
and in terms of a distinction of affect and the mastery and 'exteriorisation' of knowledge
and egoity on the classical account:
[I]n the internal structure of the original essence of revelation, interior to the
original relationship of Being to itself, all domination, every faculty of acting
or effecting, everything which habitually presents itself as the foundation... as an
origin or a cause.. .all cease.
Like Levinas, Henry questions the conception of the autonomous ego through a notion of
passivity and sensible affectivity. Selfhood is thought in terms of a sensible, embodied
given-ness. For Henry, however, it is not the 'proximity of an Other'; self-affection is
thought as the unfolding of an interiority.
Passivity could not designate, as Descartes wanted, the action of a foreign reality,
it is the relation of Being to itself, to its own reality, not to a foreign reality which
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is described and subsumed under the concept ofpassivity.. .Thus a radically
incorrect, even though traditional, understanding is cast aside according to which
passivity, within its own relationship, is necessarily extended to something other
than itself which is imposed on it, given and 'with regard to which' it henceforth
determines itself... (294)
This description of passivity seems to be diametrically opposite to Levinas's descriptions
of passivity in the face of radical alterity. The manifestation of subjectivity is, in Henry, a
self-affection, however, a notion of affectivity cannot be exclusive of 'otherness'. In fact,
Levinas as well as Henry makes the point that essential to responsiveness to alterity is the
anteriority of a positioning of an interiority or affectivity, understood in a corporeal
sense. The anteriority of affectivity is precisely an orientation toward the excess of
sensible being59. Henry's point is to delimit passivity not only with respect to act-
intentionality and a notion of mastery, but with respect to an active relation to exteriority.
Subjectivity and transcendent intentionality is based in a prior emergence of subjectivity
thought in terms of an absolute immanence of sensible being. Like Levinas, Henry
questions the limitation by which the world is the site of all manifestation.
An immanent revelation is an internal experience... An internal experience
understood as an original revelation which is accomplished in a sphere of radical
immanence exists by itself... without the support of any exterior and 'real' Being,
it is itselfprecisely an existence, or better, existence itself... Such an existence
owes nothing to transcendence, rather it precedes it and makes it possible60. More
original than the truth of Being is the truth of man (41, my emphasis).
59 Levinas's elaboration of an affectivity in being is the subject of part 1 of chapter four. The point taken up
is that of a sense , 'sens' or meaning inseparable from this corpo-reality conceived in terms of affectivity.
60 This 'owing nothing to transcendence' may seem to go against the Levinasian emphasis on the awareness
of transcendent being or the other. My discussion of Levinas in chapter four and five will make it clear that
Henry's notion of the life of the subjective body is in fact presupposed in the Levinasian analysis of the
relationship with transcendent being.
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Henry emphasises the close connection between the engendering of a singular living self
and Life, against the abstraction of life as a category separated from the generation of
self. The 'original appearance' is in-visible: forces that manifest as affectivity. A logic of
immanence according to a mode of revelation is what founds transcendence, thought
emerging through an originary mode of revelation, an anterior responsiveness. Henry's
analysis of self-manifestation is based in a certain 'logic of sensibility' if this notion is
thought according to an affective orientation of subjectivity; the notion of self-awareness
must be understood in terms of an opening up to sensible being according to subjectivity,
but specifically the 'subjective body', which according to Henry is nothing other than
subjectivity. My argument is that Henry's assertion that 'self-manifestation is the essence
of all manifestation'61 must be understood in terms of sensible existence as a dynamic,
which always already exceeds the life of consciousness and eidetic determination. In
other words, Henry's notion of self-awareness is indissociable from affectivity or what
Merleau-Ponty calls 'the sensible' and posits the in-visible or the non-conscious as
anterior significations in the emergence of subjectivity.
Material phenomenology refutes the simple transparence of the Husserlian present. When
Derrida argues that the living present "springs forth out of a non-identity with itself and
from the possibility of a retentional trace" and that "the self of the primordial present is
primordially a trace" (SP 85), he points to the invisibility of an anterior condition of
presence. Henry's argument is as follows:
If the essence of the foundation hides itself in the very act whereby it opens a
horizon of light, it is because it pertains in principle to this essence not to show
itself. The essence is real insofar as it forms the basis for truth; nevertheless, it is
in no way itself the truth, but rather a more original non-truth. However, it is to
this non-truth that the phenomenon always refers itself insofar as the latter shines
forth from the foundation of an obscure relationship. Ontology is still possible on
a phenomenological basis. That which is in question, but in an essential manner
61 This statement contains the main thesis of his work, The Essence ofManifestation.
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is simply the possibility of absolute knowledge.
The original revelation is its own content unto itself. The 'how' of this revelation
is a real Being. This phenomenon, or rather this way of being a phenomenon
which does not shine at all in the universal light, this manner which is a concrete
Being, this is what [is] designated by the title of 'ego' (40, my emphases).
In Speech and Phenomena Derrida defines differance according to what he terms the
'ultra-transcendental concept of life', that is, according to auto-affection (in general).
Auto - or Self-affection is an anterior condition of immanence with respect to any
formation of sense. Differance, as what conditions both the concepts of trace and
presence as traditionally understood, is that anteriority or original tracing which
constitutes self-presence, never itself present. For Derrida, auto-affection is temporal.
While Henry does not conceive of self-affection in terms of a temporal self-givenness of
consciousness, he does conceive of self-affection as a dynamic notion; the process of
affection is a subjective movement in which the ego becomes aware of itselfrather than a
self. Henry conceives temporality in terms of affectivity, as absolutely immanent, thus
neither according to retentional mediation, nor to a mediation of an outside. As in
Derrida, however, the constitution of subjectivity is preceded and conditioned by a
'movement' anterior to presence of self. For Henry the original self-affection of
experiencing subjectivity, while understood in terms of 'immediacy', is moreover a kind
of original bodily sensibility, the body itself or 'subjective body', before it becomes an
intentional object62. For neither Henry nor Derrida is self-presence understood as full or
'pure'. However, the anteriority of self-presence conceived by Derrida is understood in
terms of a 'fracture' that for Henry would already involve an objectivation of a self, an
act of subjectivity. Temporality in Henry is understood in relation to the notion of
passivity bound up with the 'life of the subjective body'. The concept of self-affection is
understood in terms of generation on the basis of the antecedence of the concept of Life.
Self-revelation, as the revelation of Life, is not understood as a generality, but as singular
62 Michel Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, trans. Girard Etzkorn (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1975, p. 79. Hereafter referred to as PPB.
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variation; the sense of self-affection is stripped of formal structure. It is not static and
cannot be thought in figurative terms. Henry's account of self-affection must be
understood along the lines of Levinas's notion of the 'Face' of the other. According to
Levinas, the Other as such is not understood in terms of a worldly phenomenon on the
classical account63. It must be understood in non-figural terms: according to affectivity
and 'emotion'. In Speech and Phenomena Derrida describes subjectivity as an ideal form
of presence. However, the point is that insofar as according to Derrida ideality is
linguistically constituted, self-awareness is indissociable from language. The relationship
between self-consciousness and language is this: "Since self-consciousness appears only
in its relation to an object, whose presence it can keep and repeat, it is never perfectly
foreign or anterior to the possibility of language" (SP 15). Derrida notes that this
relationship will "introduce non presence and difference (mediation, signs, referral back,
etc) in the heart of self-presence" (15). My argument is that Henry's self-awareness be
understood less as self-consciousness than as emphasising an anterior self-affection of the
body: "the ego is not a pure logical subject enclosed within its tautology" (PPB 92). I see
this as the justification of Henry's notion of language; what is expressed in Henry's
description of language is an idea of revelation itself. Self-awareness or self-
consciousness is understood in Derrida as 'ideality'. On Henry's account, self-awareness
is thought in terms of a sensibility accorded to bodily existence or affectivity. The
critiques of Derrida and Henry point to the same "originally silent, 'pre-expressive'
stratum of experience" (SP 15) which remains insufficiently accounted for in Husserlian
phenomenology. What Derrida critisises regarding the place of indication in Husserl, is
the exclusion of a dimension of sense in lived subjectivity, which Henry attempts to
resuscitate to a position within expression; this is the sense of Henry's 'speech of life'. It
is also what disrupts the purity of absolute presence on the Husserlian model.
Whereas according to both critiques 'the thing itself' is excluded to the extent that it
eludes the grasp of intuitive consciousness, sensibility is the very emergence of thought.
'Sense', or sensibility, is what provokes thought. The critique of phenomenology in terms
63 See especially Totality and Infinity.
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of a notion of invisibility concerns, in Derrida as well as Henry, phenomenology's
exclusion of the 'indicative' and significative aspect of lived subjectivity.
The impasse of classical phenomenology lies with a circle of reasoning in which the main
points of reference are object-manifestation and act-intentionality:
Insofar as meaning, all possible meaning in general, is constituted by a
consciousness, the question as to the meaning of existence moves in a circle
as soon as what is thought under the term existence is in reality nothing other than
consciousness... What becomes evident [is] that the original structure of existence
defined as transcendence and intentionality does precisely no more than take over
the structure of consciousness itself, traditionally understood as a relation to an
object, as representation64.
The act which appears as independent of its own forward movement,
independently of the movement whereby it projects itself outside itself,
reveals itself to itself, in such a way that this "in itself" means: without
surpassing itself, without leaving itself... in its essence [...], immanence.
Immanence is the original mode according to which is accomplished the
revelation o/transcendence itself and hence the original essence of revelation
(EM 227, my emphasis).
Henry does not refute representational consciousness as such; rather he points to a certain
anteriority of existence determined by affectivity. Henry's analyses of subjectivity do not
refute alterity, an Other of subjectivity is there in every experience by subjectivity,
conditioning experience: "[Subjectivity is always a life in the presence of a transcendent
being" (PPB 187). Henry's argument is that the primary self-manifestation is an absolute
condition with respect to all other manifestation, and this argument must be understood
according to the notions of affectivity and the subjective body. Representation and
exteriority in the classic determinations of knowledge, are not questioned as such, but
64 Michel Henry quoted in Gary B. Madison, 1981 p. 272.
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shown to be limited. The Essence ofManifestation points to the connection between 'life'
and phenomenal manifestation65. The notion of the 'speech of life' responds to this
connection. Henry conceives of immanence as a condition for transcendence, but
interiority and exteriority are not oppositional terms, or terms of correlation. Rather,
Henry's conception of the self-manifestation of subjectivity shows how the subjectivist
and objectifying determinations of knowledge put each other in question. Derrida notes,
in Speech and Phenomena, "if [the] ultra-transcendental concept of life enables us to
conceive life (in the ordinary or in the biological sense) and if it has never been inscribed
in language, it requires another name" (SP 15). Henry cites Meister Eckhart: "The agent
which makes us conscious of seeing should rank above the agent of vision itself"66.
65 See Michel Henry's elaboration of themes in Meister Eckhart in EM, pp. 424 - 37.
66 Meister Eckhart quoted EM, p. 331.
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Chapter Three
The Question of Immanent Genesis
As I have showed in the previous chapters, for Derrida the notion of the Living Present in
Husserlian phenomenology necessitates delay. According to Derrida's Introduction, the
Living Present's "auto-temporalisation" is bound up with inter-subjectivity, the
"discursive and dialectical inter-subjectivity of Time with itself in the infinite multiplicity
and infinite implication of its absolute origins" (IOG 152). While classical
phenomenology is access to the consciousness of the living present, the problem lies with
phenomenology's determination of ontology by its methodological presumptions1.
Derrida argues that "[B]eing itself must always already be given to thinking, in the pre¬
sumption - which is also a resumption - of Method. And undoubtedly an access to being
and being's advent must already be contracted, when phenomenology begins by claiming
the right to speak" (152). Phenomenology starts from a given, the access to which is
presumed to be language conceived as a logic. This is because phenomenology starts with
a 'being of thought' which is necessarily delayed with respect to an always already past
present, that is, an other origin/ary. The living present's self-identity is already other.
What Derrida highlights is that difference is thus a condition for (self)-presence. That is
to say, an already constituted or another origin always already informs the living present
as the possibility of appearance or manifestation. When Derrida then infers that
"Difference would be transcendental" (153), he effectively suggests that a genesis must
be accounted for which is not a genesis from the transcendental consciousness of the
living present.
My argument with respect to Merleau-Ponty is that genesis in his analyses is still a
genesis from, according to his notion of flesh. This means that the displacement made by
1 See chapter one.
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his elaboration of an operative intentionality of B/being, is as all encompassing an
abstraction as determination by transcendental consciousness. The absolute generality
implied by Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh works to obscure any singular emergence, or
any genesis outside this generality. His notion of the 'total situation', as the temporal
sensibility that produces subjectivity, points to the difference and genesis of bodily being.
However, this genesis is all encompassing, the 'Nullpunkt' of all sensible and intelligible
genesis. Merleau-Ponty's analyses can only approach what I see as a central point
Derrida makes in his reading of Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation.
Derrida's critique of Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation - which concerns the question
of inter-subjectivity - highlights the fact that I as my-self cannot have presentation or
Gegenwartigung of an other's lived experience. There is only Vergegenvartigung or re¬
presentation. The instability of the living present is precisely the retention or re¬
presentation of another origin/ary. I say "originary" because the interruption by retention
of what is supposedly mine not only affects, but necessarily effects, my Self. Retention
and protention are conceived by Derrida as the announcement of an emergence of being
and a non-identity at the heart of self-identity and so productive of Being. In fact, this
non-identity is a condition for the emergence of self-'identity': self-presence is never
pure. This is the point that Derrida makes with respect to the impossibility of reaching the
object without passing via the sedimentations of culture. Delay is the irrevocable
necessity in any situation of presence that makes any structure of 'genesis from'
incomplete. Retention is an irreducible part of experience, which means that the origin
has always already disappeared. When Derrida speaks of a "polemical unity of
disappearing and appearing" (IOG 152), he suggests that the origin always already
escapes the present. This is because the origin/ary 'is difference'. Derrida starts with a
separation. Difference is transcendental. This reconception of the transcendental poses
the question of genesis with regard to an anteriority of the beginnings of classical
phenomenology. The origin is a certain absence, and this becomes obvious with regard to
the phenomenological analyses.
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The origin/ary must on account of this critique be said to be in excess of transcendental
consciousness and its determinations. Because Husserl's transcendental consciousness
reduces mind to the intellection of cognition, at least according to the methodological
analysis, it remains transcendent with regard to what is in excess of it. Husserl reduces
this excess to refractory categories of cognitive determinations. The excess is lost
because not graspable according to consciousness as a transcendent instance in the self-
presence of its being. The Derridean terms, contamination and differance, affirm alterity
as origin/ary, anterior to the methodological determinations of Husserlian
phenomenology.
Derrida says of alterity in "Violence and Metaphysics" that it must be understood in
terms of the indefinite: "The infinitely other would not be what it is, other, if it was
[just]2 a positive infinity, and if it did not maintain within itself the negativity of the
indefinite, of the apeiron"2. Derrida speaks here of differance, impure difference and a
negativity bound up with alterity. Derrida speaks of an "indestructible and unforeseeable
resource of the Greek logos" as "some unlimited power of envelopment by which he that
attempts to repel it would always already be overtaken" (112). Derrida's insight is that an
experience cannot be maintained in the purity of the form of the living present. In
"Violence and Metaphysics" he expresses this again in terms of the openness of the Idea
in the Kantian sense, the idea of the infinite as it
designates the infinite overflowing of a horizon which, by reason of an absolute
and essential necessity which itself is absolutely principial and irreducible, never
can become an object itself, or be fulfilled, equaled, by the intuition of an
object" (120).
There is always already excess with respect to intuition as the form(alisation) of the
living present. Derrida's notion of necessary impossibility suggests a genesis
21 insert "just" here because Derrida does not refute the notion of a positive infinite as such - as the
condition of ideality the movement to infinity is positive.
3 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 114. See also p. 119.
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unaccountable for by Husserlian intuition. Meaning-bestowal through intentionality or
intuition is already informed by the content in excess of it; content is always already in
form. The 'necessity' of Derrida's notion is "violence itself"4. The question of the other,
or the recognition of genesis in terms of impure difference, is inseparable from the
necessity of violence: "Being is necessarily dissimulated" (149) in me as my self.
The question of genesis or origin in "Violence" is related to a notion of infinity - or God:
The ontic content of infinity would destroy ontic closure . Implicitly or not, the
thought of infinity would open the question, and the ontico-ontological difference.
Paradoxically, it would be this thought of infinity (what is called the thought of
God) which would permit one to affirm the priority of ontology over theology,
and to affirm the priority of theology over ontology, and to affirm that the thought
of being is presupposed by the thought of God (150).
Derrida's 'ultra-transcendental concept of life' refers to that which is necessarily both
univocal and equivocal. Univocity is necessary to allow 'access' to meaning. However,
the equivocal, which informs all generation of meaning, the difference at the root of
genesis, disrupts this necessary unity. Transferred to the thought of God quoted above,
this means that univocally, God would be immanent to man; equivocally God is
transcendent. Infinite alterity opens up the question of the originary differance, of the
transcendent instance - being - and existence as being-in-the-world. The elaborations of
this double necessity in Derrida allow me to ask the question of an immanent genesis.
Can there be immanent genesis? That is, can the question of genesis be posed outside
epistemology - or the parameters of the intellect in cognition? Must the question be
posed outside T/thought?
According to Michel Henry, whose elaboration of phenomenological themes is based in a
notion of radical immanence, the answer to the first two of the three questions is
obviously 'yes'. Regarding the last question, Henry operates with a notion of
4 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 128. See also p. 133.
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forgetfulness, which effectively suggests that immanent genesis, as well as its question, is
an irreducible presupposition and condition of thought. Henry suggests that immanent
genesis as such is the origin which has always already disappeared from view, so to
speak. That is, an origin/aiy is effaced from view and from the philosophical discourse.
What Henry recognises, and what becomes obvious with the analyses of Merleau-Ponty
and Derrida, is the necessity of the problem that once being is posited, once we say that
there is being, then it is already lost as posited. Once the determinations of subject and
object have 'appeared', the meaning is lost, because this meaning eludes our cognitive
grasp. The question of being as also the being of the question in subjective being is
implicitly reformulated in these works in the following manner: Can there be a genesis of
immanence beyond epistemology? Can we think an immanent genesis beyond T/thought?
Can we think immanent genesis in terms of a sensible in excess of rational intellection
and the doctrine of constitution?
I. Michel Henry: the Excess of Life over and against the Theory of
Thought
Henry argues, in The Essence ofManifestation, that "[i]mmanence is the originary mode
according to which is accomplished the revelation of transcendence and hence the
originary essence of revelation" (EM 197). Henry attributes a fundamental passivity to
subjective experience, one that conditions and eludes the phenomenal act and designates
affectivity as the essence of phenomenal Life. In the face of the presumptions of
representational knowledge, he delineates an emergence of thought from the sensible.
With this, he indicates a rethinking of the notions of reference and representation. My
argument is that the implication set by the priority of affectivity is that sensible life is in
excess of rational thought. Henry names this excess pathos. Affective reality is Henry's
designation of an invisible as what "determines the essence of immanence and constitutes
it" (441). To the extent that immanence is understood in terms of affectivity Henry's
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thought does not disagree with Derrida's insight that alterity - a significative effectuation
- is always already there, as non-presence insofar as non-presence is understood as non-
intuition, refusing the eidetic priority of theoretical knowledge.
Raising the question of whether or what forms of culture may be considered to be
languages on this account Henry considers the manner in which painting shows "not
things, but their emergence, their abolition in this emergence itself" (PL 362). Henry
recognises that art opens up thought to the immanence of a genesis beyond cognition. Art
is not about information and communication but opens up the register in which language
is left to be equivocal. Henry attributes to Kandinsky the intuition that " fbjecause every
speech is also and first that of Life, painting must paint the invisible" (362); the
phenomenological material of color and form is "drawn from 'life' by way of pure
impression (the color spread across the object, the 'noematic color', being only the pure
impression's projection). Form therefore has a site in life like color, inasmuch as a form
is nothing but the outline of a force, it draws from life the pathetic dynamism without
which there is neither force nor form" (363, my emphases). According to Henry's
'radicalisation' of the Lebenswelt, the "original reality" of phenomenological material is
the "impressional self-revelation in the pathos of life" (363, my emphasis). The Greek
word for truth, aletheia, means revealing and concealing. Henry insists on this duplicity
of appearing in terms of a double articulation5 of being; he redirects the question of
being, as the meaning of being, beyond ontological monism, to an originary revelation
according to affectivity. Revelation according to affectivity is what he terms Life rather
than 'being'. Henry's motivation in introducing this term is to differentiate the term from
"being", in so far as the latter notion is (with ontological monism) reduced to a 'being of
thought': that is, presence and appearance according to the vision afforded by the
transparency of phenomenological language and its abstract, general and universalisable
notions of subjective acts.
5 This articulation, as it refers to Henry's notion of language understood in a broad sense, is closer to the
notion of expression, as Deleuze employs the term. I will take up this point later in the section on Deleuze
in this chapter.
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If embodied existence is characterised by a certain opacity, it is so, according to Henry,
because of an essential obscurity with respect to transcendence: "Being is what it is in the
sense that Being signifies the original immanent relation of self in unity" (297). In the
context of a discussion of Merleau-Ponty6, Henry states: "It is because the foundation of
exteriority maintains itself outside exteriority and does not manifest itself in it that
consciousness wherein the foundation resides is said to be 'obscure' and not to show
itself" (389).
Thought is transcendence, directed at an outside of self; the essence generated outside
T/thought's exteriority eludes thought. That is to say: "Because thought, while aiming at
exteriority, fails in principle to achieve the essence which maintains itself outside
exteriority, it denies it" (386): it 'denies' immanence. "What essential determination
other than the movement toward the outside, an outside which is its own, could thought
recognize and name? [...] We must reject the naive representation of a knowledge, first
enclosed in the subject and hence restricted to 'leaving' its so-called interior sphere in
order, outside of this sphere, to reach the object" (386). As Derrida has pointed out, this is
the problem with intentionality conceived according to the stability of the living present
in intuition. The presumption is that consciousness is self-enclosed, but can exit this self-
enclosure and 'reach the object' through an act of cognition. Henry, like Derrida,
recognises the 'necessary impossibility' of the departure from self according to a pure
consciousness that achieves knowledge. In the context of Heidegger's thought, Henry
speaks of this relation to immanence in terms of an ontological "forgetfulness of [its]
essence" (385):
Ontological monism is the theory of thought. That monism surpasses thought
toward its conditions, toward intuition and ultimately toward the ecstatic
transcendence of a horizon, does this not show that it actually moves constantly
in the direction prescribed by itself and by its objective? ... Because the re¬
membering ofBeing takes place in thought and aims at its object by means of
thought, this remembering actually repeats with respect to the original
6 The discussion concerns Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology ofPerception.
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immanence, the forgetfulness of naive consciousness and makes of this
forgetfulness an absolute. Thus, in thought, the forgetfulness of the essence
cannot change into its contrary, because its contrary is rather identical to it (385,
my emphasis).
Henry's argument is that classical phenomenology or "thought" "...bears within itself
the essence that it denies" (387). When Henry suggests that ontological monism or
classical phenomenology is the "theory of thought", what he says is that T/hought7 denies
its imbrication with conditions other than the purity of its self-presence and a logical
language that supports this presence. According to this criticism, Being and Knowing
cannot be understood in terms of an interlacing, or according to a transparence in which
meaning is accessed as something given by the intellectual capacity of thought or the
thinking subject. What Henry criticises through these characterisations of 'ontological
monism' is an abstraction in which thought determines life according to the language of
cognition. Henry's important insight is that the positing of Being through such
abstraction is forgetful of the excess of sensible life, which is always already a condition
of thought. Henry's is a critique of the impossible abstraction in phenomenology's use of
consciousness according to transcendental 'genesis from. Husserl's transcendental
consciousness is transcendent in a manner that presupposes an impossible abstraction
from the world of which it is part. The abstraction of this genesis is 'impossible' because
of its exclusion of its own conditions, its inability to account for its own conditions of
manifestation. In the "incapacity of transcendence to assure itself of the possibility of its
own manifestation... there also comes to light the impossibility for transcendence to lay
its own foundation and thus to constitute the [Being] of the foundation. In such an
impossibility resides the abstract character of the essence of manifestation interior to the
ontological presuppositions of monism" (210-11, my emphasis).
71 will use the term 'T/thought' throughout this chapter when I want to emphasise that the comments and
criticisms regarding thought also pertains to a certain tradition of philosophy and its presumptions
regarding its own discourse and what thought does. In Deleuze's thought this is an important point with
regard to his contention that the development of philosophical thought should concern itself with what
thought can do rather than what it is.
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Henry's critique determines the abstract character of what is foundational in the
presuppositions of ontological monism, as the reason for the "setback" regarding the
determination of "the uttermost possibility of manifestation in its very generality" (211).
The interlacing of being and knowing through an abstraction - which also occurs with
Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh - seeks an adequation that can never be complete.
Subjective as well as operative intentionality are both elaborations of the Platonic attempt
at adequation, in which Being is 'knowing', or thought. Both Henry and Derrida's
analyses support the Levinasian insight that thought is more than identification, as there
are conditions of its own manifestation that are other than thought, and that may not be
synthesised through the latter's abstractions and acts of meaning-bestowal. The critiques
of Henry, Derrida and Levinas are directed at the abstractions of this phenomenological
process of identification and synthesis: that is, phenomenological representation.
Husserl's ultimate source of meaning is the representational core of consciousness. This
is problematic in so far as representational consciousness necessarily has a presumed
transparence to it. According to Henry's analyses this transparence is the consequence of
an abstraction and the exclusion of non-theoretical areas of signification. This is what he
means by describing 'ontological monism as the 'theory of thought'. Of course, non-
theoretical areas of signification are accounted for through Husserl's broaching of
operative intentionality, time-consciousness and passive synthesis; but as long as the core
of consciousness is determined as the meaning bestowing activity of representational
consciousness, what informs this consciousness is never really accounted for outside its
theoretical determination.
These objections to Husserlian transcendental phenomenology are all very Levinasian,
but Henry's points of contention regarding ontological monism concur with Levinas's
here. Classical phenomenology calls for a performance of thought. This means that a
certain work of thought becomes the theoretical manifestation of its determinations. The
'determinations' of classical phenomenology are based on the irreducibility of the link
between intuition and intentionality, self-evidence and representation. The ultimate
guarantor of this constellation, the guarantor with regard to the production of truth, is the
relative transparence and maintenance of a purity regarding thought in the living present.
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However, the 'theory of thought' is based in a necessary forgetfulness of the conditions
of its own immanence and transcendent position. The abstractions of this thought suppose
self-evidence as the possibility that the mental act is originary with respect to what is
other. Such abstraction thus effaces an anteriority that is origin/ary with respect to the
phenomenological beginnings. What Henry, Derrida and Levinas call for is
responsiveness to this anteriority. This anteriority cannot be reached, only inadequately
approached, by the reductions of phenomenology.
(a) Body as Life in Henry: refiguring the transcendental
According to Henry 'ecstatic' phenomenology is not sufficiently grounded. The act of
transcendence is supposed without recognition of the anteriority of a mode of
manifestation - what Henry calls revelation - characterising the life of the subjective
body. This revelation must be understood in terms of receptivity, which is originary with
regard to the movement of transcendence. Henry's concept of Life refers to the
manifestation of affectivity according to the subjective body; immanence thus determines
the essence of this 'manifestation', as a mode of givenness. This context of immanence
opens the question of forgetfulness. Henry attributes an internal coherence to the life of
the subjective body. According to its mode of givenness as singularity, the subjective
body is a name for immanence as the potential of lived being or affectivity that prompts
thought as one of its actualisations. Immanence is, for Henry, that by which
transcendence is explained, a mode of givenness or affectivity, as the real meaning of
human bodily being8. Henry's analyses criticise the extent to which the meaning of being
8
Henry poses the questions of the meaning of being in terms of bodily being, in terms of a how of the life
of the body-subject. This life is anterior to the determinations of transcendence, and must be thought of in
terms of affectivity. In this manner, immanence is the essence of transcendence. See EM 261. Henry's
analysis of forgetfulness determines the emergence of thought according to a positioning for, or as,
affectivity. The affectivity which is inseparable from the life of the subjective body is originary with
respect to thought. I take this to be the main insight of Henry's work, and it links his thought to Deleuze
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as being-object in classical phenomenology is forgetful of the concrete life or anteriority
of the living body. The essence of manifestation is not an object in the world. Real
genesis, according to Henry, is necessarily hidden. Henry's notion of immanence breaks
with the adequation of being and knowing in which being is being-object. The
immanence of affective life is understood in terms of revelation because its being is
irreducible to being-object, to the manifestation of objectivity for consciousness. Henry
comments on the necessary incompleteness of the phenomenological reduction and the
forgetfulness of the movement of transcendence:
[T]he reduction, because it in no way allows its origin to appear in thought as a
'motif, henceforth appears without foundation, and is, according to the well-
known statement of Fink, "unmotivated", Nevertheless that the reduction should
take place and.. .the phenomenologist ask.. .the question of its possibility and of
its origin "... reside in the depth of transcendental subjectivity... which we truly
are without knowing it", [this] re-membering bears in itselfand for itself, as
certain signs of its positivity, the signs of forgetfulness which it
accomplishes... (392)
According to Henry's assessment of forgetfulness with regard to ontological monism, the
intervention in existential philosophy of this concept "and the clarification of its positive
meaning... as attested to by the idea of a re-membering, immanence is rather
presupposed by [this philosophy] as what makes this forgetfulness possible and
determines it, as that which hides itself' (392, my emphasis). According to Henry, the
definition of existence by existential philosophy implies what it denies: "immanence is its
conscious presupposition" (391). The idea of a 're-membering' or restoration makes the
point that something is lost or denied in object oriented thinking; as the basis of
knowledge is presumed in the purity of consciousness, the existence of the subjective
body is denied in 'de-membered' conscious intellection. Henry argues that "[b]ecause
according to the philosophy of existence, consciousness forgets its own phenomena, 'it
and Levinas's, especially, as they point to an inadequately recognised sensibility which informs thought
and is inseparable from embodied being.
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can recall them'... [and] this notion of a possible and necessary re-membering, attests
to... the reality of what it denies" (391):
... [B]orn and developing in object-oriented thinking, at the very core of its
movement toward the object and of the grasp which it effects, the feeling that
this grasp, and this by reason of the direction which is peculiar to it, is in no way
exhaustive; something in the grasp is lost, something essential which must be
recovered (391).
[As] thought restricts itself in an exclusive manner to the movement of
consciousness toward the world in the examination of its constitutive problems
and that the explanation of this world and of its typical structures is itself pursued
in conformity to the telos of intentionality and according to the mode of unveiling
which belongs to it and characterizes it... the re-membering still moves about
forgetful of the essence (392).
However, according to the argument here, this is "determined" by the immanence of the
essence: "In this way the question ofits possibility and its origin, which the epoche poses
with regard to itself becomes apparent. Because this possibility resides ultimately in the
original immanence of transcendental life, thought which looks for this possibility in the
world does not find it" (392). The forgetfulness is of the life of the subjective body, the
'recovery' cannot be directed to 'the world of objects', thought's own horizon or
intention. Henry's point is this: "that the loss of the essence results in object-oriented
thinking from its direction and not from the finitude of a content surrounded by horizons
is attested to by the character of re-membering (391,my emphases)9.
The positive phenomenological determination of immanence explains the status
ofexistence interior to the philosophy which takes the latter and its 'obscurity',
the obscurity ofexistence itself, as its theme (392).
9 The latter emphasis of course refers to the material dimension of the life of the subjective body.
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Henry points out that there is, within this philosophy, a realisation that this obscurity
"should be that of the essence and constitute its most notable phenomenological
characteristic" (392-3). Proceeding to quote passages from Merleau-Ponty's
Phenomenology ofPerception concerning the latent knowledge of the body, he concludes
that the "original mode of revelation" of the body nevertheless becomes here nothing
more than a "marginal phenomenon of this consciousness, the simple companion of the
perceptive act, its repercussions and backwash in sensibility" and thus do not sufficiently
take into account the relation of consciousness and the perceptive act to "the immanence
of the essence which is the foundation of [the] obscurity" (394). Henry finds the
"presentiment of immanence, at the very core of its negation and forgetfulness" (394) to
be "recognisable" not only in the existential versions of classical philosophy, but finds
that in phenomenology overall,
[alongside the determination of reality beginning with objectivity wherein reality
concretizes itself phenomenally, is juxtaposed the idea of that which rather does
not manifest itself in this objectivity. Such an element, non-objective in principle,
is not thereby nothing, but rather the condition of objectivity itself (394).
This passage contains the gist of Henry's argument relevant to the question of immanent
genesis. Genesis, conditioned firstly by the life of the subjective body, understood in its
movement or "sui generis" (PPB 54-55), is immanent insofar as it eludes theoretical
consciousness and its determination of objects of thought10.
This element, the 'sui generis' of the subjective body, is maintained "outside of
objectivity in the very act whereby it constitutes its foundation, [and] determines
positively the 'obscurity'" (394) which defines the essence of immanent life. This is the
meaning of the "duplicity of appearance" with regard to the affectivity of self-
manifestation. Forgetfulness, which is part of egoic subjectivity, is then already
10 Based in great degree on Maine de Biran's analyses of the body, the argument raised by Henry's
conception of the subjective body is that the place of 'real movement' takes place according to the body. As
opposed to the Cartesian conception of the body, "it defines the real body and not the idea of the body, as a
subjective and transcendental being" or an 'original sphere of existence' (PPB 57).
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determined by the indication of the immanence it denies. Immanent life indicates in
transcendence the excess of affectivity. Henry's argument is that as irreducible to
transcendental consciousness, the 'immanence of the essence' refers to an anteriority of
this consciousness, which is no less than origin/aiy with respect to the phenomenological
mind.
Henry's analyses in Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body (1975) determine how
an ontological theory of the subjective body is a condition for resuscitating within
thought a certain "reality" pertaining to the concept of subjectivity. According to Henry,
this reality is lacking in the descriptions of classical phenomenology (PPB 186). Henry is
concerned to resuscitate a philosophy of subjectivity outside the intellectualism and
abstractions of the phenomenological preference for representational consciousness. His
claim is that the description of subjectivity as transcendental is only a residue remaining
after T/thought, as the theory of thought, has reduced the subject through its abstractions
and "flight from reality" (186). Henry criticises the notion of subjectivity effected
through traditional phenomenological tenets, "its projection into the element of
transcendent being" (186, my emphasis):
That subjectivity cannot be confused with the pure universal and empty milieu
which floats around in representation, this results immediately from the fact that
subjectivity is nothing transcendent. That which characterises subjectivity from an
eidetic point of view is rather the fact that it is a life in a sphere of absolute
immanence, that it is life itself. The abstract is transcendent. The transcendent
element is a dead element which must be maintained in life by something more
concrete than it, for to maintain in life that which is dead is, as Hegel says, "that
which requires the greatest force." Moreover, that which maintains in life is life
itself, not understanding, but the effective life of absolute subjectivity in all its
forms, viz. the body as well and, in a general way, that which ordinary language
also calls life... Can the concrete character of absolute subjectivity be doubted if
it welcomes within it, as its most profound determinations, the intentionalities
which together comprise our bodily life? (186, my emphases).
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Henry is concerned with ontology to the extent that it is a manner of approaching the
problem of the body. That is, the ontological analysis of subjectivity in terms of an
absolute life of the body suggests a notion of Life that properly admits the concrete,
singular being of bodily subjectivity. Henry points out that an original and originary
being of bodily subjectivity is anterior to the noetic-noematic correlation. The body as
such cannot be said to be a product of constitution by consciousness. Rather bodily
subjectivity is originary with respect to the life of consciousness. The body is always
already the subjective body. Subjectivity cannot be abstracted - in the theoretical terms of
thought - from concrete subjective being as the life of the body. Thus the question of the
body is not that of subjectivity becoming aware of its body. The life of the body in-forms
subjectivity: it is the necessary content of the form of subjectivity, what I referred to
earlier as the 'otherness of self-awareness', which is thus consequent of the "absolute
immanence of the body" (58). This otherness must be designated, according to the
broader argument of Henry's analyses, as what has not been understood to any real extent
by phenomenology. The life of the body can be described as the real body of T/thought.
For Henry, bodily experience is the structure of absolute subjectivity and as such a
singularity of Life, an original revelation. This gives a different meaning to Merleau-
Ponty's "I am my body". In Henry this refers to an anteriority of reflective thought, but
not the presence of all-encompassing flesh. This is important for thinking immanent
genesis. The relation of body and subjectivity is both univocal and equivocal. Univocity
refers to a surging forth of immanent being. However, because subjectivity is always life
in the presence of a transcendent being its emergence is effected through this presence of
Alterity. When Henry says that subjectivity is "always a life in the presence of a
transcendent being" (187), this is not a contradiction of his descriptions of absolute
subjectivity or bodily immanence. The point for him, and this is the reason why his
analyses are relevant to the question of immanent genesis, is to account for subjectivity
differently than the abstractions of classical phenomenology that reduce it to an empty
form. Henry's insight is that subjectivity, as bodily subjectivity, "already has a content...
is an original content, viz. that of internal transcendental experience as such (187, my
emphases added to Henry's). It is this content ofform Henry refers to when he speaks of
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Life, and the density of sensible being in excess of the understanding or of rational
thought. The singularity of the living body is, according to Henry's analyses, "a real
element in the effectiveness of being", and thus in excess of the abstractions of classical
phenomenology which reduced its being to being-object, as "belonging to the ontological
milieu of being in general" (188).
This being in general refers to what the previous two chapters of this work designated as
the inability to account for the concrete singularity of what is other to consciousness's
thematic determinations. Henry permits an important addition to this 'ontological
insufficiency'. His analyses add that the insufficiency of the determination of otherness in
terms of a thematic generality is a consequence of a mis-recognition of bodily being. This
mis-recognition is the necessary failure to grasp the body in its self-revelation. The
subjective body is a condition for the emergence of subjectivity. However, the self-
revelation that is the life of the body necessarily eludes constitution by the understanding;
it thus eludes the conceptualisations of T/hought. What we designate here as thought
works through a certain presumption that conceptualisation is a certain abstraction,
generalisation and universalisation of concepts. Gilles Deleuze takes up this critique of
the formalisation involved in such use of the concept: it leads to a mis-recognition in
which the concepts prove 'too general or too large for the real'11. Ontological monism,
according to Henry, fails to "raise" itself even to the "idea of the subjective body" (188).
Thought, as the theory of thought, operates with a notion of absolute knowledge, which
does not escape a presumption of adequation with respect to Being and Knowledge. The
body conceived according to its own revelation, or its own transcendental content in¬
forming subjectivity, disrupts the idea of an absolute knowledge according to a pure
consciousness of the living present. The content of the body - its revelation according to
subjective life - is "irreducible to any transcendent content" (188).
11 See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Athlone 1994 [1968]), p. 68.1
will take up Deleuze's critique and alternative philosophy with respect to such mis-conceptualisation in
part three of this chapter.
Immanent genesis, as genesis of the subjective body - in the presence of transcendent
being, but irreducible to it - is not genesis from. Immanent genesis is understood here
through an analysis of the ontological being of the subjective body. The transcendental
subjective body cannot be reduced to transcendent content according to the generality of
objective being. The generation of a content of form (the subjective body) refers to a
possibility of absolute knowledge in so far as this refers not to knowledge of and
according to pure consciousness, but to an anteriority of a content always already
informing consciousness. That is, the life of the body as immanent genesis prompts
thought. This Life12 is necessarily in excess of phenomenological determination on the
classical account. Again in Henry, we find the Derridean insight that phenomenological
beginnings are always delayed. The anteriority that is forgotten always already informs
the abstractions and disrupts the presumption of purity in the living present.
The insight of Henry's critique of 'ontological monism' is that the presuppositions of
transcendence in fact show that the transcendent subject must be affected by something
outside itself; there must be a condition for transcendence. This is what he terms
immanence or the movement of the subjective body. Thus the question raised is how
transcendence is affected - and effected, this is the central insight made here - by an
anterior 'givenness' or indication of 'objects', as sensibility, signification by the body13.
There are no original 'objects ofthought'. As the originary anteriority, or the ontological
possibility of transcendent thought, immanence is "transcendental" (EM 260).
Transcendence, as the supposed departure from self, is effectively put in question by the
12 In Henry this Life, its revelation to itself, is given the name of God as The Essence. The revelation of Life
to itself (EM 295) must be considered in terms of the attempt to designate a movement of the Infinite, as
that which eludes the intellection of cognition regarding determinations in transcendence. My consideration
of Henry regarding immanent genesis, regards the analyses to the extent that they show the limit of act-
intentionality and object-manifestation. Genesis can be thought beyond these, in terms of the immanence of
affectivity in a corporeal sense.
13 As I read Henry on this relation of transcendence to immanence, it is the understanding of the anteriority
of immanence as inseparable from the affections of the subjective body that makes the departure from self-
presence on the Husserlian account. Immanence, although The Essence ofManifestation refers to it as
revelation of the Absolute (EM 307), is thus different from the presence presumed maintainable according
to classical phenomenology's determinations by transcendence. Immanence is never pure. Otherness, as the
life of the subjective body, is presence attuned to affectivity, i.e the presence of alterity. This positioning of
the subjective body for or as affectivity, gives an account of corporeality that supports a notion of
immanent genesis. That is, genesis not reducible to the cognitive subject or categories of the 'world'.
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immanent life of the subjective body. Immanence, and immanent genesis, is its
impossible presupposition, and informs a necessary forgetfulness in T/hought.
II. Questioning the 'Other Husserl': Genesis and Language
When I pose the question of an immanent genesis, it is prompted by the lack - the
reduction - in classical phenomenology of a sufficient account of origins of meaning
beyond acts of consciousness. I consider transcendental phenomenology, based on what
Fink designated as act-intentionality and object-manifestation, to be limited on account of
a reduction of the notions of genesis and language. Donn Welton's study of Husserl, The
Origins of Meaning: A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology
(1983)14, attempts to defend Husserl with respect to criticism regarding the notions of
perception and language in his phenomenology. Welton makes a case for the so-called
"other" Husserl that Derrida's analyses also recognise. His approach is a consideration of
Husserl's later forays into the genetic analysis of meaning, with regard to its effect on the
relation between perception and speech. Welton takes up the point that the later genetic
analyses tend to modify the static analysis in which meaning is invariably considered in
terms of a logical determination, or methodological inevitability. He points to the Husserl
that Derrida finds in the Inner Time-Consciousness lectures, to determine that for the
later Husserl consciousness is "above all" (OM 3) process rather than collection of
mental elements. There is recognition in the later Husserl that thought is accomplished
"from the outset" (4) as linguistic; and genetic analysis shows that speech and perception
"give birth to each other and opens the door to a description of the interaction of our
linguistic manner of intending objects with the modes of their presence in perceptual
fulfillment, i.e to an analysis of what we will call the dialectic of meaning and sense" (4).
14 Donn Welton, The Origins ofMeaning: A Critical Study of the Thresholds ofHusserlian Phenomenology
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983). Hereafter referred to as OM.
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Welton's consideration of this relationship is bound by a delimitation of 'language' as
'speech-acts'. Apart from Welton's recognition that the turn in Husserl to genetic
analysis does not really change much with regard to his theory of language - i.e language
is not productive, but repeats the insights of intuition by "'lifting' the noematic sense (or
core) into the domain of 'logos' (270, quoting Husserl from Ideen 1, 350) - the notion of
language investigated remains reduced. The point emphasised in Derrida, Merleau-Ponty
and Henry is that language exceeds speech acts. The signification of language in a broad
sense must be taken into consideration in regard to the question of genesis. The
signification of language and the question of the origin of meaning must be 'lifted'
outside the relationship between speech and perception. The focus of analyses that
remain with the latter delimitation of language, consider it according to its logical
function only. The signification of language understood in a broader sense is always in
excess of its usage as medium of communication. The effects of signification are
inseparable from the affections of the subjective body, and irreducible to the speech-acts
correlative to perception. Husserl's genetic analyses of sense-formation move beyond the
strict sense of 'sense posited' by judgments of consciousness - in the Investigations and
Ideas 1 particularly - to sense formation according to the 'context of its horizons'.
However, the dative of the latter expression clearly shows the delimitation in a double
sense. Firstly, meaning is established according to an appearance for consciousness, and
in relation to other appearances. Secondly, meaning is determined by an act of
consciousness, on the basis of other determinations of consciousness. The introduction of
the temporal horizon in the Lectures on Inner Time- Consciousness puts in question the
adequation presumed in meaning intention and its fulfillment, but as Derrida has shown,
there is a contradiction between Husserl's paragraph 16 and 17 here15. Husserl does not
resign the notion of the fulfilment of meaning in the presence to consciousness in the
Erlebnism. His elaborations of passive synthesis recognise the import of the temporal
horison for the determination of sense, but synthesising consciousness gathers meaning or
15 See chapter one, especially p. 35.
16 Levinas of course emphasises that intentionality is always towards fulfillment, never attained.
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sense as univocal according to the living present. Moreover, although Husserl's analyses
of passive synthesis recognise a "fundamental stratification" between "passivity and
receptivity on the one hand, and that spontaneous activity of the ego typified by
judgments, on the other" (OM 272-3) it nevertheless remains that Husserl's analyses do
not take the real consequence of this as this calls for a reconception of the transcendental.
Derrida does. The life of the subjective body, its affections - or 'original transcendental
content' (PPB 187) - and the manner in which it effects the ego-subject that makes
judgments is never broached in the Husserlian analyses. Henry's analyses negotiate this
impasse, which marks classical phenomenology, through his specific conception of the
forgetfulness of immanence.
If Husserl sees, as Welton points out, that there must be a distinction between language
and thought as active intention, the consideration remains misplaced with regard to the
account of the living body. The insufficient account of the affection and effects of the
living body with regard to sense-formation is the reason why "thinking" is reduced to its
active intention. Welton's criticism of Husserl is misplaced to the extent that the question
that must be posed in face of the Husserlian analyses is not whether passivity, receptivity
and notions of the linguistic origins of thought are broached in his analyses, but of the
possibility within classical phenomenology of a real consequence or elaboration of the
insights provided. The answer to that question is that Husserl's insufficient account of
language in a broad sense leaves out the import of signification as it is born out of
affectivity and a real sense of embodiment. Husserl cannot account for what has been
described above as the 'otherness of self-awareness': the separation or difference that is
the origin of Self, and that is inseparable from the alterity experienced by the living body.
"Thinking" cannot be separated from its origins in the body, and so the distinction
between language and thought as active intention is misplaced and insufficient. It misses
a crucial dimension of both thought and language. Taking seriously the notion of the
subjective body and what it can do, we must conclude that the signification of language
in a broad sense - with Derrida and Henry - is not separable from thinking. This
inseparability is differently conceived than what Husserl seems to have in mind in the
early works, in which language clearly coincides with thought.
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Welton's argument regarding the re-orientation in Husserl's notions of sense and
language is supported by his reading of Husserl's 1920-21 lectures on "Transcendental
Logic", in which the ideality of language is not referable to an ideal intuition of
consciousness. The fact remains that the consequences of this are not explored as a
problematic in Husserl's published works, and that fact must be considered in terms of
his neglect of the real implications of embodiment. Husserl remains engrossed with the
ideal of a 'scientific' language. The idea of correlation, the ideal of the mathematical
object guiding the question of sense formation, remains an abstraction and 'forgetfulness'
of what the body can and does do as transcendental content. Ultimately, the sense of
language and 'linguistic' in Husserl - even in the lectures on "Transcendental Logic" - is
reduced to word-formation(s). Thus there cannot be a real account of the relation between
embodiment and language, and language and thought. In a passage from the lectures on
'Transcendental logic" quoted by Welton, it is clear that Husserl's statements amount to a
recognition that "thinking", even solitary thinking, is linguistic (OM 376). Husserl's
statements are, firstly with regard to "thinking expressing itself in solitude", that it is
"certainly not" a matter of first having a conceptual formation and then seeking "the
appropriate words". Husserl's states: "Thinking is performed at the very outset as
linguistic. What lies in our practical horizon as that which is to take on structure is the
still indeterminate presentation of a formation that is already a linguistic formation".
However, 'linguistic' is here understood according to a notion of language in the narrow
sense. This performance by consciousness remains dependent on a capacity of cognition
to perform a synthesising operation. The passage continues to claim that " [t] he thought
that floats before us and that we inwardly bring to expression is already double-sided but
yet completely indeterminate" (my emphasis). Then 'concludes' that "[a] 11 sense-fulfilled
assertions as concrete unities of linguistic body and linguistic sense are 'spiritual
formations'"17. Welton suggests that the vagueness of the concluding paragraphs here
opens up implications that Husserl at this point does not wish to consider. He proceeds to
17 All the above Husserlian statements are from his 1920-21 lectures on 'Transcendental Logic" as cited in
Donn Welton, The Origin ofMeaning, p. 276.
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quote a passage from Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic that demonstrates the
extent to which Husserl engages with the sense of "thinking" as "linguistic at the outset":
Human thinking is usually accomplished linguistically, and all confirmations of
reason are as good as entirely bound up with speech. Furthermore, so far as it is
intersubjective, all critique from which the rationally true is to emerge uses
language and its results always leads to propositions18.
This passage underwrites my argument that Husserl restricts himself to the sense of
language according to speech-acts. Thought is determined by the act of speech, as it
produces the correlation in which the rationally true emerges. The specific sense of
intentionality, which informs Husserl's notion of speech act as every act of meaning, is
based in a forgetfulness of the body-subject regarding the formation of meaning.
Welton points out that the genetic analysis of passive synthesis in Husserl (in the second
part of F I 37 and published as Analyses zur Passiven Synthesis) is reduced to "sense
genesis of judgments": that is, the analysis of the "intentional implications", as a "sense-
history" of the judgment which is as Welton points out only "incidentally temporal" (OM
278). The real implication of temporality, the absence of an alterity that always already
disrupts the unity of the conscious self-aware subject, Husserl does not elaborate.
Temporality's originary role with respect to the sense-formations that prompt the
emergence of subjectivity is reduced to something "incidental" in Husserl. Husserl's
priority lies with the constitutive function of subjectivity with respect to meaning
formation. Husserlian 'genetic' analysis is bound to, and reduced by, the priority of the
methodology as it is presumed to exhaust meaning formation. Although perceptual
meaning in Hussserl differs from the logistic determinations of meaning in the earlier
works, he cannot free perception from cognition; perceptual meaning is identified with
language, as something more than a projection by consciousness. However, this
language, in so far as it is restricted to its function within (originary) speech-acts, ignores
18 The passage corresponds to the lectures on "Transcendental Logic", catalogued as FI 37 (1920-26), and
Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1969), p. 357. My emphases.
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an irreducible factor in meaning formation, and so this liberation of meaning from its
early logistical characterisation does not go far enough19. It restricts the notion of
language and thus delimits any 'genetic' sense of the approach to meaning formation.
The beginnings of transcendental phenomenology, even the later beginnings, presuppose
a delay that necessarily passes unrecognised.
Husserl's attempt at a differentiation of thought and language in terms of 'stratification'
remains a negative abstraction. The analyses of passive as well as active syntheses are
conducted according to this stratification. In F I 37, Husserl speaks of introducing a
broader analysis of sense bestowal beyond the function of propositions, words and the
medium of expression (OM 279). However, any attempt at accounting for pre-
predicative experience is referred to its complex relation to the judging activity of ego-
consciousness in a manner that excludes the real implication of language as something
that precedes me as my-self. Any reciprocity between experience and predication is
limited to what is present to consciousness in the narrow sense of the Husserlian living
present. The recognition in Husserl's later works that language and signification are
informed by sedimentations of culture, that there is thus meaning formation in excess of
the acts of consciousness, are not taken up with respect to the body or an originary
temporality. Beyond Husserl, language must be conceived in broader terms than the life
world of man in face of the cultural community. Meaning formation is in excess of
"man's" perspectives afforded by man's vision of cultural inter-subjectivity. That these
perspectives are considered linguistic, informed by 'sedimentation', does not complete a
genetic account of meaning-formation. The presence of the life-world is presence to the
Husserlian ego-consciousness, language is a function of the horisons present to this ego-
consciousness, and is thus forgetful of the immanence of the body with respect to
transcendental subjectivity and transcendental phenomenology, and the alterity that
informs any presence to self. Beyond Husserl, alterity should not just be defined
negatively. Alterity conceived in terms of corporeality and a corpo-real is not just a
19 Welton suggests that Husserl's later and "proper description of the structure of perceptual acts" has
repercussions with regard to his theory of language which liberates meaning from the early logistical
characterisations, but sees this liberation in the identification of language and meaning "in the case of
originary speech acts" (OM 283).
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foreign instance that distorts cognitive intentional acts of recognition. Alterity so
conceived is a non-representable which informs the mind in a form of recognition that is
not representational, and that is not presentable according to a pure consciousness.
Alterity leaves traces20 - inseparable from the being of the subjective body - and is what
passes through subjectivity without becoming present or re-presentable. It is this aspect
of corporeality that should be accounted for in a genetic account of language and
meaning formation. Husserl's analyses fall short of a sufficient account of genesis and
language on these grounds.
My argument with respect to this forgetfulness of classical phenomenology, which in fact
is presupposed by its analyses, points to immanent genesis as the very potential for
meaning formation. I will address the analyses of Gilles Deleuze in the next section. My
reason for taking up Deleuze on this point is that he provides a notion of immanence that
clarifies the idea of a missed potential of this tradition of thought in terms of immanent
genesis.
III. 'Sensibility' and Immanence: Deleuze
Gilles Deleuze's thought poses the question of immanence in similar terms to Henry; his
notion of immanence is developed in response to what he considers to be the illusion of
transcendence in thought. Deleuze's thought, like Henry's, departs from traditional
phenomenological tenets. His notion of immanence provides challenges to classical
phenomenology as well as to strands of post-structuralist thought with which he is often
too easily aligned. Like Henry, Derrida and Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze's thought departs
from classical phenomenology in his questioning of the referral of phenomena to the
20 "Trace" is here understood in Levinas's and Derrida's sense of the term.
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interiority of consciousness or the thinking subject who constitutes them21. Like Merleau-
Ponty and Derrida he also engages with phenomenology and Husserl. Post-structuralist
thought in general shares the critique of the subject considered as methodological point of
certainty, as the essence that constitutes the world. For Deleuze, as for most post-
structuralist thought, the question is how the subject is constituted in the given. Deleuze's
philosophy operates with a notion of dynamic materiality that speaks for genesis outside
eidetically determined structures, or constitution of objects in consciousness. Deleuze
speaks of a physics of bodily life, which underwrites the notion of immanent genesis as
bound up with sensibility.
Classical phenomenology's recognition of a moment of passivity with regard to
subjectivity would on Deleuze's account fall short of an adequate recognition of
immanence with respect to transcendence. Deleuze, with Guattari, points out that it is a
feature of the "modern moment" to think transcendence from immanence:
[W]e are no longer satisfied with thinking immanence as immanent to a
transcendent; we want to think transcendence within the immanent, and it is from
transcendence that a breach is expected (WP 47).
When phenomenology discusses immanence as immanent to transcendental subjectivity,
"as in Husserl and many of his successors who discover in the Other or in the Flesh, the
mole of the transcendent within immanence itself" (WP 53), the problem lies with the
notion of constitution, and the abstract schematism of the operation of intentionality.
Deleuze does not, with regard to the priority of transcendental subjectivity in classical
phenomenology, deny transcendental acts. What he questions is the presumption of a
prior and originary transcendental instance in consciousness and its constitutive capacity;
the problem with this presumption in classical phenomenology is the positing of the
subject in transcendence from its material.
21 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh
Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994). Deleuze says, "... with Descartes, then Kant and Husserl, the cogito
makes it possible to treat the plane of immanence as a field of consciousness. Immanence is supposed to be
immanent to a pure consciousness..." (46). Hereafter WP.
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Deleuze's problematisation of the phenomenological 'exit from matter' reorients the
notion of subjectivity in terms of an essential openness pertaining to the materiality of
being. This openness is to an excess characteristic of material being that exceeds and is
productive of the life of subjectivities. I want to introduce this point as taken up in
Deleuze by a comment on Merleau-Ponty, who conceives of the openness in terms of his
notion of Flesh. Unlike Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty conceives openness to the materiality of
being in a manner that blurs the relation between the material and immaterial. In Deleuze,
the material and immaterial are co-extensive but not in a figural sense, and so differently
conceived than in Merleau-Ponty.
In the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty regards being as infinity rather than
subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty recognises here a notion of infinity which, as in Spinoza as
well as Leibniz, is positive: " a depth of being which is recognised only with the notion of
infinity [as] an inexhaustible reserve of being which is not only this but could have been
other (Leibniz) or is effectively more than we know (Spinoza, the unknown attributes)...
They have devalued the closed world for the benefit of a positive infinity" (WN 169)
The veritable infinity... must be what exceeds us: the infinity of Offenheit
and not of Unendlichkeit—Infinity of the Lebenswelt and not infinity of
idealization—Negative infinity therefore—Meaning or reason which are
contingency (169).
The notion of being as infinity is understood here not in terms of the idealisation of a
teleology of reason, but in terms of an openness (Offenheit) to the materiality of being22.
However, this openness with regard to the materiality of being is understood in Deleuze,
as in Henry, in terms of the divergence of affectivity and not in terms of the continuity
implied in Merleau-Ponty's notion of Flesh. According to the relation of otherness and
self-awareness implied by Henry's temporality in terms of 'antecedence' or anteriority,
22Deleuze says about (Spinozist) attributes that "they are indeed substances in a purely qualitative sense"
and expresses with this his reading of Spinoza according to a specific notion of infinity in relation to
'immanence', our involvement with the dynamic materiality of existence. See Expressionism in
Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. M. Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992) p. 65. Hereafter EP.
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the divergence in affectivity must be understood in a non-figural sense. Revelation, as a
movement of immanence - infinity - is according to Heniy's descriptions of the excess
of affective Life irreducible to Being as ontological difference.
Deleuze's notion of immanence as absolute processuality and emergence questions the
regime of Being according to ontological difference in terms of the notion of our
involvement with a dynamic materiality and becoming. His notion of becoming displaces
the idea of ontological difference to the extent that it is based in a notion of ground or
origin conceived according to a homogeneous relation to what is grounded (LS 96):
Becoming implies a genesis that does not concern origin or end, and a certain
forgetfulness of egoic subjectivity. The notion reflects Deleuze's concern with a thought
involved in the body, but not as in Merleau-Ponty reducible to it. In Difference and
Repetition he argues: "in the path which leads to that which is to be thought, everything
begins with sensibility" (DR 144).
Deleuze's "transcendental empiricism" puts out the idea of a sensibility in face of
thought. This 'sensibility' is different from sensation as directive of empiricism proper; it
diverges from transcendental determination regarding the constitution of the world of
subjects and objects. The sensibility in question here is affectivity or the 'passage'
between sensations, the designation of a power or potential of non-dialectical becoming.
Deleuze describes this sensibility according to the notion of a 'transcendental field'.
Different from empirical representation according to a subject or sensation, it refers to a
'duration' of impersonal pre-reflexive consciousness - the immanence of a movement
without beginning or end, irreducible to the positing of a Self or an object. The
transcendental field must be conceived as anterior to the classical delimitations of the
'field' of consciousness, which determined subject and object in the rigidity of their
phenomenological constellation. Deleuze conceives of the 'transcendental field' as a
virtual power - the capacity to be affected - that actualizes itself as factual consciousness
through the simultaneous production of subject and object when the subject 'refers'
consciousness to objects. This conception of the production of subjectivities is different
from the phenomenal positing of a self in transcendence from its material. Deleuze
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articulates the notion of an absolute immanence, immanence that is not in or to an already
posited transcendent instance. The problem with such positing, performed by classical
phenomenology, is that the subject posited according to such transcendence remains a
generality of being in which immanence is contained and thus 'deformed', that is,
stripped of material content. The latter conception of subjectivity as a synthesising unity
closes off the materiality of being, reduces it to the objectivity of the world. Nothing is in
excess of this transcendent instance, and being cannot be thought as anything but being-
object. The notion of absolute immanence, what Deleuze calls a 'plane of immanence,
refers to an anteriority with regard to transcendent effort, defined by the transcendental
field, the pre-personal - 'consciousness' or 'awareness' without self.
Deleuze's Spinozism23 reorients the relation of mind and matter, in so far as the
materiality of being is conceived differently than the figuration by classical
phenomenology in which materiality is the inert hyle awaiting its formation into sense by
a synthesis on the part of transcendent consciousness. Deleuze's philosophy of
immanence makes an important distinction with his notion of the plane of immanence.
According to Deleuze,
Any organization that comes from above and refers to transcendence [...] can be
called a theological plan: [...] it will always be a plan of transcendence
that directs forms as well as subjects [...]. [It] always has an additional
dimension; it always implies a dimension supplementary to the dimensions of
the given24.
23 Deleuze's notions of immanence, univocity and expressionism in philosophy, as I treat these in the next
sections, refer to his reading of Spinoza. I engage with these notions to the extent that they cast light on the
question of immanent genesis. My argument is that these notions enable an understanding of immanent
genesis in line with the analyses of Henry and Derrida as they point out the limitations of the
phenomenological and certain classical analyses of meaning formation.
24 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Richard Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights, 1988)
p. 128. Hereafter PP.
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Conversely, a plane of immanence "has no supplementary dimension; the process of
composition must be apprehended for itself, through that which it gives. It is a plan of
composition, not a plan of organization or development", that is, production of 'the new'
rather than a modification of the contents already belonging to a consciousness (PP 128,
my emphasis). Deleuze's philosophy is a valuable contribution with respect to the
question of immanent genesis; it redefines materiality in terms of his notion of
immanence. Genesis is understood in terms of the virtual potential of a plane of
composition, across which a materiality of being - in its excess from consciousness -
creates according to impersonal or pre-personal becomings25. Life is understood
according to a notion of dynamic materiality: it is a 'virtual multiplicity of events and
responses'. I quoted Deleuze from Negotiations 1972-1990 in chapter one, arguing for
the indistinction of images and things: "There's no difference at all between images,
things and motion '26. The idea of production conceived according to an impersonal
process - becoming - questions even the nature/artifice distinction. The Deleuzian plane
of immanence does not make this distinction, "artifice is fully a part of nature" (PP 124).
This is a not unimportant point. The effort to make a distinction between nature and
artifice, which marks much of the tradition of thought, is less pertinent here than the
effort to account for the extent to which a materiality of being marks both. A certain Life
marks nature and artifice in a non-organic sense. This conception eludes the
phenomenological analyses. Deleuze thinks the in-distinction in terms of a production or
process, which displaces idealistic categories to the extent that its relationship to desire is
thought as an immanent principle outside the transcendence of consciousness. When
desire as such is thought as a logic of immanence, what this does is question the power of
conceptualisation as an intentional activity of 'pure' consciousness, according to which
the abstraction and generality of a universalisable notion are presumed in transcendence
of its material or content. Desire, as the logic of immanence, puts the notion back in its
context or concrete situation, restores it to the materiality of its emergence. The point
25 See Gilles Deleuze, "First Series of Paradoxes of Pure Becoming", pp. 1-3, in The Logic ofSense, trans.
Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (London: Athlone, 1990, [1969]). Hereafter referred to as LS.
26 Gilles Deleuze, quoted in Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 88. My
emphasis added.
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emphasised is that matter is more than what is taken up by consciousness, mastered by
perception. I shall return to this point regarding matter and perception.
The specific nature of Deleuze's thinking of immanence must be understood according to
his development of the notion of univocity in his reading of Spinoza. His thinking of an
'infinite infinite'27, or absolute processuality, reflect his univocal ontology28. The notion
holds Deleuze's response to the Heideggerian opening of the question of Being in terms
of 'ontological difference'29. In what way is Being said of beings? Deleuze's argument in
Difference and Repetition is that Heidegger's treatment of the question never probed
sufficiently the consequence of ontological difference; he did not adequately think
difference in itself. For Deleuze, only a univocal ontology can provide a necessary
concept of difference in itself, and "conceive of being in such a manner that it will be
truly disengaged from any subordination in relation to the identity of representation" (DR
66). Deleuze's claim is a seeming paradox: "univocal Being belongs only to difference"
(66). What exactly is the relation then, for Deleuze, between a univocal ontology and a
thought of difference in itself?
Deleuze's system of univocal ontology moves beyond both Spinoza and Heidegger in
that it removes the classical references of God, self and world. In Spinoza, Deleuze finds
an ontology of univocity in which Being is 'said in one sense'. However, the project of
Difference and Repetition, to think difference outside the concept of identity moves
beyond Spinoza in its attempt to articulate univocity according to pure differentiation or
modality, movement30. In an affirmation of Heidegger's 'ontological intuition', Deleuze
27 See WP Deleuze describes this duration or 'event' as "there where nothing takes place, an infinite
awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting and reserve" (158). The virtuality of the pure plane of
immanence - the Deleuzian event - means that nothing takes place, but "everything becomes" as
"variations, modulations [...] singularities of a new order" (158). I will elaborate on Deleuze's thinking of
the event and 'singularities' in the following sections.
28 Deleuze introduces univocity in Expressionism in Philosophy, his main book on Spinoza. The theme of
univocity is prominent in Difference and Repetition and The Logic ofSense.
29 Deleuze states: "We regard as fundamental this 'correspondence' between difference and questioning,
between ontological difference and the being of the question" (DR 66).
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aims to conceive a univocity or immanence according to which "difference [is]
articulation and connection in itself" (DR 117). According to Deleuze, an adequate
concept of difference in itself "must relate different to different without any mediation
whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed" (117, my
emphasis). Deleuze refutes the Aristotelian claim that the Being of beings must be
understood according to analogy, that is, according to the categories of possible
experience determined by the transcendent instance of T/hought, that is, the categories of
a specific concept of representation31. The determination of the sense of Being with
respect to beings on this model of representation is conceived in terms of a generality that
prevents, according to Deleuze, any real concept of the universal as well as the singular.
The genesis of the individual - individuation - or the formation of meaning is on this
model of representation reduced to a generality according to a reflexive difference only,
afforded by identity in the concept32. Paradoxically, an analogical or equivocal
distribution of Being can only account for what is on this account general in beings33.
Thinking univocity, on Deleuze's model, on the other hand, accounts for individuation
and difference in itself outside this model of representation. While Being is said in the
same sense of all that is, the Being of beings is not attempted grasped in terms of
substance or form(ation) according to the categories, but in terms of the divergence of
30 Deleuze moves beyond Spinoza with this point, as in Spinoza modification is o/substance, or God.
Difference is here still regulated according to an ultimate reference point or a principle of ultimate identity.
You could say that Deleuze replaces Spinoza's notion of substance with a 'sub-instance'. I will explain this
in the sections below, in terms of Deleuze's thought of genesis according to the notions of event and
intensity.
31 The Aristotelian legacy subordinates difference to 'identity' in the structure of representation that
Deleuze criticises in DR. This structure conceives difference according to a fourfold subordination: analogy
of judgment; identity in the concept and opposition between predicates; and resemblance as the yardstick
with respect to perception. This structure is made possible by the abstraction which overcodes the real, as a
prior transcendence of consciousness to its material - the main problem from which Deleuze's thought
makes its departure. The critique of this structure is necessarily bound up with the notion of immanent
genesis.
32 See Deleuze's comments on Aristotle in DR pp. 269-70 especially.
33
According to DR, with an analogical or equivocal concept of Being the relation to beings is determined
by the distribution of 'common sense' and the hierarchical notion of 'good sense'. Particularity is
subsumed and undermined by a generality afforded by the categories. See especially p. 269. See also
Deleuze, LS pp. 75-9.
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affectivity or 'modal variation'. What this means is that a real being of the body - what
happens to bodies - is taken into account as a crucial determinant of the Being of beings.
Deleuze can present this novel model of univocity in so far as he speaks of real difference
in itself, the relation of Being to beings, as a degree of power or intensity*4. This notion
of difference in itself can only be conceived according to univocity. Deleuze's thesis is
that univocity understood in this manner gives a collective rather than distributive sense
of Being and so can account for real difference in itself. The relevance of this notion of
univocity is that it gives a sense of embodiment that accounts for differential relations as
they mark the life of the body. Within the univocal sense of Being, difference is effected
according to a capacity for affectivity. That is, "intensity is the form of difference in so
far as this is the reason of the sensible. Every intensity is differential, by itself a
difference" (222). Difference in itself is understood according to a quantitative rather
than qualitative measure: Being is 'immediately' in all beings, without mediation of a
transcendent. To the extent that a degree of power or intensity accounts for a quantitative
difference, or difference in itself, it is the 'element' of immanence that allows us to think
immanent genesis. In so far as Deleuzian difference in itself cannot be grasped on the
classical model of representation, it is the 'non' Being of the virtual. I put 'non' in
inverted commas, as the virtual is not opposed to the real, just to a constitution by a
transcendent instance according to the distributive and hierarchical effects of identity,
opposition and negation (145). The notion of immanent genesis makes sense if the
relation of Being to beings is thought according to affective orientation. Deleuze extends
the notion to an orientation in thought which restores it to its concrete situation. Thought
cannot be thought in transcendence of its material. This recognition emphasises the
necessity of thinking affectivity, body and immanent genesis.
34 Deleuze elaborates what he means by difference in itself in Difference and Repetition. Difference is "not
diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given... as diverse. Difference is
not phenomenon, but the noumenon closest to the phenomenon... [an] inequality by which it is
conditioned" (222). Every event and appearance is referred, according to this notion of difference, to a
correlation with "orders of differences: differences of... tension, potential, difference of intensity" (222).
162
Deleuze's concepts of univocity and 'difference in itself' are important in their capacity
to take up the real being of the body. The concept of univocity marks an advance on the
traditional or classical model, from Aristotle, through Kant to phenomenology, in that its
account of non-categorical difference allows him to formulate a difference of Being from
itself, not just external difference between beings. I mean by this that a life of the body is
always as its difference from itself, in so far as it is always 'itself according to a
transcendental perspective or an 'original transcendental content'. The Deleuzian account
of univocity grasps the perspective of the body, its effects and in-formation with respect
to consciousness. The body and the mind are on this account 'externally related'.
One consequence of the notion of a difference of Being from itself is that subjectivity is
reconfigured as 'multiplicitous'. This means that subjectivity emerges through the
difference of its body - affectivity - and according to the events that mark a passage
between bodies. Genesis is understood according to differentiation by degrees of power
or 'intensities' - the capacity to be affected. As multiplicitous, subjectivity emerges
through its difference from itself, that is, from a pre-verbal, pre-personal state, anterior
with regard to the personal psychic self of structural linguistics or classical
phenomenology. As multiplicitous, subjectivity is thought according to the being - the
event - of the subjective body35. Accordingly, this account changes the concept of
'possible experience'. Multiplicity is conceived according to two different aspects, both
emphasising embodiment. Firstly, it refers to the fact that there are events of different
strata or levels of experience. Experience is produced according to affectivity, feeling and
the pathic, not just through schemas of rational and logical thought. According to
Deleuze's concept of becoming, the becoming of bodies and language are co-extensive.
Secondly, multiplicity is conceived in terms of movement and process, or the emergence
of immanent being. Subjectivity is traced back to the concrete situation of its material or
embodied being, to its singularisation by what Deleuze describes as 'the plane of
35 In WP Deleuze states "The event does not relate the lived to a transcendent subject = Self but, on the
contrary, is related to the immanent survey of a field without subject" (WP). Whereas Deleuze speaks of a
"non-psychological life of spirit", a certain non-organic life, I will use the term 'subjective body' as this
term captures well the emphasis on embodiment that is required to think, with Deleuze - and Henry - an
immanent genesis.
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immanence'. Deleuze describes the plane of immanence as a dimensionality that "knows
only relations of movement and rest, of speed and slowness, between unformed or
relatively unformed, elements, molecules and particles borne away by fluxes" (DR 92).
In other words, this concept of subjectivity, a consequence of the model of univocity,
diverges markedly from the phenomenological emphasis on integrated subjectivity,
noting a forgetfulness of egoic subjectivity. The Being of beings becomes on this model
inseparable from the anterior sensibility pertaining to the body's affections. Embodiment
is thought according to non-linear processes that elude reflective consciousness.
Subjectivity emerges in a process inseparable from differentiation according to a capacity
for affectivity, the material being which Deleuze terms 'intensive'. This is what I mean
by Deleuze's displacement of 'substance' as well as the organising principle of the
individual or self in supposed transcendence of its material, for the sub-instance or the
event of being inseparable from embodiment.
Deleuze's philosophy theorises the virtual dimension of intensity or affect as immanent to
body and mind, and thus to experience; it is, however, not directly accessible in terms of
the structures of representation. An invisibility or anonymity informs the Being of beings
and the formation of subjectivity - the supposed 'transcendent unit' as the ultimate
concept of identity is never the purity of its presence to self. The importance of this
reconceptualisation of subjectivity as multiplicitous lies in the incorporation of an
affective dimension constitutive of, but not reducible to, the individual constituted.
Singularisation or individuation refers to the reality of 'sub-instances' that cannot be
reduced to qualities added to an already formed transcendent instance. This materiality of
being, or 'affect', as the point of engagement by which the mind-body dualism is
suspended, questions by extension the subject-object distinction. Deleuze's
'differentiation of difference' involves a specific temporality which marks an
indistinction between subject and object, even between the human and the
natural/artificial object. Deleuze presents his thought as a challenge to the tradition of
thought which refers the Being of being to transcendent substance and the absolute
interiority of subjectivity; the challenge comes in the form of a 'physics' or physicality
according to intensive quantities, and so a destabilization of the 'pure' phenomenological
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present. His theory of intensive multiplicities or the anteriority of multiplicity effects a
'disintegration' or de-personalisation of subjectivity on the phenomenological model.
Deleuze's notion of absolute immanence is very close to Henry's notion of Life as that
which refers Being to an excess of being necessarily irreducible to the acts of
transcendental consciousness. The point Deleuze makes is that subjectivity must be
conceived according to its 'incarnation', its emergence in the midst of the materiality of
being. Deleuze's conception of an openness to the materiality of being is thought in terms
of a notion of 'virtuality', a potential for singularisation, or an event realised by the plane
of immanence as the latter corresponds to 'lived states' inseparable from the materiality
of being. Deleuze describes 'event' in terms of the indefinite article - it refers to a life, an
anteriority of being, which in-forms me as my self. In so far as virtuals define
immanence, the actual is the process that takes up the event according to its 'plane' of
reality, that is, an attribution or 'incarnation' of substance into subject and object36. The
plane of immanence is not contained by subject (or object), but designates a life
constituted by events - irreducible to subjective or objective determination - and by
singularities/processes of singularisation, or pre-subjective, pre-reflexive acts of the body.
Transcendental acts are thus not reducible to transcendent determination. The
transcendental field is not something contained by the ego-consciousness, but the event
across which the formation of consciousness happens, that is, the indefinite life according
to which consciousness actualises itself. The notion of absolute immanence may be
defined according to a 'temporality of antecedence', that is, according to the passage of a
life across which subjectivity emerges among states of things and according to a lived
state inseparable from the subjective body. The 'essence of subjectivity becomes in this
manner inseparably from an openness to the materiality of being. This Spinozist
conception of immanence, which is not immanence to something, allows Deleuze to
articulate transcendence as always already a product of immanence. Such an articulation
of immanence allows the question of genesis to be posed outside the determinations of
36 Recall that Deleuze leaves the Spinozist vocabulary of substance and attributes in DR. The Spinozist
vocabulary demonstrates adherence to a concept of difference according to identity, which Deleuze
precisely attempts to move beyond in this work.
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ego-consciousness and reformulates the relation of subjectivity to the materiality of its
being. The question of genesis becomes inseparable from a specific understanding of
embodied being.
(a) The Body-Conscious and the Question of Immanent Genesis
In the compendium to his Expressionism, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1988), Deleuze
emphasises an insight of Spinoza's parallelism of mind and body: rather than thinking a
body determined by the workings of the mind, Spinoza recognises that there are actions
of the mind that are also and already actions of the body (PP 18). Deleuze reintroduces
into the midst of T/hought - the notion of what thought is as well as the philosophical
operation - what I will call the 'body-conscious'. 'The body-conscious' recognises the
role played by the body and its affections in the formation of consciousness. For Deleuze
this means re-thinking what thought can do. If thought begins, so to speak, with the body,
with the materially affected being of subjectivity, thought in terms of the life that
produces subjectivities, then this means a re-thinking of the notions of representation and
reflection.
That there are actions of the body that are not taken up in the mind according to reason
and representation does not mean that these - as supposed 'disembodied' categories of
thought - are not affected by that which eludes them. Deleuze refers the impossibility of
disembodied thought to an unconscious of thought (PP 19). Deleuze attributes to Spinoza
the recognition that, in the context of ethics, a 'just view' must take account of the body.
There is no disembodied view or perspective from which to make judgments. The
perspective of the body is an immanent perspective, immanence within thought, which is
also the source of the incompleteness or impossibility of its transcendence. This means
that the ideas of T/thought are necessarily 'inadequate'. Deleuze's 'ethics', as he takes up
Spinoza's thought on this point, concerns itself with an unconscious or unthought of
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T/thought37. This means that he adopts an ethos of thinking - the thought of immanence
- that is involved with the body and takes seriously the Spinozist departure from the idea
of the 'disembodied' rational consciousness for a focus on how thought is correlated with
the affections and effects of the body-conscious. There are unknown aspects of the living
body as there is an unknown of thought, and this further complicates the notion of a
beginning of thought. The resource of the non-conscious of the body is what Deleuze
refers to when he states: "we do not know what a body can do" (PP19). The real
significance of the body must be sourced in terms of the situation of thought - the
emergence of the being-subject of thought according to a so-called plane of immanence,
according to which everything that is expressed is already inscribed within materiality.
Deleuze's notion of the unconscious of thought questions the abstractions of
representation as 'inadequate'. Representation misses the emphatic dimension of real
activities; it loses the body-conscious to the illusion of the adequacy of a 'pure'
consciousness. When Deleuze says that "immanence is the unconscious itself and the
conquest of the unconscious" (29), he means to take matter into account over meaning
insofar as representation must be understood to be informed by the life of the subjective
body and affected by the forces of its 'inscribed' meanings. Immanent thought considers
the manner in which it is affected, the manner in which it is inseparable from the
materiality of the culturally and 'linguistically' inscribed body. The temporality of this
body eludes the self-presence of consciousness. The point for Deleuze is not to undertake
a reversal of a traditional schema so to privilege body over mind, but to assert the
constitutive effects of the former on the latter. The Deleuzian plane of immanence is
determined by the notion of transcendental field as a 'third term' that represents an
outside of thought. According to the dichotomous subject-object and mind-materiality
relations of the tradition of Platonic schematism, immanence is only thought within these
pairs of oppositions. Deleuze's thought recognises the subjectivity of thought as already
marked in its emergence from fields of organisation and signification38. Immanent
37 In WP Deleuze describes the plane of immanence as the "nonthought within thought" (59), but the plane
of immanence is more than a presupposition about the state or nature of T/thought, it is a matter of being
also, a presupposition regarding the unconditioned.
38 Refer to Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988)
for the elaboration of this point.
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genesis refers to the subjective and variously subjected body as always already part of a
cultural-material matrix of discourses and meanings. Not that the discourse of classical
phenomenology does not, but it does not to any real extent think the body as the body of
thought. To do so demands asking the question of immanent genesis.
Immanent genesis acknowledges that being exceeds being-object and that subjectivity
cannot be posited in transcendence from its material/ity. Phenomenology's veritable exit
from matter is for Deleuze an abstraction, according to the concomitant notions of
representation and reflection, which ultimately spells an impotence of thought. A body,
for Deleuze, is a site according to which physiological and socio-cultural forces engage.
Subjectivity is thought according to the subjective body and its determinations of
thought. Subjectivity is not an encounter of a thought with another without being
scripted, signified according to the perspective of the subjective body. This perspective is
its openness to the materiality of being in so far as this body is not enclosed 'by its skin',
but enfolds the physiological and socio-cultural according to its own perspective or
specific temporality39.
The temporality of the body, according to Deleuze's account, must be understood in
terms of antecedence with respect to consciousness, as the difference between a lived
state and a preceding state. According to Deleuze, the power of a body must be felt
relative to the anteriority and implied affects of the preceding state (PP 39). The outside
of T/hought refers in Deleuze not just to an external context of inscriptions but to what
co-exists with, but is not reducible to, the present now or presence to consciousness as the
emergence and duration of emotions, for example. The body is, according to an
expression of emotions, a capacity for evaluation irreducible to acts of consciousness40.
Such evaluation eludes representation and reflection on the classical model. A corpo-
39 See Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (London: The Athlone Press,
1993) p. 85, especially. Hereafter this work is referred to as LB.
40 Deleuze interprets Spinoza's system as a logic of expression. Deleuze's 'expressionism' amounts to the
view that expression - such as that of the subjective body - is a power of existence, which exceeds the
limitations of 'possible experience' as determined by the tradition of philosophy traceable from Aristotle
and Kant to phenomenological analyses. See EP, pp. 155-67.
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real, referring to the body in terms of its temporality and affections, is not encountered in
representation, but resists the closed present or 'the world' according to consciousness.
Deleuze says regarding 'the new' that it is relevant in so far as it affects, that is, in so far
as a difference is introduced into the present or what we are, in terms of which we
become (WP 112). In Practical Philosophy, Deleuze regards time in terms of an
asymmetry, a differentiation of the past retained in itself from a spontaneity which creates
the new/future (107). In Difference and Repetition (1994) this spontaneity becomes the
mark of a becoming, a temporality of the body which, if taken seriously, means the
affirmation of all chance (198). Temporality is thus inseparable from a difference that
eludes the self-presence of ego-consciousness. This difference constitutes temporality;
the temporality of the body is conditioned by external inscription, encounters with other
'bodies' that elude representation in reflection.
The body, on Deleuze's account, defines a mode of existence different from the
determinations and relations that make up the present according to consciousness in its
presence to Self. Thought can - and should according to the Deleuzian ethos of
immanence - be understood according to the body as an intense capacity that affects the
formation of thought. Deleuzian 'ethics' suggests that acts of the mind must be thought
according to acts of the body. The latter defines a mode of existence according to a
virtual capacity that does not reside in the world as determined by the subject-object
dichotomies of transcendental consciousness. The subjective body must be thought in
terms of a specific sensibility, the reciprocal implications of an intense capacity -
affectivity. Affectivity can be grasped in terms of 'the virtual'. The virtual refers to a life,
rather than the world of our representation, what exists only in terms of its expressions.
Such 'expression' is best described as a revelation of the body in terms of affectivity.
Deleuze says:
The paradox is that at once 'the expressed does not exist outside of the
expression and yet bears no resemblance to it, but is essentially related
to what expresses itself as distinct from the expression itself (EP 333).
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In The Logic of Sense Deleuze takes as a principle the artwork's independence from its
conditions of production: "the foundation cannot resemble what it founds" (99).
Generation (of sense) eludes resemblance or any relation in which "the condition [is]
[T/] thought in the image of the conditioned as the simple form of possibility" (68).
Deleuze's notion of expression, as he takes it from Spinoza, is precisely that which
cannot be defined in terms of resemblance: "The significance of Spinozism seems to me
this: it frees expression from any subordination to emanative and exemplary causality.
Expression itself no longer emanates, no longer resembles anything" (EP 180). Expression
for Deleuze is the actualisation of the virtual (DR 211), the plane of immancence or
consistency, or the 'infinite infinite'. Deleuze quotes Merleau-Ponty: "The extraordinary
harmony of external and internal is possible only through the mediation of a positive
infinite... If at the kernel of Being, there is an infinite infinite, every partial being directly
or indirectly presupposes it, and is in return really or eminently contained in it"41. The
notion of a past that has never been represented, has never been present42, refers to that
absence which necessarily informs any present and presence. An absence precedes the
phenomenological beginnings of transcendental reflection. This past is an originary past,
the trace of which is what Deleuze terms the immemorial or repetition without original
(DR 85). Again, Deleuze's argument is based on the distinction he makes between
intensity and quality and intensity and logical intention.
In the terms by which Deleuze develops Spinoza, an "...eternal and singular essence is
the intense part of ourselves that expresses itself relationally as an eternal truth; and
existence is the set of extensive parts that belong to us under this durative relation" (PP
40). According to this thought, there is a certain auto-positing of being, which Deleuze
understands in terms of the notion of 'eternal return'43: the mode of existence in question
41 Quoted from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 148-9 in Gilles Deleuze, EP p. 28.
421 take this phrase from Levinas. "The infinition of the infinite comes from a past more distant than that
which is within the reach of memory, and is lined up with the present. It comes from a past that has never
been represented, has never been present, and which consequently has not let a beginning germinate".
Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 114.
43 In DR, Deleuze explains the notion of 'eternal return' in relation to simulacra: "When eternal return is
the power of (formless) Being, the simulacrum is the true character or form - the 'being' of that which is.
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here is "untimely", but pertains to a material support without which it ceases to exist (WP
166) 44. The capacity to affect and be affected forges relations based in this affectivity and
this is the importance of 'what a body can do'45. This affectivity can only be thought
according to immanent genesis, if by that is meant a certain activity of creation outside
the parameters and designations of thought traditionally conceived. T/thought comes
from its outside; an unthought of thought is always already part of thought. The outside -
irreducible to the exterior on this account - refers to forces of material being that elude
the representations of the mind, and are irreducible to its material version, the mind-brain.
Affectivity must be thought in terms of an auto-positing dynamism not reducible to
classical causal relation.
The problematisation of the phenomenological 'exit from matter', as the subject is
posited in transcendence from its material, conceives of a co-presence of the finite and
the infinite, which is irreducible to relations of cause and effect46. The ground and the
grounded are derived from this co-presence. Deleuze's thought attempts to think the co-
presence of what would on the classical model be thought as ontologically and
temporally different. That this would be possible and even necessary is a valid thought in
so far as there can be no other manner of grasping the influence and workings of the body
and energetic materiality on thought. The Spinozist conception of immanence, as Deleuze
develops it, is an attempt to think 'the unconditioned' apart from the transcendent
When the identity of things dissolves, being escapes to attain univocity, and begins to revolve around the
different. That which is or returns has no prior constituted identity: things are reduced to the... differences
which are implicated in [identity] and through which they pass" (67). Deleuze notes, with reference to
Pierre Klossowski: "taken in its strict sense, eternal return means that each thing exists only in returning,
copy of an infinity of copies, which allows neither origin nor original to subsist" (67). The simulacrum, the
'presence' of which attests to "a difference as its immediate element" (68) puts identity and representation
in question. "Things are simulacra themselves" - signs - in so far as the sign interiorises the condition of its
repetition, the "coherence of eternal return" (68).
44 See also LS, which refers the 'real subject' of the eternal return as intensity and singularity, and describes
the relation between the virtual potential of intensity and actualised intentionality (299-300).
45 See LS where Deleuze describes the 'provocation of the mind by the body' and the relation between
body and language, the 'integrity of the body' with reference to Klossowski (291). The body effects
thought.
46 The specific co-presence of the finite and the infinite as a co-presence of difference is what Deleuze
reads in Leibniz's description of the monads and 'the fold'. See LB.
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instance, in order to avoid the hierarchies of transcendent organisation. Such organisation
and hierarchic relation posit from without material becoming a causality and genesis
which thus delimit possible experience according to the transcendent determinations of
subjectivity. According to Deleuze's immanentism, cause and effect are not easily
distinguishable. An immanent cause refers to the reality of an autopositing of being -
being thought in relation to the Indeterminate47. Transcendent determination according to
consciousness explains a transcendence of the world by what is already part of the world
so determined, and so is necessarily limited. The argument regarding immanent genesis,
is that this positing of transcendence cannot account for the excess of material being
which always already informs it. According to this limitation, immanent causality refutes
the notion that what moves is moved by another on the Aristotelian model. Deleuze's re-
conception of materiality develops on the Spinozist cause, capable of effecting itself. As
opposed to the transcendent instance in classical phenomenology, immanent causality is
capable of approaching a notion of a corpo-real, and to take the consequence of the
meaning of affectivity. This thought of an immanent cause need not be thought in terms
of God, but a notion of infinity problematises the limitations of 'possible experience'
according to the transcendent instance of ego-consciousness as a delimitation on thought
and the generation of meaning.
According to Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, being is identified with infinite being; it is
identified with pure affirmation, positivity and creation. Being is a being thought in terms
of a virtual cause or power of expression, subject to the recurrence characteristic of the
materiality of being. The potential of a virtual cause is different from designations of
'possible experience' as the latter is bound up with transcendent consciousness. That
which returns in Deleuze's conception of untimely recurrence is the virtual reality or
intensive quantity, which is inseparable from his specific conception of materiality.
According to Deleuzian immanence, a qualitative identity of the absolute is relative to a
quantitative distinction of beings,
47 See Gilles Deleuze, "Immanence: A Life", trans. Nick Millett, in Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 14,
nr.2, 1997, especially pp. 5-6.
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And this quantitative distinction is no mere appearance, but an internal difference,
a difference in intensity. So that each finite being must be said to express the
absolute, according to the intensive quantity that constitutes its essence, according
that is, to the degree of its power (EP 197).
Repetition is of the different in itself, its self-differentiation as the unconditioned being of
its immanent cause. Becoming is the mode of being of such immanent causality, a
physics or physicality of being (DR 41).
The notion and relevance of a 'power to be differentiated' must be understood in terms of
Deleuze's notion of repetition. Deleuze explains the necessity of breaking down the
notion of causality in order to arrive at an adequate understanding of repetition. Again,
this must be thought in terms of Deleuze's specific reconception of materiality and its
critique of the traditional conception of generic subjectivity. According to Deleuze, there
are two types of repetition: static repetition, which refers to the "overall, abstract effect
[and] results from the work", (that is, 'transcendent' effort), and a dynamic repetition,
which "concerns the acting cause... [and] is like the 'evolution' of a bodily movement"
(20). Deleuze says of the two types of repetition:
One refers back to a single concept, which leaves only an external difference
between the ordinary instances of a figure; the other is the repetition of an
internal difference which it incorporates in each of its moments, and carries
from one moment to another. One could try to assimilate these two repetitions
by saying that the difference between the first and the second is only a matter of
change in the content of the concept, or of the figure being articulated differently,
but this would be to fail to recognize the respective order of each repetition. For
in the dynamic order there is no representative concept, not any figure
represented in a pre-existing space. There is an Idea, and a pure dynamism which
creates a corresponding space (20).
Both Deleuze's concept of repetition and that of difference and intensity are thought
according to a notion of 'energetic' materiality. The question of whether there can be
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immanent genesis and whether this genesis can be thought depend, with regard to
Deleuze's thought, upon his notion of singularities. Deleuze develops the notion of the
transcendental field according to its constitution by "impersonal and preindividual
nomadic singularities" (109). The conceptual triad consisting of singularity, immanence
and intensity is the foundation of Deleuze's conception of materiality. The disruption of
the hylomorphic schema of classical phenomenology refutes the judging transcendent
instance, as a view from nowhere, a form-ation without content. The notion of singularity
opposes the generalities of classical thought, as the latter are incapable of thinking
materiality outside a certain imposition of form (the subject as transcendent instance of
being, Platonic form, Kantian categories etc.) in its account of genesis. In so far as
classical transcendental phenomenology takes up what to Deleuze is an Aristotelian-
Kantian impasse, there is an incoherence or incompleteness in the account of genesis.
According to The Logic of Sense, the critical problem lies with the account being limited
by a choice between "either an undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness, formless
nonbeing, or a supremely individuated Being and an intensely impersonal Form" (LS
106). Deleuze's re-conception of materiality negotiates this impasse. His conception of
materiality is capable of accounting for the excess in material being with regard to the
forms of judgment and transcendence. That is, Deleuze theorises energetic materiality
outside the image of matter imposed by transcendence. Deleuze's thought of immanence
is one that makes the potential of (energetic) materiality constitutive, by recognising the
dynamic rather than static nature of bodies as a site of affectivity. Immanent genesis
opens thought and entities to an outside. This outside, different from exteriority, refers to
a non-organic life, according to a "profound link between signs, events, life and
vitalism"48. This life is defined by 'energetic' materiality. Deleuze describes a vital
component in the understanding of this life as the being of 'the multiple'. Deleuze
differentiates between two alternative accounts of genesis. The first refers to the
incomplete notion of meaning formation in the Kantian tradition:
That of an Idea that acts, but is not - that acts therefore only from the point of
48 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990, trans. M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press,
1995) p. 143.
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view of an external cerebral knowledge [...]; or that of a force that is
but does not act - that is therefore an internal Awareness (from Leibniz to
Ruyer)(WP 213).
The latter refers to what I have described as the otherness of self-awareness. This
otherness is a consequence of the fact that the lived state of a body is understood as the
locus of forces, an unthought of thought49. The 'beginnings' of meaning formation must
be understood in terms of an initial 'complexity', from which the states of the lived body
are inseparable. The unthought of T/thought or 'initial complexity' refers to the fact that
thought is always already opened to its outside, and undermines thought's positing of the
given in terms of a "supplementary dimension" (PP 128). This notion of an initial
complexity explains the plane of immanence as a 'plane of composition, not of
organisation' (128). Deleuze's opening of Spinozist questions is, with regard to the
tradition of Kantianism and classical phenomenology, crucial to grasp the extent to which
Deleuze can provide a corrective on the issue of genesis and T/thought. Deleuze develops
Spinoza's philosophy in terms of the notion of immanence, while working on the
assumption that Spinoza's thought on immanence provides the means to really resist the
impositions on genesis by transcendence. The Logic of Sense expresses the task of
Thought or philosophy as always "a matter of denouncing the illusion, the false infinite,
the infinity of religion and of the theologico-erotic-oneiric myths in which it is
expressed" (LS 278). Instead, Deleuze thinks immanence according to a positive infinite,
an "infinite infinite" as a kind of affirmation of 'practical philosophy'. In this lies the
valuable ethos of Deleuze's thought. The necessity of thinking immanent genesis is
bound up with the recognition of a Life 'vis-a-vis' being, neglected by the transcendent
analyses of the tradition, and of the need to assess the being of the body with respect to
thought and genesis. Immanent genesis, as always already part of the genetic account of
transcendent T/thought, is the obscurity at the heart of it, a missed essence of thought.
49 In Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. D.W Smith and M.A Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1997), Deleuze states that a body refusing its determination by a transcendent perspective as
organism (whether the perspective is medical or philosophical), must be understood as a 'powerful non¬
organic vitality' in its relations to 'the imperceptible forces and powers that seize hold of it, or that it seizes
hold of' (131).
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Immanent genesis informs T/thought. Moreover, it disputes the notion of matter as
'content' awaiting form-ation according to the transcendence of consciousness. The
insight of Deleuze's take on Spinozism is that there is always already a content 'of form'.
The consequence of the inadequate account of this state of things in cartesianism, through
Kantianism and classical phenomenology is a repression or disqualification of the view of
the body and an incomplete notion of the genesis of meaning or sense.
(b) 'Expressionism' and Genesis of the 'Baroque'.
'Expression', or 'expressivity' rather, refers in Deleuze to an event, the actualisation of
the virtual. As the event is of a different order of reality, it is not reducible to a
description of events of 'the world' or objects of transcendent determination. According
to What is Philosophy? the event is "immaterial, incorporeal, unlivable, pure reserve"
(156). Immanent genesis can be understood according to this reserve of virtuality in so
far as this reserve designates its excess to representation. The implication of Deleuze's
thinking of the event is an imbrication of manner with matter. The expressed is sense (EP
335), an incorporeal event. As indissociable from 'singularities', sense is anti-general, a
"non-represented entity... something extra-representative" (LS 146). Noting the same
notion of a 'knowledge' that remains indifferent and "external to its object" as Michel
Henry, Deleuze states that "[representation attains this topical ideal only by means of the
hidden expression which it encompasses, that is, by means of the event that it envelops"
(146). The generation of sense, in Deleuze, is thought in terms of the power of
'singularities' to 'quasi-cause'; they participate in structures as "effects of corporeal
causes" (94). A singularity is an incorporeal doubling of the expression/what is
perceived; the question of the body, for Deleuze, concerns its depth or envelopment
within surfaces, its "power to organize surfaces" (124). This is the meaning of the
statement that the body, on Deleuze's account, is one that is 'not enclosed by its skin',
but must be understood relationally. Sense must be understood in terms of sensibility, it
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cannot be understood outside embodiment and a specific notion of 'energetic materiality',
it is "that which happens to bodies and that which insists in propositions", that is, "the
expressed which subsists in propositions and the event which occurs in states of bodies"
(125).
The systematic function Deleuze assigns to the concept of expression in his reading of
Spinoza allows him to interpret Spinoza's parallelism in terms of problematising the
separation of knowledge and world into theory and materiality50. The concept of
expression according to Deleuze's reading of Spinoza provides basis for an 'integral'
knowledge of reality, and an approach to knowledge embedded in a 'dynamic reality' of
which it is the expression.
The logic of expression that Deleuze finds in Spinoza is presented in terms of a triadic
structure. Deleuze's designation of expressionism in philosophy -represented by Spinoza
and Leibniz - questions basic or originary opposition, with respect to the notion of
philosophical beginnings and to its overall logic. Deleuze's philosophy must be said to
approach an idea of visceral thought, a concern with viscera or affectivity. The visceral is
other but not opposed to representative consciousness, and a potential of thought.
Deleuze's thought takes us beyond theories that reduce consciousness to either
physiological or disembodied process. While the word 'visceral' translates as 'inward
feeling', the notion of a visceral philosophy reflects a specific problematisation of theory
and materiality. Sensibility, as the expression of affectivity - forces of the body or the
intensity inherent in any materiality - is a condition for objectivity, and the manner in
which this is conceived here marks an advance on the attempts made by classical
phenomenology. An original revelation of the body - I believe this terms is close to what
Deleuze means by expression - is not only separate from consciousness but conditions
objectivity. A visceral philosophy refutes the separation of thought and body, or thought
and its object, in Cartesianism and classical phenomenology. It deems it an untenable
abstraction.
50 As in Henry, Deleuze's ontological thought expresses a deeper sense of complicity between thought and
life-world. I refer to the previous paragraphs of this chapter as well as chapter two.
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In Difference and Repetition Deleuze expresses this point as follows: "The conditions of
a true critique and a true creation are the same: the destruction of an image of thought
which presupposes itself and the act of thinking in thought itself" (DR 139). Michel
Henry criticises this presupposition as reductive when he states that the 'ontological
monism is the theory of thought', reduced to the ideality of its presuppositions. Deleuze's
What is Philosophy? determines philosophy as a form of thought rather than knowledge;
real knowledge would involve the dimension excluded from representative ideality, and
the reductions of classical phenomenology. It would involve an orientation in thought
understood as a positioning for, or as, affectivity.
Deleuze says of the 'logic of sense' - or in another word, sensibility - that it is inspired
by an empiricism as it "knows how to transcend the experiential dimensions of the visible
without falling into Ideas and how to track down, invoke and perhaps produce a phantom
at the limit of a lengthened or unfolded experience" (LS 20)51.
Beyond what representation yields to speculative consciousness and reasoning, Deleuze
refers T/thought to the movement of matter/energy, or the pathic conceptualised as le pli
or the fold. Accordingly, he operates with a conception of a Life of immanent unfolding;
experience and its terms are immanently, their actualised expression thought in terms of
the expressivity of a virtual matrix. Deleuze's reading of Spinoza and Leibniz by
development of the notions of immanence and the fold undertakes a move from the life of
subjectivity to the Life that produces subjectivities. The re-involvment with the
materiality of being problematises the binarism of traditional conceptions of identity and
representative knowledge and the Cartesian and structuralist conceptions of subject and
object. On these points his thought converges with Michel Henry's.
In accordance with Spinoza, Deleuze develops the notion of affect according to its
autonomic nature, its expressivity. According to Spinoza's Ethics on Deleuze's reading,
affect is an originary receptivity or revelation or a parallel becoming of body and mind,
according to which the notion of origin is reduced to an effect of consciousness.
51 Deleuze's discussion of expression produces a different concept from that of Husserl, whose notion is
thought in terms of resemblance between expression and expressed. See LS p. 20, 97 and 122-3.
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Immanent genesis operates outside the latter's delimitations. "The entire Ethics is a
voyage in immanence; but immanence is the unconscious itself, and the conquest of the
unconscious" (PP 29).
In comparison, Henry does not conceive of immanence in terms of the 'unconscious'.
However, he conceives the anteriority of the obscurity of the 'essence' insofar as it is the
condition of objectivity, as non-conscious. The unconscious in Deleuze names a
responsiveness to the sensible. 'The given by which the given is given' refers to a
specific notion of sensibility: sensation always involves an outside of sensation. Real
genesis must be thought according to an initial complication. This initial complication
does not conform to the regime of visibility in representation, and on this point affects the
concept of 'perception' as well as 'knowledge'. The former must be extricated from its
delimitation by resemblance and recognition on the Aristotelian account.
Recall at this point the notion of 'essence' in Henry, and the argument that obscurity
belongs to the essence, is the essence (EM 391-2). With respect to the notion of a "latent
knowledge of the body" in the early Merleau-Ponty, Henry criticises the transference of
knowledge as reduced to a "marginal phenomenon of consciousness" and "simple
companion of the perceptive act", as this transference mis-represents the manner in
which consciousness and the perceptive act relate to "the immanence of the essence
which is the foundation of [the] obscurity" (394). According to Deleuze, to perceive and
to unfold means the same: the Leibnizian Monad unfolds between two folds - the fold is
'always a fold in two' - and thus between the folds it perceives. Perception must be
understood in terms of a parallel unfolding with the energies and movement of the
subjective body, always already scripted according to its past states. Deleuze argues in
The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1993) that ideas and knowledge 'are in the fold',
already scripted outside the 'purity' of consciousness's determinations. What Deleuze
takes from Leibniz and his theory of perception is the argument that a conscious
perception must be related, not to the recognisable object of a traditional schematics of
space and time, but to the multiple unconscious perceptions which compose it52.
Difference and Repetition states:
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Every perception is hallucinatory because perception has no object. Conscious
perception has no object and does not even refer to a physical mechanism of
excitation that could explain it from without: it refers only to the exclusively
psychical mechanism of differential relations among unconscious perceptions that
are comprising it within the Monad (DR 17).
Deleuze's reading of Leibniz considers the process of sensation as firstly the
unconscious perceptions of particles of matter, secondly the formation of conscious
perceptions of objects. The latter perception is conceived as a derivation or extraction
from 'differential relations' of unconscious perception: the affectations of the body take
the place of priority from representation. "Thus the variable and relative unity of any
given phenomenon can be explained, all phenomena are collective" (LB 120).
Representation and its categories seem to miss the encounter in which affectivity as a real
force informs perception in the movements between perception and thought. Immanent
genesis, thought according to the body, accounts for this movement. The body theorised
by Deleuze is B/being according to its expression and perception. The Leibnizian
monads, unities enveloping multiplicity, are theorised as expression and realisation of the
world. However, "realize is not to say that they are real: they become real with respect to
what is actual in the soul. Something completes and realizes it/self/ in the body" (LB
120). Conscious perception has its 'foundation' in a virtual multiplicity of genetic
elements. That is to say, the body as a location for perception and site of expression is an
impetus for thought. Immanent genesis refers to the genetic elements of thought that
constitute its outside and the reality of a 'sub-representative domain'.
Accordingly, the notion of the fold and baroque sensibility displaces the notion of ground
or origin on the classical account. Deleuze says of the specific Baroque sensibility, that
"the Baroque invents the infinite work or process" (LB 34). The notion of fold involves
affectivity:
52 Refer to Deleuze's interpretation of Leibniz on perception: "Perception in the Folds" in LB pp. 85-99.
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[T]he fold affects all material [and] becomes expressive matter, with different
scales, speeds and different vectors... it determines and materializes Form. It
produces a form of expression, a Gestaltung, the genetic element or infinite line
of inflection, the curve with a unique variable... [the infinite fold] separates or
moves between matter and soul, the fagade and the closed room, the outside and
the inside. Because it is a virtuality that never stops dividing itself, the line of
inflection is actualized in the soul, but realized in matter... Such is the baroque
trait: an exterior always on the outside, an interior always on the inside. An
infinite "receptivity", an inifinite "spontaneity"... Up to now Baroque architecture
is forever confronting two principles, a bearing principle and a covering
principle... Conciliation of the two will never be direct, but necessarily harmonic,
inspiring a new harmony (35, my emphasis).
The baroque sensibility refers to an ever-unfolding plane of immanence, on which 'an
infinite' expresses itself. According to this sensibility is expressed a virtual continuum as
a ground for an actualisation of differentials. The 'baroque sensibility' shares affinities
with Michel Henry's development of a 'material phenomenology'; both think immanent
movement without the dative relation. Immanence or consistency on this conception is
thought in terms of affectivity, inseparable from the being of the body. The main idea of
Deleuze's thought is the virtual power that is actualised in the sensual, in a sensibility.
My argument is that the notion of the body-conscious, as I take it from Deleuze's
analyses of univocity and the baroque, amounts to an adequate notion of immanent
genesis as a potential for thought to consider. Michel Henry demonstrates the same
potential of thought if he is read according to what is implied by the analyses of language
and embodiment.
When Deleuze suggests that the conditions of the sensible be understood outside the
Aristotelian and Kantian categories taken up by phenomenology, he points instead to a
'reason of the sensible' as the condition of what appears and describes it as "the Unequal
in itself, disparateness as it is determined and comprised in difference of intensity, in
intensity as difference" (DR 222-3). 'The Baroque' further develops an understanding of
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this intensity. The difficulty of grasping the notion is a consequence of the fact that in
experience we know 'intensity' only as "already developed within an extensity" (223).
Difference in the form of intensity is marked by its tendency to cancel itself out; "the
vanishing of difference is precisely inseparable from an 'effect' of which we are victims.
[It] remains implicated in itself, while it is being implicated in extensity" (228). The
production of difference or intensity is thus "by definition ... 'in-explicable'" (227).
Henry expresses this in his description of the 'essence' of T/thought as 'obscure'. Life
coming to itself, as Heniy would express it, concerns the in-visible, the intensities,
energies and movements that pass in - between - bodies. This means that difference is
"
essentially implicated, that its being is implication" (228). Accordingly, the concepts of
the repetition of difference and of virtuality in Deleuze point to a complex of material
relations of lived experience that informs thought. The use of the variations over the latin
terms complicare and explicare in Deleuze reflects a recognition that the beginnings of
thought must necessarily be determined by an 'initial complication' and implication in a
manner which has not been sufficiently theorised. With this recognition lies the
contribution of 'immanent ontology' and the analyses of both Henry and Deleuze. Their
reorientation of thought is an attempt to rethink materiality, and provides a missed
encounter with the body in thought. Deleuze makes a pertinent point in his Bergsonism
(1988):
There is a correlation between life and matter, between expansion (detente) and
contraction, which shows the coexistence of their respective degrees in the virtual
whole, and their essential relativity in the process of actualization. Each line [of
actualization or differentiation] is related to a type of matter that is not merely an
external environment, but in terms of which the living being manufactures a body,
a form for itself53
From his reading of Bergson, as through his reading of Spinoza, Deleuze develops the
notion of a differentiation of difference in terms of positivity or affirmation, and creation.
53 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Constantin Boundas (New York: Zone Books, 1988) p. 103.
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In Bergson he finds the resources for his understanding of the virtual continuum, as a
potential to be actualised, not opposed to the real but also not limited to the resemblance
bound up with perception on the classical model of possible experience. Deleuze states in
Difference and Repetition that " [t] he elementary concepts of representation are the
categories defined as the conditions of possible experience. These, however, are too
general or too large for the real... Everything changes once we determine the conditions
of real experience, which are not larger than the conditioned and which differ in kind
from the categories" (68).
I regard the virtual in Deleuze as expressing the insight that genesis must be thought
outside the transcendent instance which is part of the world it determines. Genesis is not
just thinkable as genesis from. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze develops this point
over the question of extensity in a manner close to the terms of Henry's analyses.
Extensity does not develop or appear without presenting a left and a right, a high
and a low, which are like the dissymmetrical marks of its own origin. The
relativity of these determinations, moreover, is further testimony to the absolute
from which they come. Extensity as a whole comes from the depths. Depth as
the ultimate and heterogeneous dimension is the matrix of all extensity [...] The
ground [fond\ as it appears in a homogeneous extensity is notably a projection of
something deeper [profond] [...] The extensity whose genesis we are
attempting to establish is extensive magnitude, the extensum or term of reference
of all the extensio. The original depth, by contrast, is indeed space as a whole, but
space as an intensive quantity the pure spatium (229-30; my emphasis added to
Deleuze's).
Deleuze's statements here amount to the assertion that creative action be conceived in
terms of self-affection. In a transposition of vocabulary, creation and created are
conceived here according to the logic of expression in Deleuze. The creation and created
belong to the same 'community' of 'essence'. In as much as appearance is animated by
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the same force or principle as essence, 'the created' "is essentially related to what creates
itself as distinct from the creation itself"54.
I see these descriptions in Deleuze as pointing to precisely the self-animation of the Life
productive of thought in Henry. Henry and Deleuze conceive of creation outside
determinations by constitutive acts of - to; rather there is action - true creative action is
self-affection. To the extent that virtual, pre-individual singularities resist subsumption by
the generality of the concept and its organisation by intentional subjectivity, they are
indeterminate transcendentals, or 'original transcendental content', with respect to
consciousness. In semiotic terms, Deleuze refers to these transcendentals in terms of the
indefinite article and the anonymity of the proper name. That is, this is not empirical
indetermination, but "a determination of immanence or a transcendental determinability.
The indefinite article cannot be the determination of the person without at the same time
being the determination of the singular"55. Deleuze's notion of energetic materiality, a
certain virtual potential expressed in the physicality of existence, is the immanent life that
produces subjectivities. A concept, for Deleuze, is but an instance of multiplicity, and the
creativity of a concept can be traced back to a materiality before its individuation or co¬
ordination by transcendental subjectivity. Deleuze states: "The One (L'Uri) is not the
transcendent which can contain everything, even immanence, but is the immanent
contained in the transcendental field. 'A' (Un) is always the index of a multiplicity: an
event, a singularity, a life... Although a transcendent which falls outside the plane of
immanence can always be invoked or even attributed to it, it remains the case that all
transcendence is constituted uniquely in the immanent current of consciousness particular
to this plane. Transcendence is always a product of immanence"56. Transcendence,
thought, is the product of an 'energetic materiality'. Immanent genesis refers to an
54 See Gilles Deleuze, EP p. 333 on the logic of expression.
55 Gilles Deleuze, "Immanence: A Life", p. 5.
56 Gilles Deleuze, "Immanence: A Life", p. 5. Deleuze points out that even Husserl recognises that being
transcends consciousness in this manner, and remains transcendent, but this 'no wise alters the fact that it is
conscious life alone, wherein everything transcendent becomes constituted , as something inseparable from
consciousness...Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 62, quoted in Gilles Deleuze, "Immanence", p. 6.1 have already pointed
out the paradox of transcendental determinations in Husserl via Derrida's reading.
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unfolding plane, a transcendental which eludes the grasp of intentionality and cognition
on the traditional account. According to Henry, life is this activity, matter is the
'continuum of its resistance', its non-spatial aspect - or non-figural rather - being equally
force, resistance. Deleuze asserts in Bergsonism that "[w]hen the virtuality is actualized,
is differentiated, is 'developed', when it actualizes and develops its parts, it does so
according to lines that are divergent, but each of which corresponds to a particular degree
in the virtual totality" (100):
[W]hat co-existed in the virtual ceases to co-exist in the actual and is distributed
in lines or parts that cannot be summed up, each one retaining the whole, except
from a certain perspective, a certain point of view. These lines of differentiation
are therefore truly creative: They only actualize by inventing, they create in these
conditions the physical, vital or psychical representative of the ontological level
that they embody (101).
The constitutive interiority granted the subject as identified with the being of thought is
rejected by Deleuze's analyses. Insofar as negativity and the disjunction of subject and
object are produced in terms of the intentional direction of this interiority, classical
phenomenology does not sufficiently recognise immanence. According to Deleuze, all
that is, is modal variation - in Difference and Repetition he explains this in terms of
simulacra as they deny negativity, or internalisation on the phenomenological model.
While they do not 'contain' relations intrinsic to them, simulacra produces divergent
relations. Subjectivity in Deleuze is constituted as an experience, the locus of the terms of
experience insofar as these are understood according to a self-unfolding matrix, the
differentiation of the virtual. Affect is the notion of a point of engagement of the virtual
and actualisation and thus takes up the function of the Husserlian noema on Derrida's
reading, as both non-existent and reaf1. The limits of a generative potential are virtual:
what is for Deleuze is generation or creation.
57 As a name for the force involved in an experience of affectivity, this concept in Deleuze is meant to
illustrate a creative potential as "man's non-human becoming" (WP 173). It is what Deleuze attempts to
name by a concept of life, which is creation or actualisation of singular tendencies of a virtual potential.
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Deleuze orients thought toward its real origins in the body. What is overlooked in
T/thought are the unconscious many-faceted workings of the body - machinic,
technological, human. In Deleuze, the activity of thought is viewed in terms of a
complication of materiality and thought. Thought and body are viewed as expressions of
"something in life prior to the definition of each"58. Deleuze's writings enable
understanding of why it might be pertinent to theorise thought in terms of what, with
regard to Spinoza in particular, he considers to be its powers. His analyses show a
necessary shift in emphasis from definitions regarding the laws of operation of thought to
the powers and capacities of thought, as they must be sought in thought's imbrication
with the affects of the body. What is valuable in Deleuze is his providing of a theoretical
site for the connections or potential syntheses of material processes and sentient
experience with the effects expressed as abstract thought.
I would add here, as a point of contrast to what Deleuze's thought does, that much of 'the
postmodern' shares a certain flight from experience and from sentient experience perhaps
more than anything. The 'postmodern situation' is perhaps most obviously marked by the
digital becoming more real than the cellular. The issue of information transmission - the
various methods and ever multiplying complexes of form-content - furthers focus on the
relation between materiality and language. Various methods of transmission - codes,
inscriptions, machines or correlatively genes, bodies, brains - ask for re-
conceptualisations of the relation of matter and thought. In other words, the relation of
matter and thought is continuously up for reevaluation.
The critique of the presuppositions of a T/thought which culminates in the analyses of
classical phenomenology, presents an approach to corporeality that keeps in view the idea
of what thought can do rather than what it is. Both Deleuze and Henry provide
exceptional viewpoints in this regard, as they demonstrate an understanding of immanent
genesis.
58 Gilles Deleuze, Dialogues with Claire Parnet, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London:
Athlone, 1987) p. 59.
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For Deleuze, the question of being is, with respect to art, approached in terms of a
genesis of immanence. In art, or the aesthetic, is preserved precisely the excess that is lost
when philosophy or epistemology names it. Art can grasp this excess in its expression,
and preserve, of the question of being as a being of the question. It is the question that is
preserved in art. This is because art presents what is always outside the delimitations of
thought, a process or genesis never reducible to its representations in thought. In Deleuze
is apparent a particular aesthetic according to which 'process' takes precedence over form
with regard to the question of being. Deleuze's 'physics', his exploration of the notions of
intensity and singularity, represents an aesthetic which brings into philosophy precisely
what it is forgetful of, an irreducible embodied life from which its concepts are a negative
abstraction. This particular aesthetic poses the question of information transmission, as it
points out the limitations of the Aristotelian schema of representation and the Kantian
categories as these continue to delimit the idea of knowledge transmission.
Art, as materiality and body, is always beyond information and communication in the
structure of traditional language; the idea of transmission of 'information' is posed rather
in terms of construction - expression rather than articulation. The language of art is the
conveyance of an outside of thought - the being of the sensible - as it is expressed in the
body. The constructivism of Deleuze, his referral of concept formation, as all genesis, to
the 'plane of immanence' or composition, returns genesis to the in-formation of the body,
and so presents its challenge in terms of the forgetfulness of the outside of T/thought.
Michel Henry's critique of classical phenomenology's understanding of the relations
between monstration, phenomenon and language, puts in question the particular
identifications which amount to the 'emergence of the outside' reduced to the appearing
of 'the world itself', determined by phenomenology's act-intentionality and object
manifestation and the general concepts of representation. This critique has resonance with
the work of Henri Michaux, and I take this up in chapter five. Michaux's painting and
works of prose/poetry examine and question the rigid geometrism of the constellations
that go under the name of intentionality, the outside of thought and the relation between
otherness and self-awareness. Comparatively, Levinas expresses an insight common to
Henry, Deleuze and Michaux, that "sensation and aesthetic effect produce the things in
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themselves, but not as objects of a higher power; in side-stepping all objects they open up
a new element foreign to the distinction of a 'without from a within'"59. With Deleuze's
conception of the Fold, there is no Other side in the sense of a general other. There is
only the virtuality of the event, the immanent differentiation and the emergence of
specific others. This particularity that pertains to material being is expressed in art. The
question of immanent genesis is posed as the possibility of thinking the singularity of
heterogeneous location, immanence or difference in itself.
If art is not about information it is because information is about error and correctness
according to a politics of opinion. And language, conceived in terms of semiotics, works
on recognition and translation, and so does not account for the outside of thought
according to Henry and Deleuze. Henry's notion of a language of revelation operates
according to a conception of affectivity that asks a further question of point of view. In
his "Pathos and Language" is presented a notion of language that escapes the confines
and authority of intentional consciousness. Language is, on this account, no longer an
instrument but determined, in Deleuze's words, by what 'flashes across the intervals'
when communication 'takes place between disparates' (DR 20). This notion of language
grasps an aspect of signification that makes up processes of embodied being, 'a physical
process of signaling' (20). It is language which, rather than being dependent on
recognition and resemblance - identity and analogy - according to a generality of the
concept, withdraws from these in so far as it founds them. I will take up this point in
chapter five with regard to Michaux's art.
(c) Affectivity and the Orientation of Thought.
59 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, p. 54.
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In conclusion to this chapter, I want to point out the implications of some of the
differences between Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas with regard to the theme of
immanent genesis.
As for the possibility of thinking the singularity of heterogeneous location, difference in
itself, Merleau-Ponty's immanent ontology differs from the immanent ontology of
Deleuze and from Henry's analyses in a way that detracts from this possibility. Merleau-
Ponty's analyses reorient thought towards its origins in the body. He is concerned to de-
intellectualise the specific Anteriority' or capacity of the subject in traditional
transcendental philosophy. He shares this concern with Deleuze and Levinas. However,
the con-fusion of the sensible and the intelligible that is a consequence of his notion of
flesh, does little to support the notion of heterogeneous location or an understanding of
orientation with regard to the relation between the sensible and thought. In Merleau-
Ponty the interiority of the subject is understood as interior to experience or 'life', but this
is conceived in a manner that undermines a notion of affectivity that would allow us to
think 'difference in itself'. The lines are too blurred in Merleau-Ponty. His analyses
provide an important conception of the in-visible, the idea that genesis is not fully
available to the directions of transcendental consciousness and the 'visibility' afforded by
the supposed access to its 'objects'. Merleau-Ponty states in The Visible and the
Invisible: "the transcendental... goes beyond subjectivity in the sense of counter-
transcendence and immanence" (VI 172). This notion of counter-transcendence is too
schematic and abstract to provide an adequate notion of immanent genesis. Merleau-
Ponty's notion of an intentionality within being cannot adequately account for the manner
in which thought is affected according to the otherness which marks bodily being with
regard to self-awareness. The in-visible in Merleau-Ponty is understood strictly in terms
of this hyphen, it is the invisible of the visible. That is, flesh is all-encompassing.
This all-encompassing flesh is problematic because it leaves no possibility for thinking
potentials of T/thought in terms of its orientation. That is, what an adequate notion of
immanent genesis provides is an understanding of thought with regard to a positioning or
orientation with respect to affectivity. Merleau-Ponty provides a notion of a corpo-real,
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which is necessary to account for affectivity. However, this corporeality does not account
for affectivity in terms of the absolute divergence or otherness it implies in the formation
of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty's immanent ontology reconceives the transcendental in
a manner that does not account for difference, only relative divergence. It is difficult to
think relations and the singular within this philosophy of the flesh. That is, it is difficult
to think immanent genesis without a difference between thought, and the sensible excess
that the traditional conception of the transcendental attempts to subsume.
Merleau-Ponty's immanent ontology takes the form of a continual displacement of
genesis. Genesis is neither here nor there. With a view to the difference of Deleuze's
immanent ontology, my argument is that Merleau-Ponty's notion of reversibility is
marked by impotence with respect to the production of the new. If subjectivity is the
"privileged bearer" (VI 274) of transcendence or Being as the implication of absolute
continuity, Merleau-Ponty's ontology cannot account for immanent genesis in its
productive capacity with respect to thought. My argument is that the importance of
Deleuze, Henry and Levinas's analyses of affectivity is that these provide a conception of
why thought must be judged according to its positioning in terms of affectivity. Merleau-
Ponty's do not.
Merleau-Ponty recognises, like Levinas, that I am always already more than my self or
my life. That this is so is a consequence of the fact that my life is also not mine, but in a
specific sense given to me before a positing of me as my-self. While Merleau-Ponty's
analyses do not account for the otherness that gives rise to such a situation, Levinas's
analyses most elaborately insist on it. The relevance of Levinas, which is a thinker of
transcendence, not immanence, lies with his provisions for thinking affectivity, the
positioning of thought with regard to affectivity. What I mean by this is that his analyses
compel Thought to take into account the relation between its being and affectivity.
The analyses of the life of the body depend in Merleau-Ponty on an all-encompassing
ontology of the flesh; in Levinas the life of the body is approached according to what he
calls the psyche60. The psyche in Levinas refers to affectivity as the condition of inter-
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subjectivity, and disruption of the language of thought. Levinas radicalises the
implication of passivity and exposure to otherness in the Deleuzian insight that the lived
body is 'not enclosed by its own skin'. Subjectivity is signified according to the
perspective of the subjective body in its radical exposure to Alterity. In Levinas, the
emphasis on the responsiveness to otherness lies with the other person, and ethical inter-
subjectivity. This relation gives an account of affectivity that supports rather than
undermines - as would seem obvious by an account of the transcendence of the Other -
the conditions for thinking immanent genesis; thought is always already 'scripted' in the
encounter with another61. The argument for (re-) orientation in thought with regard to
affectivity extends to the emergence and recognition of Alterity in its specificity or
particularity. The analyses by Levinas, Deleuze and Henry are relevant to the extent that
they radically question thought that cannot account for otherness in other than general
terms, according to a subjectivity which is enclosed in its own skin. Affectivity, as
inseparable from a positioning of thought in a corporeal sense is the key to recover a
misplaced ethos with respect to traditional transcendental philosophy.
60 The analyses in Merleau-Ponty regarding the differentiation of the lived body and the body as object is of
course implied by these different critiques of classical phenomenology. It would be impossible to think the
notion of affectivity without it.
611 raise this point in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four
Orientation in Thought: Affectivity, Ethics
And Aesthetics
I. Affectivity: Orientation in Levinas
Emmanuel Levinas is the philosopher of our time who has most explicitly oriented
philosophy toward its missed encounter with the alterity of the other person. More than
anyone else, he has directed his attention to the specificity and singularity of the Other,
seeing that a certain forgetfulness of radical alterity has led to a reduction of the meaning
of subjectivity. The absorption in our time of the singularity of the individual into units of
various forms of institution has brought about a reduction of the individual, stripped of
his real significance for a registration as a generalisable abstraction in systems of thought
or discourse. A radical abstraction, such as that which replaced the corporeal significance
of the individual as a subject during the period of Nazism, has historically been repeated
in various political-ideological and religious discourses. The well-known result of the
particular abstractions of Nazism were the concentration camps and the mass
extermination of individuals subsumed under the general category of the Jews, identified
by the Star of David quite literally attached to persons as a mark of a generalisable unit of
human beings. The meaning of the integrity of the subjective body of individuals, the
corporeal meaning of their subjectivity, disappeared from view. The specificity and
singularity of subjectivity is continually put under erasure through a generalisation,
according to which physical subjectivity becomes dispensable. Levinas's 'ethics as first
philosophy' is very much marked by this question of a reduced subjectivity. His
philosophy positions itself as an orientation in thought toward a formulation of
subjectivity, which respects the corporeal meaning and integrity of the individual.
Levinas's entire work brings philosophy to the question of an ethical approach to
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subjectivity. For Levinas, this question of ethical approach is directed towards Alterity in
the terms of moral inter-subjectivity; the alterity of the other person, the Other or Autrui,
justifies my subjectivity, my being as my-self, and so acts as a directive to the question of
the meaning of subjectivity. The signification of the other person, his significance as a
corporeal other, determines the sense of my subjectivity before subjectivity in general.
This understanding of the terms signification and sense criticises phenomenological
methodology, which accords the phenomenologically reduced sphere of meaning access
to the structures and meaning of subjectivity1. For Levinas, the reductions of
phenomenology preempt the real significance of the Other and the relations of affective
being which give rise to subjectivity.
What is important in the notion of affectivity or affection is the relation between
transcendence and immanence. The question of beginnings so pertinent to
phenomenological methodology is suspended by Levinas for a sense of 'beginning' prior
to phenomenological origins2. The previous chapters of this work have shown how the
question of origins in phenomenology and much of the philosophical tradition has meant
re-presenting 'presence' according to what Derrida criticises as the illusion of immediacy
11 refer to Levinas's discussion of the relation between psychology and phenomenology, and the issue of
'psychologism or 'relativisation' of truth/knowledge as it came to occupy the later Husserl and his
insistence on the difference between psychology and the absolute knowledge available to
phenomenological science. See especially the end of chapter seven in Emmanuel Levinas, The Theory of
Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. Andre Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1973). Levinas questions the 'reach' of phenomenological methodology. Levinas, like Husserl, does not
grant psychology any real access to significations or meaning. However, for Levinas, neither does the
phenomenological bracketing of the 'natural attitude' along with its insistence on the reflective awareness
of consciousness. According to Levinas, the restriction set by reducing the origins of meaning formation to
the confines of consciousness, is no less 'psychology'. The spheres of signification which give rise to the
self, do not begin with (in) consciousness, but according to concrete conditions of our corporeal being, or
our physical exposure to alterity as singular beings. This chapter ends with what is Levinas's point of
departure for his philosophy, the insufficient approach to inter-subjectivity in Husserl, the ultimate meaning
of which for Levinas, is ethical rather than ontological or epistemological.
2
Ultimately, Levinas's critique of classical phenomenology and specifically Husserl's theory of intuition
argues that 'intuition' on Husserl's account does not, as it supposes, give the origins of subjectivity or inter-
subjectivity. Like Heniy and Derrida, Levinas recognises that consciousness and intuition cannot achieve
the origin for itself 'by itself'. Affectivity accounts for immanent genesis beyond the supposed immediacy
of meaning-formation in intuition. Human being begins with sensibility and time understood according to
the disruption of self-presence by alterity/ 'proximity'. Levinas writes in "The I and Totality" that "if self-
knowledge rests on conditions, no knowledge, even reflective, even psychoanalytic, has a beginning" (31)
in the sense of origins on the classical account. Emmanuel Levinas, 'The I and Totality" in Entre Nous: On
Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1998), pp. 13-38.
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to consciousness and which he contests according to the differance of presence. Levinas's
notion of the 'trace', the meaning of which Derrida takes up, disagrees with the fullness
of such representation; it is incomplete and must necessarily be so3. For Levinas, the
'tracing' of diachrony accounts for an excess of sensible being, unavailable to the
structures of representation and the phenomenologically reduced subject-matter.
Levinas's particular ethico-phenomenological account of subjectivity is ultimately an
account of sensibility, and this (notion of) sensibility puts in question the coherence of the
'world' given by the account of consciousness in classical phenomenology. Sensibility is,
as in Deleuze, originary with respect to the formation and meaning of subjectivity.
Continuing the work of the earlier Totality and Infinity (1969)4, Levinas's Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence (1981)5 orients thought to its exterior6, a sensibility and a
relation to radical Alterity according to which subjectivity emerges. That is, the ethics of
philosophy in Levinas is awareness of its sensible dimension, and proposes a disruption
of the classical relation of language and consciousness by sensibility.
Levinas defines sensibility as a "changing of being into signification" (OB 17).
Subjectivity qua signification - the 'Saying' rather than the 'said' established as essence
in discourse - suspends essence qua the disinterestedness of one-for-another. "As
3 In the 1968 essay "Differance" Derrida refers explicitly to Levinas. Levinas states that the passage of a
trace - of otherness - involves an absolving of self. On Levinas's definition, the trace leaves a trace/mark
as effacement of presentable traces. Effacement is what constitutes the trace, a certain absence irreducible
to the distinction between absence and presence, because it does not belong to the realm of appearances
(for consciousness). Levinas describes it as occurring "by overprinting" by which he means an excess of
affective being. See Levinas, "The Trace of the Other" trans. Alphonso Lingis, in Deconstruction in
Context, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986) p. 357. In "Differance", Derrida
writes of the "interval" which is a condition for the present in that what appears in presence "is related to
something other than itself" (13). This interval is what Derrida calls the "arche-trace" and must be
understood according to what withdraws in appearance, as a "change of site" (24). See Jacques Derrida,
Margins ofPhilosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982).
4 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1969).
5 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). Hereafter referred to as OB.
6 Exterior, as in not accounted for in its categories of representation and intellection according to
phenomenological subjectivity.
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signification, proximity7, saying, separation, I do not fuse with anything" (14).
Signification is 'prior to being' according to the correlations of consciousness and as such
"breaks up the assembling, the recollection or the present of essence" (14). This breakup
of identity, of essence or the self-presence of consciousness, is what Levinas calls ethics.
The 'changing of being into signification' is what this ethics names 'substitution', or the
subject's exposure and subjection to its outside, its radical passivity with respect to an
excess of sensible being: in other words, sensibility. Human being is radically implicated
in sensibility. This sensibility speaks of an affectivity that comes from the Other, of a
passivity which lets us speak of this sensibility as a self-alterity which marks the corpo¬
real. Corporeal being, as 'always being in the presence of transcendence'8, of Alterity,
starts with a separation.
When Levinas, in Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger (1988), interprets
Husserl's 'originary impression'9, he speaks of a passivity coinciding with the
beginning's 'spontaneous genesis' in the event of the present (142-4). In concordance
with the notion of sensibility we find in Deleuze, 'the new' comes from outside
consciousness. Genesis starts with a separation with respect to a sensibility, which places
both the passivity and the activity of 'spontaneous genesis' with what is different from
consciousness, that is, according to a necessary discontinuity in internal time-
consciousness. This gives rise to what we have spoken of as the otherness of self-
awareness, the presence of alterity which gives rise to subjectivity. Pre-intentional, an
originary sensibility is inseparable from the presence of alterity, and introduces the
difference that allows us to understand time in terms of retention and protention. It is thus
a relationship with signification in the broad sense - an expressivity or Saying brought
about by a separation in the manner in which I am positioned in the world as embodied
7
'Proximity' in Levinas refers to the relation of one-for-the-other, an exposure without 'mediation', an
absolute anterior relation, which is a 'condition' of all signification, an original contamination inseparable
from an orientation of the body.
8 Recall Michel Henry in Philosophy and Phenomenology ofthe Body, p. 187. - See chapter two of this
thesis, p. 38 as well as chapter three, p. 10.
9 See Emmanuel Levinas, "Intentionality and Sensation", in Discovering Existence with Husserl and
Heidegger, trans. Richard E. Cohen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
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being - that gives rise to subjectivity. Levinas's insight is that sensibility is not something
that we project on the world, nor a project with regard to the world. The critique in
Levinas, as well as Deleuze, Henry and Derrida of the primacy and supposed sufficiency
of 'representation' and intentionality, points to the fact that it propounds the reductive
view that the only intelligible world is one that is determined - preformed - according to
our projects or the active intervention of cognition10. Levinas's notion of sensibility - or
'Saying' - disrupts the thematisation involved in such projects of representation. When
Levinas speaks of the violence of discourse, of the thematisations of 'the said' ascribed
meanings, what he refers to is actually the 'violence' in supposing the world of our
projects as primary and sufficient to make up the meaning of subjective being. The
'violence' refers furthermore to the fact that 'Saying' or sensibility always disrupts, but
exists in a 'necessary relation of interdependence' with, totalising representational
structures11. What discourse presents is always marked by a violence, like 'metaphysics'
in Derrida's account. Whereas, according to Levinas, subjectivity qua knowing and the
structures of representation is "subordinated to the sense of objectivity" (OB 132). On the
other hand, the expression of the Saying is necessarily given by the structures of the said.
It becomes absorbed in thematisation and ascribed meaning, as we always respond to the
sensible world in terms of meaningful structures. 'The Saying' is the expressivity or
sensibility of an 'infinite infinite', or what is always already in excess of 'the said'. The
problem of language is described by Levinas in similar terms to Michel Henry's:
The correlation of the saying and the said, that is, the subordination of the saying
to the said, to the linguistic system and to ontology, is the price that
manifestation demands. In language qua said everything is conveyed before us, be
10 The following sentence from Otherwise than Being represents what Levinas questions in such an account
of the position of subjectivity vis-a-vis the world: "A subject would then be a power for re-presentation in
the quasi-active sense of the word: it would draw up the temporal disparity into a present, a
simultaneousness" (133). The problem is that "the assembling of being in the present, its synchronization
by retention, memory and history, is representation; it does not integrate the responsibility for the
separated entity" (L40). The call of the Other, sensibility and separation, "does not arise out of... any
recallable present" (140). The specific temporality of Alterity and what we have called 'the otherness of
self-awareness' in the previous two chapters, are not recuperable in the Husserlian present, in re¬
presentation.
11 For the relation of 'the Saying' and 'the said' in Levinas, see Otherwise than Being, especially pp. 31-48.
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it at the price of a betrayal (OB 6).
Levinas, as much as Henry, argues that language restricted to 'the said' of
phenomenological discourse, misses a crucial signification pertaining to the sensible
excess of being. The cognition of being born(e) in the said is forgetful of Saying: "The
identity of entities refers to a saying teleologically turned to the kerygma of the said,
absorbing itself in it to the extent of being forgotten in it. It refers to a saying that would
be correlative with the said..." (37). As 'correlative' with the said, this saying would
"coagulate the flow of time... take up a position with regard to a 'something', fixed in a
present, represent it to itself and thus extract from it the labile character of time" (37).
Again in Levinas we encounter here his critique of the schematics pertaining to the
relation of intentionality and representation; identification occurs according to the logic
of 'scientific language' in which what is in excess of cognition and thematisation, (a
signification or sensibility which belongs to language in a broader sense), is reabsorbed in
an 'already said' (36-37). Language is irreducible to the 'verbal artifices' or rhetoric of
the language of thematisation (6). Saying is not exhausted by the thematisations of this
discourse. Sensibility undercuts these thematisations. Levinas argues in "The I and
Totality" (1954), that the face signifies in a manner which involves 'faith', "which does
not mean here a second source of knowledge but which is assumed by every theoretical
statement"12. What he means is that the 'absolute' or the 'fixed point' is the absolute of a
concrete embodied being, not affirmation of truth in the statements of discourse, 'a truth
about beings': "Language cannot encompass the other: the other, the concept of whom
we are using at this very moment, is not invoked as a concept, but as a person"13. That is,
language begins with sensibility.
Sensibility, as the mark of a corpo-reality, intervenes in cognitive language and the
projects of intentionality and re-presentation. That is, before language is language as we
12 Emmanuel Levinas, Entre-Nous, On Thinking-of-the-Other, p. 32.
13 Emmanuel Levinas, Entre-Nous, p. 32. In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas states that
the "reference to an interlocutor permanently breaks through the text that the discourse claims to weave in
thematizing and enveloping all things" (170).
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traditionally know it, linguistic and logical, it is an exposure and relation to what is Other,
'saying' as "exposure without reserve to the other" (168). In Totality and Infinity: An
Essay on Exteriority Levinas makes the point as follows: Saying or "speaking, rather
than 'letting be', solicits the Other" (195). The language of cognition and the structure of
intentionality are secondary with respect to this affective relation. Levinas notes that
"intentionality remains an aspiration to be filled, and fulfillment, the centripetal
movement of a consciousness that coincides with itself" (62). These are movements that
disregard the intervention of alterity, and the sensibility through which we respond to the
corporeal situation of being-for-another. The encounter with alterity - self-alterity and the
alterity of the other person - happens in "a time that does not enter into the unity of
transcendental apperception" (140). The Levinasian trace - diachrony - refers to a
movement of signification anterior to consciousness, an immanent genesis of meaning.
That is, exposure and sensibility elicit a response that disrupts the formal structures of
logic. Alterity orders the ethical relation as the corpo-reality of what escapes my freedom:
" The signification of what escapes my freedom is the defeat or defecting of the unity of
transcendental apperception" (179; 140-41). The otherness of self-awareness is what
elicits subjectivity according to the experience that "I, the same, am torn up from my
beginning in myself, my equality with myself" (184). Levinas understands the stakes of
sensibility or affectivity as follows; the experience of alterity is given in the terms of
responsibility, or the verb 'to respond', and in this response lies the meaning of
subjectivity. Accordingly, "the glory of the Infinite is this responsibility" (144), "anarchic
identity", a positioning for or as affectivity, a certain beginning before origins (144):
"essence is undone in signification" (140).
Significantly, this 'glory', or singular being of the Other, "could not appear" (144).
Levinas's critique of modern 'subject-object epistemology', in which our Being is
reducible to being-object, questions its delimitation by the privilege of the metaphor of
vision. This metaphor represents the forgetfulness of our corporeality and creation
beyond the manner in which vision - the phenomenon of manifestation on the classical
account - affords a source of knowledge. Levinas characterises responsibility in terms of
"the giving of signs" (144); affectivity or the one-for-the-other is the true situation of
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knowledge. In Levinas, infinity points to radical alterity; the infinity of the other is his
subjectivity as Other. The ethical relation is a return to a concrete reality lost in
epistemological discourse in so far as the latter seeks 'origins' in consciousness. Infinity
is the transcendence introduced as the particular relationship with an Other; it is response
to a singular being rather than to the abstractions of Being. Levinas's account of Alterity
demonstrates how theoretical being is always already the situation of particular material
being. 'The face' of the Other is for Levinas the mark of Alterity, but the particular face
reveals infinity, it infinitely orders me to respond. According to Levinas, 'the face'
signifies prior to our projecting light upon it14. The face affords response as a particular
intentionality; Levinas states that "the intentionality that animates the idea of infinity is
not compatible with any other; it aims at what it cannot embrace, and is in this sense, the
infinite"15. That is, irreducible to a beginning in the present of representation, "as
infinition of infinity, it comes from a past more distant than that which is within the reach
of memory, and is lined up with the present" (OB 144), and this is its positivity. Infinity
escapes objectivity and disrupts 'objectivising', theoretical consciousness. In Ethics and
Infinity (1985), Levinas describes the relation to the Infinite as 'not a knowledge but a
desire'16 and situates Infinity firmly within a material situation, the corporeality of our
being. In this manner Levinas is able to account for a corpo-real that Husserlian
phenomenology is not.
14 See Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 74. Levinas defines language in a broad sense as "the
coinciding of the revealer and the revealed in the face" (67).
15 Emmanuel Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity", in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans.
Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 54.
16 See Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 1985) p. 92. Levinas points out how in Descartes the thought of the Infinite puts reason in a position
to receive. However, "In Descartes the idea of the Infinite remains a theoretical idea, a contemplation, a
knowledge. For my part, I think that the relation to the Infinite is not a knowledge but a Desire" (92).
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(a) Body and 'Psyche': The circuits of Sensibility and Affectivity
The emphasis of Levinas's account of the ethical relation is that of the Life of the
subjective body, beyond theoretical representation of objects, or what Levinas calls the
'psyche'. What is important about this concept of the 'psyche' and the ethical relation in
Levinas's account, is that they demonstrate the radical degree to which subjectivity is
never 'enclosed in its own skin', but exposed in a sense which takes seriously the notion
of embodiedness. It is this embodiedness, thought according to its 'regard for' exteriority
against much of the philosophical tradition, which sets Levinas's thought apart. It is also
what links him to Deleuze and Derrida. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas speaks of 'true
discourse' as an "original relation with exterior being [and a] production of meaning"
(66).
Levinas's theory of ethical subjectivity draws the Husserlian subject out of its essence as
'inner consciousness' and transcendental ego, into relations of sensibility in which the
external and the 'internal' enter into constant circuits. Ethical subjectivity is a theory of
the self according to which phenomenological ego-consciousness is no longer
foundational but preceded by the exteriority of responsibility. Levinasian sensibility
works on the presupposition that what Husserl called intentional affectivity - beside
cognitional and volitional intentionality - is preceded by a non-intentional affectivity.
The temporality of response and responsibility in Levinas is a re-orientation of
subjectivity against its reduction to the sufficiency of its self-presence. The import of
exteriority does not cancel out interiority, it enters into a 'circuit' with it17. That is,
subjectivity comes 'after the fact'; it is delayed with regard to the physical reality of an
inter-subjective world, which is not reducible to an object of subjectivity's autonomous
creation. The face of the Other, the meaning of its expressivity, disrupts the identity of
the ego-consciousness in so far as it exceeds its meaning-bestowing autonomy, its
17 Such circuits are, as I see it, close to what is expressed by Deleuze's 'energetic materiality'. I argue that
Levinasian non-intentional affectivity is lent depth by this notion. Deleuze's notion of energetic materiality
puts into question the demarcations of the mediated world, such as the relation of object and subject, inside
and outside.
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'freedom' according to the tradition culminating in Husserlian phenomenology. As
suggested in the previous chapters, the presence of transcendence involves a certain
forgetfulness of ego-consciousness. It also involves a certain forgetfulness of logical
orientation, that is, thought bound by 'possible experience' according to mediation by the
categories in traditional representational thought. The response elicited by the face of the
other is of a non-cognitive sort; it cannot be reduced to the contents of an intuition or a
concept. Affective orientation before intentionality is a susceptibility and a passivity,
which always already mark our corporeal situation, our exposure to a creation or genesis
not accessible or assimilable according to our cognitive capacity. A singularity exceeds
the interiority of the subject, but is inseparable from a life of the body, and the judging
capacity of emotions18. Affectivity and response are always before the self, and recur
infinitely as the interruption of its self-sustenance. There is thus immanent creation
exterior to the 'subjectivity' of ego-consciousness. Beyond object-determination and the
reflection of human reason, there is a singular genesis and individuation that give rise to
subjectivity. In Levinas, the notion of singularity is inseparable from moral obligation or
responsibility, and so the singular and the social are both understood according to this
originary event of lived, rather than conceptualised, inter-subjectivity. Levinas's 'psyche'
demonstrates the reality of a subjectivity that questions the stability of ego-consciousness,
by what he expresses throughout Otherwise than Being as the 'other-in-the same' and the
'other in me'. These abstract formulae point to the reality of singular creation outside the
parameters of this ego-consciousness19. In this sense we can speak of immanent genesis.
Levinas's notion of the psyche refers to that sensibility which exceeds Husserlian
intentionality, in other words, the reality of a non-intentional affectivity. The 'psyche' is
on this account not what is equal to consciousness but what exceeds or interrupts it as the
'time of the other' - 'diachrony'. Time is inseparable from embodiment, understood as
the sensible susceptibility to the other; this morally responsible body, in all its singularity
and reality as flesh, is what Levinas calls the 'maternal body'. That is, I am as body,
18 See Chapter three, p. 25. This is precisely the point regarding the body that Deleuze takes from Spinoza.
19 Levinas's main writings on the notion of the psyche are found in chapter three of Otherwise than Being
or Beyond Essence.
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infinitely responsible for the 'other in me'. Levinas states: "Indeed in the transcendence
of intentionality diachrony is reflected, that is, the psyche itself, in which inspiration of
the same by the other is articulated as a responsibility for another, in proximity" (OB 67).
The psyche is moral responsiveness, the one-for-the other or the reality of proximity.
Proximity signifies a relation anterior to meaning bestowal; the "approach"20 of a
singularity is a relation without the mediation of a principle of intuition or of ideality.
According to Levinas, it is this concrete situation which gives rise to self-awareness. This
ethical relation exceeds philosophy understood as the thematisation of epistemology and
the establishment of ontological relation. "The very pneuma of the psyche, alterity in
identity, is the identity of a body exposed to the other, becoming 'for the other', the
possibility of giving" (69). What is important in this passage and Levinas's other
descriptions of the psyche is the very vulnerability of the body and its orientation, the fact
of its 'complicity' - without the intentional overtones of that word - with a creation
anterior to consciousness. The genesis of meaning begins with the situation of the body,
one-for-the-other because the signification implied by this situation is other than what is
taken up - 'after the fact' - by consciousness in reflection. This is why Levinas insists on
the distinction between 'the Saying and the said'. For Levinas, signification exterior to
the system of language according to speech-acts and linguistics, is inseparable from the
ethical relation: that is, it is responsiveness to what is not mine, nor of my command. The
signifyingness of the "affective", "active", and the sensible as inscribed "in a system, in
the said, and in the simultaneity of a particular language, is borrowed from this prior
psyche, which is signifyingness par excellence" (69). The important point made is that a
situation pertaining to the life of the subjective body is at the root of all signification.
When Levinas speaks of this situation according to an animation of the body, it is "not a
metaphor" (70), and does not involve mediation by consciousness. A fundamental
passivity is the reality of a corpo-real, which undergoes a genesis that eludes object-
oriented phenomenology. Singular creation, according to the forces that animate the
subjective body, gives us an understanding of individuation that defies the categories of
representational thought and the notion of objectivity in classical phenomenology. The
20 Levinas speaks of the mutation of the intentional into the ethical as an infinite movement "where
approach pierces consciousness" as "the surface of the human face" (DEH 225).
202
same point is expressed by Henry, of the need to orient thought beyond 'the world' and
'being' according to the classical conception21. In this sense, immanent genesis is that
which cannot be objectively given, a force of creativity, which animates the life of human
being22. The illusions of 'objectivity' are the illusions projected according to
phenomenological light, as it obscures an immediate subjective reality, which Levinas
emphasises as emphatically not mine. The important point raised by conceiving a life of
the body in terms of affection and sensibility, singular individuation, is that subjectivity is
always already in excess of any generalisable unit of being. Subjectivity is entirely other
than a particular instance of a generalisable abstraction exhausted as an object in
representation and reflection. The reality of subjectivity is its complicity with a creative
principle. This is a principle of excess, sensibility, and the reality of immanent genesis.
According to the question of immanent genesis the body is the 'reality' rather than the
'medium' of life's auto-affection, to use an expression from Henry again.
(b) Signification Other than Phenomenological Abstraction
Levinas's notion of the excess of an absolute alterity could be considered to be an
abstraction according to the logic of traditional discursive philosophy. However, I argue
that this would not be an accurate reading of the notion. Levinas's notion of alterity is
very much other than an abstraction. The relation with the face of the other is not an
object cognition; the "transcendence of the face is at the same time its absence from this
world into which it enters" (TI 75). The face signifies otherwise than that which can be
21
Accordingly, the meaning of the play of difference in Derrida is 'unlimited' because it precedes the
question of the world as such, it 'transcends' the world as 'contained' by the philosophical tradition.
Levinas states in Totality and Infinity:An Essay on Exteriority that the face is not accessible as "object-
cognition. The transcendence of the face is at the same time its absence from this world into which it
enters" (75).
22 I'll end this section with a comment on Deleuze, who in The Logic ofSense speaks of a project for
philosophy in tracing the manners in which " the individual would be able to transcend his form and his
syntactical link with a world" in order to understand how a "non-organic life of things... burns us" (178).
203
taken up in reflection, recuperated or disclosed in discourse. The idea of Infinity, the
'signifyingness' of the face is revealed, not thematised or disclosed (TI 62). 'The face' is
the excess consequent of an anterior sensibility that eludes Husserlian constitution.
Levinas describes the manifestation of the Other as a "coinciding of the expressed with
him who expresses" (66). 'Signifyingness', or genesis of meaning, occurs outside the
parameters of phenomenological meaning-bestowal because it is entirely anterior to this
activity of consciousness, and concerns an 'animation' of the body, a sense of otherness
prior to the determination of meaning by constitutional logic. The signification of the face
does not 'belong' to the horizons of the 'world' or the 'ways of the world' thus
constituted. The signifyingness of the face transcends culture and is anterior to any
historical language. Levinas's interpretation of the other insists on its transcendence of
the 'world', and understands the latter as the discursive truth of what has already been
said23. What Levinas wants to emphasise is the absolute anteriority of the manner in
which we live from a material or corpo-real situation and the significations that pertain to
this situation24. The urgency of ethics is its priority, in both senses of the word, to
ontology and epistemology. The reality of the face is concrete, immediate; it pertains
immediately - without mediation on the classical model - to embodied inter-subjectivity,
23 Levinas's theory of language deals with the problem of transcendent meaning given within the
parameters of the 'world', recognising that the world is 'resistant' to transcendence in so far as no
phenomenon can include in itself through 'manifestation' that which cannot appear. The activity of
discursive language, as it repeats the appropriation of the world by act-intentionality, is expressed by
Levinas as "the way being borrows in order to show itself", an over-determination by the "logos as
rationality". See Emmanuel Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl, pp. 217-18. Language in the
narrow sense and according to Husserlian phenomenology serves to repeat or 'communicate' what has
already been established in intuition. Levinas states, however: "Meaning neither given nor non-given is
intended. But it is starting with meaning that being is manifested as being" (218). Levinas directs us to the
signification or 'signifyingness' which is language in a broader sense and which, because it eludes this
activity of intentional language, is 'beyond being', not of the 'world' or the onto-thematic event that is the
disorientation or detour of ideality. The problem with the postulation of the essence of a universal truth in
intuition is that this set up of ideality assumes that everything can be known; that understanding and
perception are synonymous; and that objectivity is what is given to consciousness, exhausted in its
significance as the epistemologically willed. 'Proximity' complicates the classical conception of
intentionality; it refers to a "relation between terms where the one and the other are united neither by a
synthesis of the understanding nor by the relation of subject to object and where nevertheless the one
weighs or matters or is significant to the other" (225), that is they are tied by something "knowledge"
cannot exhaust.
24 Levinas states in Totality and Infinity. "We live from life, exist by means of matter" (TI 82- 86). This is
the single most important point made in Totality and Infinity. The abstractions of discursive thought must
take this situation into consideration in a specific manner. What classical phenomenology does not
recognize sufficiently is that the corpo-real cannot be abstracted from constitutional ego-consciousness.
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and the singular relation of the one-for-the-other. As time is the very structure of
subjectivity - the time of 'diachrony', the absolute anteriority of the other person effects
subjectivity as the disruption of inner time consciousness. Response and responsibility
are in this sense the very essence of time, and 'come before' discursive consciousness
and philosophy. The alterity of the Other is not accessible as the epistemologically
willed; it is an imperative for responsibility which affects our bodily being before any
self-correcting epistemological impetus, or what we call the intellect in cognition and
reflection. Human being is first of all openness and vulnerability in face of a signification
that affects prior to the 'certainties' of self-identity. The signification of alterity is
described by Levinas as "proximity", "dia-chrony", and "non-indifference". While these
may be abstract terms, the ethical relation they refer to is anything but abstract. Rather,
the ethical relation is deeply rooted in the manner in which we are first of all embodied
beings, answerable to the affections of embodied life in all their particularities. Levinas
designates the signifyingness of the face and its affect on me - in the 'accusative' -as the
premise of moral inter-subjectivity.
Levinas's essay, "Signification and Sense"25 argues that signification exceeds the
contents 'given' to consciousness in intuition. Just as in representation the 'presence ' is
already past, so the temporalisation of proximity is an anachronism to consciousness. The
concreteness of the sensible, and the lived reality of sensible human being, signify as the
approach of the face, is language or an engagement in life that precedes intentionality.
Levinas's critique of Husserl's 'intuitionism' and intellectualism points to the
'disorientation' of classical phenomenology's 'return to the given'. Levinas points out
that significations do not appear to consciousness as the given "placed on an illuminated
horizon" (SS 11). The notions of horizon or 'world' in classical phenomenology detract
from the immanence and singularity of a creation or signification beyond its illuminated
boundaries conceived on the model of a context for consciousness (11). Levinas's
argument is that signification precedes the 'givens'. "Signification cannot be inventoried
25 Emmanuel Levinas, "Signification and Sense", trans., Poller, in Humanism of the Other (Illinois:
University of Illinois Press, 2003). Levinas's essay is guided by Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on
embodiment with regard to vision and signification.
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in the interiority of thought" (16). Levinas follows the argument of Merleau-Ponty to a
certain point, of the body as a 'sensing sensed' and "the fact that the body is immersed in
the world that it thinks and consequently expresses this world as it thinks it" (16). The
emphasis on embodiment in Levinas, however, is the emphasis on the separation - in
proximity - which gives rise to affectivity and the response-emergence of subjectivity.
This is the orientation which gives rise to the ethical relation, and which undercuts
consciousness - and vision - as a privileged manner of access into the real. Levinas asks,
"Does not sense, as orientation, indicate a thrust, an outside of self toward the other than
self...? (25). Because embodied life precedes philosophy and precedes thought, we must
look to the significance of the body, what a body can do, to conceive of an orientation in
thought as "orientation - a sense - in [embodied] being that would unite univocality and
freedom" (26).
Like Henry, Levinas orients us towards a 'freedom' of the subject in which thought is
more than a 'theory of thought', or thematisation through the detour of idealism and the
circular movement by which meanings are established for consciousness. 'Freedom' lies
in the potential to respond to what is other than what consciousness already knows. The
face invokes what is absent to consciousness and the knowing subject, that which is not
already fixed by intuition. It invokes the presence of an irretrievable past and a yet-to-
come future. Levinas quotes Leon Blum writing in prison in 1941, "We work in the
present, not for the present" (28). Desire, or the "surplus that is inadequate to
intentionality", or "thinking beyond what one thinks", the "idea of infinity" (33), these
are the absent contents of consciousness. The face challenges the consciousness that
sights it; it always exceeds its knowledge and as such is unassimilable. The face
represents in this capacity a potential for creation, what is 'new' with respect to the
formulas of 'the said'. "Infinity is not correlative to the idea of Infinity, as if that idea
were an intentionality accomplishing itself in its 'object'. The marvel of infinity in the
finitude of thought is an upheaval of intentionality, an upheaval of this appetite for light
that is intentionality" (34). The relation with the other, the invocation by the face, does
not comply with the act of unveiling being, as what is already there or 'said' in the
discourse of representational consciousness. The approach by the face traces "the
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rectitude of an orientation or sense" (34), which does not confuse the moment of return of
consciousness with its birth (34), Levinas quotes Merleau-Ponty from a conference in
1957, as the latter refers to the problems posed by Husserl's phenomenological reduction:
"Where does it come from, this resistance of the unreflected to reflection?" (34). The
answer for Levinas, lies in these absent contents, the positivity of a Desire which is not
prompted by a lack and is 'non-consumative', but is created by the approach of the face
of the other. Merleau-Ponty also refuses to answer according to the finitude of the
subject, but his account of an openness to a certain materiality of being is, as I have
pointed out, left with the impasses of the notion of Flesh.
It is important to realise the anteriority of sense with regard to cultural-historical
signification (36). The manner in which ideology and politico-religious discourse tend to
operate with a conception of the abstract man in men (36) is precisely a result of a
tendency to organise signs of culture into principles of abstraction regarding the human
being. Subjectivity is subsumed in the generality of 'human being', stripped of the corpo¬
real affects that inform individuation and lend particularity and significance to the
individual, as subjectivity. This move to a sense brought about by corpo-reality is
importantly different from Husserlian reduction. It is a move toward a naked significance
that is not forgetful of the affects of the body, but recognises what being a body means.
The body holds the potential of access and realisation with regard to the meaning of the
absolutely Other. The subjective body is sensibility, the in-apparent, the unfolding of
sense beyond the confines of the 'world'. Sense is traced in the body. "The significance
of the trace consists in signifying without making appear"; the trace establishes a relation
"personal and ethical, a relation, obligation, that does not unveil... [as] the trace does not
belong to phenomenology, to comprehension of appearance and dissimulation, it could
be approached by another path, by situating that significance from the phenomenology it
interrupts" (41). The trace functions as a sign, but signifies outside intention, and the gaze
operating according to what is already 'said' or sighted according to the intentional
correlation. According to Levinas, beyond the interiority of a Self, the trace is the retreat
of the Other and escapes presence as well as memory; it "obliges with regard to Infinity",
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"the insertion of space in time, the point where the world leans toward a past and a time"
(42).
The face is, in and of itself, visitation and transcendence. But the face, fully open,
can at the same time be in itself, because it is in the trace of illeity. Illeity is the origin
of the otherness of being, in which the in itselfof objectivity participates by betraying
it... It is by that illeity, situated beyond the calculations and reciprocities of the
economy of the world, that being has a sense. Sense that is not a finality (44).
II. A Reading of Derrida's Memoirs ofthe Blind
"... to feel my eyes is to feel that
they are threatened with being seen"
- Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible
Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind (1993) speaks of blindness and invisibility, and situates
the problematic within the theme of the point of view26. Derrida's treatment of the point
of view in Memoirs takes us straight into the issues of corporeality and the aesthetic with
which we are concerned in this thesis. The work reflects on the meaning and implications
of the phenomena of vision, from the thematics of blindness to evidence. First published
to accompany an exhibition of drawings of the same name at the Louvre Museum 1990-
91, Memoirs of the Blind comments on drawings concerned with 'blind men and
visionaries' and approaches these works outside the classical work of the art-historian.
26
Jacques Derrida, Memoirs ofthe Blind, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1993). Hereafter MB.
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Derrida's work approaches the artworks in order to say something about positions - also
in a meta-discursive sense - or about ways of 'opening eyes' by opening up the
problematic of the point of view, the corporeality which informs every gaze and in¬
sight27. The point of view cannot be abstracted from the corporeality that is inextricable
from a viewpoint.
Derrida's work is concerned to 'draw out' a certain 'origin of drawing'. The claim of
Memoirs is that all painting 'is drawing', that drawing is at the origin, the point at which
vision is forgetful of itself, as it also moves outside vision. Derrida elaborates this claim
by his specific approach to the 'point of view'. 'The point of view' is approached through
the themes of "blindness, dispropriation, and the interruption of a lineage or filiation: the
cancellation of what makes representation possible..." (MB ix). Ultimately the themes
concern the affections of the body, what a body does, beyond our representational being
in the world, 'on the other side of vision'. Derrida wants to say something about "a
singular genealogy, a singular illustration, an illustration of oneself among all these
illustrious blind men who keep each other in memory, who greet and recognise one
another in the night" (ix)28. The text and the approach to the drawings, as well as the
question of what drawing does, say something about the legacy of representation and
what is bypassed in this legacy. Our dependence upon objects and representation of
objects is forgetful of the life of the body, the manner in which the latter informs the
objectification we perform regarding our being in the world. Derrida's work and his
reading of these artworks perform a certain bracketing of the tradition of representational
knowledge, which has put its faith in the notion of evidential in-sight. The manner in
which we establish ourselves as 'worldly beings' is forgetful of whatever does not appear
27 The full version of Memoirs which I comment on here is expanded from the original 'catalogue' to
accompany the exhibition, and includes seventy-one over the exhibition's display of forty-four drawings
and paintings.
28 As the Preface points out, the French Memoirs of the title can be read as both 'memoirs' and 'memories'
of the blind. Derrida later in the text emphasises the double genitive 'of the blind'. The memoirs are of the
blind, but also o/the blind. This is of great importance as one of the arguments of the text is that all
painting/drawing is blind. That is, it originates through a certain blindness, the point - which is not a point
in space and time, but rather refers to the point of view according to the life of the subjective body - in
which vision is suspended. Vision is suspended at its origin. I shall return to this point.
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to us - according to the 'transcendental illusion of the ego' - in the 'light' of the world.
Derrida's translators ask us to recall that "the draftsman's contract always concerns a
pleasure and a condition that are not only out of sight, but out of this world" (MB x. My
emphasis). As embodied beings we are given to the experience of ourselves by what is in
infinite excess of this experience. Forces of sensible or material being inform the
experience of self-awareness beyond our representation of ourselves as objects of the
world. If what we have referred to in this thesis as the subjective body is considered in
terms of its undergoing of life's auto-affections, the body must be considered in terms of
this singular creation, belonging to a singular human being, before it can be posited as an
object 'external' to myself or as an object of reflection. Derrida opens his text with an
acknowledgement of the difference between seeing and believing. The Greek skepsis
inscribes this difference; it has to do with the eyes, visual perception and the gaze which
finds the object (1). Derrida makes the move from phenomenological perception to the
event that gives rise to perception and perspective, the movement of a bodily exposure
beyond its representation. Derrida's theme of the point of view recognises this initial
exposure to singular creation by finding that it is the 'point' that is blind, a certain
blindness at the heart of sight is not only a condition of sight, but calls the traditional
notion of perception into question29.
Organised around the theme of the point of view, all the seventy-one drawings of the text
concern blindness. They range from the biblical story of Christ healing the blind, the
blind as visionaries, to Oedipal blindness. Derrida approaches these drawings of the blind
according to the organising theme of the point of view, in order to argue that blindness is
at the heart of 'perception' or what gives rise to perspective. The first of Derrida's two
hypotheses regarding the relation between blindness and what gives rise to perspective is
the abocular hypothesis, that "the drawing is blind" (2)30. The hand is always already out
in front of sight, the "operation of drawing would have something to do with blindness,
29 Recall here Derrida's claim that he knew 'no such thing as perception'. Recall also the consequence of
Deleuze's immanentism: the inseparability of perception from creation or conception, in both senses of the
word.
30 'Abocular'from ab oculis or 'without the eyes'.
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would in some way regard blindness [aveuglement]" (2). The second hypothesis: "an eye
graft, the grafting of one point of view onto the other: a drawing of the blind is a drawing
of the blind... There is no tautology here, only a destiny of the self-portrait" (2). Derrida
designates a 'drawing potency', the trait31 at the origin of drawing. Derrida asks what
happens when one writes without seeing and answers: "A hand of the blind ventures forth
alone or disconnected, in a poorly delimited space; it feels its way, it gropes, it caresses
as much as it inscribes, trusting in the memory ofsigns and supplementing sight. It is as if
the lidless eye had opened at the tip of the fingers" (3). The blind body draws, it 'draws
out' by way of a 'retreat [retrait]' a certain potency of the body which pierces through
blindness, by a 'memory of the trait', a "sort of re-drawing, a with-drawing... and a
supplementary trait" (3). Derrida refers to a blindness, or invisibility, which concern the
point at which the painter or draftsperson directs the gaze from model to canvas, the hand
is out in front, one could say 'it precipitates'. According to Derrida, "the theme of the
drawings of the blind is, before all else, the hand" (4). The logic of the trait is what makes
this retreat from sight into a potential at the origin of drawing. Derrida states: "The trait
must proceed in the night. It escapes the field of vision because it is not yet visible" (48).
Derrida draws attention to how spoken language "speaks to itself, which is to say, from/of
blindness. It always speaks to us from the blindness that constitutes it" (4). While the
word is understood and heard, 'the sonorous phenomenon' remains "invisible as such"
(4). The trait, like the word, takes up time, not space: the spread out invisibility is a
'drawn-out' moment of faith rather than sight in which some thing is drawn from faith in
memory. Faith rather than sight is at the origin of drawing and it originates as a bodily
movement, the 'point' in which blindness guides before sight. This mention of memory
testifies to an indebtedness in face of what is other than sight, the 'law beyond sight', and
this "debt must be repaid with words on parchment, with visible signs of the invisible"
(29). Inscription or drawing testifies thus as monuments to an observance of a law
beyond sight, "ordering truth alongside the debt, ordering truth from the debt... [testifies]
at once to the overabundance and the failure [defaillance] of the visible" (29). What
'guides the graphic point' according to Derrida is the "observance of a commandment,
31 The French trait has a range of meanings, as is pointed out by the translator, from "a trait or feature to a
line, stroke, or mark". (MB 2)
211
the acknowledgement before knowledge, the gratitude of receiving before seeing" (29).
The logic of the trait suggests this: "at the origin of the graphein there is debt or gift
rather than representational fidelity" (30). Drawing is a response, beyond the distinction
between passivity and activity. Faith or memory, 'in the moment proper to it' is blind.
Inscription or drawing, are matters of a "restoring of sight" rather than the object of
visibility. Accordingly, "truth belongs to this movement of repayment that tries in vain to
render itself adequate to its cause or to the thing... The just measure of 'restoring' or
'rendering' is impossible - or infinite" (30). Derrida speaks here of the conditions of
visibility by showing how drawing commemorates invisibility, how there is a certain
blindness at the origin of all the monuments of vision. Drawing or inscription: these
graphic acts are indebted to a certain absence and inseparable from corporeality.
Between Derrida's two hypotheses about eyes and hands, which cannot really be
separated, is an 'event'. Derrida locates the event, or the point of view, which is not a
point as such, in "the fold" which makes up the relation between the two hypotheses "the
one repeating the other without being reduced to it" (41). To understand Derrida's
argument regarding these hypotheses of blindness and invisibility, it is necessary to
understand the notion of the trait as it remains invisible, "not only because it is not yet
visible, but because it does not belong to the realm of the spectacle, of spectacular
objectivity" (45). The trait does not conform to the visible, the "heterogeneity" which
separates trait and what is drawn remains "abyssal" (45). This abyssal heterogeneity of
the visible to the invisible can be understood either as a "reserve of visibility" or as
radically different with regard to the phenomenality of light and sight. "The visibility of
the visible cannot, by definition, be seen" and the hypothesis is, on Derrida's view "that
the draftsman always sees himself to be prey to that which is each time universal and
singular and would thus have to be called the unbeseen, as one speaks of the
unbeknownst. He recalls it, is called, fascinated, or recalled by it. Memory or not, and
forgetting is memory, in memory or without memory" (45). Because the invisible can be
located at the origin of visibility as a condition of possibility, there is always a possibility
of "ruination" at the origin of drawing and the sacrifice of perception for memory. This
suggests the visible as marked by a necessary 'impossibility'. There is an inaccessibility
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at the heart of the 'visible' and this is why we can speak of a singular creation of the
invisible and confer upon it a kind of transcendental operation. This inaccessibility is
testament to the fact that perception is not the purity of coming into presence for a
consciousness that sights it; we always perceive more than we perceive, to perceive is
already to recollect, and to acknowledge an excess of the perceived. The origin of
drawing is self-effacing. Derrida speaks of the different aspects of the trait, the first
regarding the double genitive 'of the blind' which marks the act of tracing/drawing. The
second aspect is what Derrida calls the "withdrawal [retrait]... the differential
inappearance of the trait" (53); the trait, once it has been traced, disappears and so marks
the limit of representation. The trait is 'the line itself, beyond figure/form it "signals
toward" an inaccessibility, it is what continually divides itself in becoming other than
itself (54). The third aspect of the logic of the trait/traced is its 'rhetoric'. Derrida
suggests that the withdrawal or differential inappearance, "at the very moment when the
trait is drawn, when it draws away" (56), is this not precisely the condition of possibility
for speech? Language appears in the fold of the visible and the invisible, conditioned by
blindness, the corporeal event or aspects that make up the point of view. Graphic
restitution of the invisible, the blindness at the heart of vision, or drawing/writing, is
testament to a singular genesis, "a phenomenon whose inappearance is of another kind"
(52).
If the trait is radically other than phenomenality conceived by light/sight, it follows that
"the visible as such would be invisible, not as visibility, the phenomenality or essence of
the visible, but as the singular body of the visible itself, right on [a meme] the visible"
(51). What Derrida describes here is the in-visible of Merleau-Ponty's The Visible and
the Invisible. At this point, Derrida speaks of a "re-reading of the later Merleau-Ponty"
(52). Although Derrida speaks of an "absolute invisibility" rather than Merleau-Ponty's
"four layers" of the invisible, both Derrida and Merleau-Ponty recognise the
'phenomenon' whose inappearance is of another kind. Merleau-Ponty states in his
working notes: "the invisible is there without being an object, it is pure transcendence
without an ontic mask. And the 'visibles' themselves... are centered on a nucleus of
absence" (WN 229, quoted MB 52). The importance of recognising this absence lies in
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that it opens us to that which other. Our experience, according to Merleau-Ponty, is open
to what is not originally present to us, to consciousness or vision; an absence is thus part
of originating experience (VI 159). According to Derrida, this openness is im-mediately
part of experience. Derrida relates the openness and the absence, as these inform the point
of view, to what Merleau-Ponty describes as the punctum caesum. Derrida quotes two
working notes of Merleau-Ponty, which I have already quoted in chapter two of this
thesis, in order to show that Merleau-Ponty makes the point that the visible is made
visible by an absence at the heart of sight32:
When I say that every visible is an invisible, that perception is imperception, that
consciousness has a "punctum caesum", that to see is always to see more than one
sees - this must not be understood in the sense of a contradiction - it must be
imagined that I add to the visible... a non-visible... - One has to understand that it
is the visibility itself that involves a non-visible... (WN 247, quoted in MB 52).
What consciousness does not see it does not see for reasons of principle, it is because
it is consciousness that it does not see. What it does not see is what in it prepares the
vision of the rest (as the retina is blind at the point where the fibres that will permit
the vision spread out into it). To touch oneself, to see oneself... is not to apprehend
oneself as an ob-ject, it is to be open to oneself... The feeling that one feels, the
seeing that one sees, is not a thought of seeing or of feeling, but vision, feeling, mute
experience of a mute meaning (WN 248, quoted in MB 53).
The point of view, like the punctum caesum, must be understood in terms of a corporeal
condition. The blindness at the heart of sight is the trait of invisibility, an im-mediate
absence. As Derrida points out, the punctum in its anatomico-physiological or
opthalmological definition must be considered an image or index regarding vision in
general of that cannot be reflectively "thought" in the "specular or speculative mode"
(MB 53). That is, while the punctum is blinded at the point it 'sees itself seeing' and so
32 See chapter two, pp. 17-19.
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eludes the notion of being-object for thought, it nevertheless is a condition for reflection
and speculative thought. Both Derrida and Merleau-Ponty point to the invisible as the
originary aperspective (53), which conditions the visible, and by consequence thought.
For Derrida, this means that painting, which commemorates visibility must be reinscribed
as drawing, to commemorate the movement of invisibility which tends to cancel itself out
in the rhetoric of visibility. Derrida's argument that the invisible lies "right on" the
visible - as a tear or punctum - does imply that an openness to the invisible is a condition
of our corporeity. Even if the invisible is understood as an "absolute invisible", as an
absence, it is inseparable from a certain life of the subjective body. Merleau-Ponty's
ontology of the invisible, however, obscures any notion of a subjective body, as
consciousness's "tie to Being, its corporeity..." (WN 248), becomes a manner of fusing
an enlarged corporeity with a sort of spiritual sensible intelligible.
Derrida's rhetoric, as he speaks of commemoration of the invisible and argues that
drawing is drawing of the blind with a double genitive, takes us to a specific view of the
self-portrait. Self-portraiture shows the limits of representation and the inadequacies of
vision. Because the source point of drawing is blind, as drawing draws from or traces the
invisible, the self-portrait shows the impossibility of adequate self-representation. The
mirror image of oneself is never 'the full picture'. The inadequacy of mirrored
representation is due to the corporeal situation that, firstly, a mirror image is always in
reverse and, secondly, in order to see oneself seeing the eyes must focus and the focal
point obscures the full image. Derrida describes the meeting of the eyes in the focal point
as a situation in which "invisibility is shared out between the eyes" (57). One never
arrives at the complete image of one's own face, but sees oneself as other. Self-awareness
is always marked by otherness, and self-portraiture undertaken via the mirror-image, can
only portray the self as other than itself. This is so, not because the self-portrait is another
object, but because our grasp of ourselves as objects remains elusive. An absence is at the
source of presence. The self-portrait is testament to an invisible, without this invisible
ever appearing, but must rather be understood as the self-portrait's de-monstration33. The
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invisible is traced at the limits of any representation, as 'specter' rather than spectacle.
Manifestation goes beyond phenomenal appearance on the classical model. Derrida's
discussion comes back to the critique of the phenomenological notions of presence and
presence to self. The de-monstration involved in self-portraiture raises the question of the
unpresentable, and the relationship between the unpresentable and representation. I take
up this point in the next chapter's discussion of Henri Michaux's art.
(a) The Specter of the Other in Re-presentation
When Merleau-Ponty states that "to feel one's eyes is to feel that they are threatened with
being seen" (VI) he makes the point that bodily being is exposure, first of all. Interiority
and self-awareness are always determined by a sense of divergence. In Levinas and
Derrida this means that the otherness of an absolute separation is the mark of
corporeality. Merleau-Ponty's ontology speaks of a chiasmic divergency that Levinas's
ethics of affectivity and signification by otherness would refute. Levinas states in
Otherwise than Being that corporeality is a situation, which places one in a position of
vulnerability. For Levinas, there can be no con-fusion of the other's corporeality and my
own, and he speaks of a divergency which is absolute. For Levinas, contact with another
person's corporeality, as literally when touching another's skin, does not call for a
recognition of implication with another's corporeality, but addresses me. For Levinas,
this address is the consequence of the other's corporeality being revealed to me as face.
This corporeal situation reveals the other and, as a consequence, myself in our singular
corporeal exposure and passivity. Levinas speaks of the emergence of ethical subjectivity
as "a recurrence to oneself out of an irrecusable exigency of the other, a duty... becoming
a debt and an extreme passivity" (OB 109). Self-awareness comes as a consequence of a
33 See Merleau-Ponty's essay, "Cezanne's Doubt" in Sense and Non-sense, trans. Dreyfus and Dreyfus
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 9-26. Cezanne's doubt is precisely the logic of the
self-portrait, the de-monstration at the heart of presentation.
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"cellular irritability" (143), a consequence of corporeal exposure, "prior to all reflection,
prior to every positing" (111). Levinas's account of the signification of the other and the
openness of the corporeal situation resists the 'migration' involved in Merleau-Ponty's
notions of encroachment with regard to the signification evinced by the other's flesh.
Levinas notions of approaching otherness and sensibility refer to a situation in which
there is no 'dimensionality' with regard to the notion of being tied to others before any
articulation of self-identity. The notion's meaning with regard to corporeality is ethical,
not ontological. Against the dimensionality implied in the notion of flesh, Levinas speaks
of susceptibility: "the self is susceptibility itself" (195 n 12), the submission to
"irreversible diachrony" (90). The tracing of such diachrony is the signification involved
when we speak of the otherness of self-awareness, and cannot be reduced to an object for
consciousness. The manifestation of the face is the manifestation of what is absent to
consciousness, the invisible content of form. Ethical recognition of otherness is not
reducible to the embodied forms of representation. What is traced in the face of the other
is a significance, which is irrecuperable in the presence of an object for consciousness. It
exceeds this presence and presence to oneself. Otherness in-forms re-presentation like a
specter: its contents are irrecuperable and immemorial. In this otherness lies the real
significance of our corporeal situation; the ethical demand lies beyond manifestation of
the visible. In this manner, affectivity points to a relation between ethics and aesthetics,





Body Matters: Embodiment and Creative Time in the Art of
Henri Michaux
There are thinkings of the systematicity of the body, there are value codings of
the body. The body as such cannot be thought.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
Henri Michaux's works span both visual and verbal art. He engages with both art forms
over several decades, producing a prodigious body of work. That his is such a
proliferating body of work has to do with the manner in which especially the visual
works - paintings and drawings - tend to be created in momentary fashion, it is a sort of
speed art recording movement. The notion of a 'body of work' has particular resonance
with regard to Michaux. His is very much an art of the body, a proliferation of the matter,
or dynamics, of the body itself. Whether this 'proliferation' is understood in terms of his
experiments with the hallucinogen mescaline - the effects of which he comments on for
more than a decade - or the various expressions of body matter effected on canvas
according to affections of subjectivity, the body or embodiment is central to Michaux's
creation. Embodiment matters here to the extent that the body's expression in subjective
life, as much as in creation and re-presentation in the works of art, makes up the subject
matter of his corpus. The situation of embodiment is inseparable from the creation or
genesis of the artwork, not as a tool or vehicle for the artist, as extended to brush and pen,
but as the immediacy of an energetic materiality that effaces itself in the line on the
canvas or the written word on the page. That is, a genesis or creation pertaining to the
dynamics of embodiment is requisite and anterior to the artistic creation. Michaux's art is
testament to the energetic materiality, which marks the life of the subjective body; the
body of work cannot be understood separately from this life.
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I. Orientation Towards the Other/ the Time of the Body.
(a) Time and Sensibility/Sense
I want to start this investigation of Michaux's work by showing that the requisite of what
we have termed the dynamics of the subjective body relates to what Levinas in Time and
the Other1 designates as the absolute anteriority of a body-subject which is attuned to
what he terms the wholly Other, or the other in the Other. Subjectivity emerges as an
awareness of exteriority, the bodily 'memory' of a separation or difference that allows
one to 'hear the call' of an Other. Separation gives rise to subjectivity in the awareness of
otherness. Subjectivity is according to the otherness of self-awareness, which always
already marks the life of the subjective body. The awareness of otherness is prior to self
and interiority; it is im-mediate with respect to the structures of consciousness. Levinas's
thought on otherness and subjectivity opens up a space of difference, a space of 'difficult
freedom', which demands a response to the Other2. It is a space of a 'creative
emergence', 'revelation' and 'communication' that are not based in knowledge. That we
live from the body means, before any ontological supposition, that "we are in relation
with something that is absolutely other (TO 74, my emphasis). Since orientation towards
the other cannot be thought outside the corporeal situation of (being) the (singular) body,
time must be thought according to the singular body; for Levinas, this is the situation of
1 Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1987). Hereafter referred to as TO.
2 Levinas's analyses of the emergence of subjectivity in Time and the Other emphasise the event of this
emergence as the awareness or introduction of difference into the anonymous indifference that he
designates as the material plurality of the ily a, or the 'there is'. The introduction of difference is the
awareness of exteriority by the subjective body before any notion of self and thus proper self-reflection.
The awareness of otherness, felt according to the subjective body gives rise to the reflection upon this
corporeal situation and is thus the creation of interiority. This is what Levinas means by subjectivity
coming into being in its hearing the call of the other. That is, the ability to respond is conditioned by the
subjective body.
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the singular one-for-the-singular-other. For Levinas, the meta-physical situation of
response/ibility to an Other is 'extracted' from a bodily situation or physis, the
positioning or meaning of 'the life' of the subjective body3.
According to Levinas in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, the 'arrival' or 'gift'
of the absolute Other, as 'hearing his call', is a transcendence disruptive of discourse4. As
Derrida recognises in his second essay on Levinas5, this moment of interruption cannot
be understood as the purity of the phenomenological present. In fact, Levinas's 'moment'
orients us to the impurity of the 'present' in so far as the interruption designates only the
trace of what is already past. That is, what Levinas describes as the moment or 'arrival'
of the Other is the "entre-temps", the between of an absolute anteriority, which cannot be
recalled or presented by consciousness as presence-to, and its referral to the future. This
'entre-temps', or immemorial 'time of the Other', is precisely an admission of the extent
to which the present is never available or presentable as such, to discourse or to theory.
Levinas's 'moment', the im-mediacy of exposure to otherness, points us to a
forgetfulness of philosophical teleology, which is a forgetfulness of 'sense' bound up
with the life of the body, in favour of designated 'meanings'. The temporality related in
the otherness which always already marks the coming to awareness of subjectivity, must
be thought otherwise than self-presence6. The importance of pointing to this forgetfulness
is the resuscitation of this neglected moment or entre-temps according to the time of the
body or sense/ibility. The Other is in excess of any containment by consciousness; this
3 On this viewpoint, and this is what I want to underline by bringing together the different philosophies of
Henry, Deleuze and Levinas, it becomes less relevant whether metaphilosophically speaking Levinasian
'ethics' is understood as first philosophy. What is relevant is that thematics and methodology come
together in the specific sense of 'positioning' that I take to be an argument regarding time and the
singularity of embodiment in these different positions or philosophical arguments.
4 The previous chapter discussed this in terms of Levinas's designation of an interruption of 'Saying' in the
supposed immanence of the general thematisations of 'the said'. I showed there that the concordant
conception of language as what occurs in the encounter with the other according to the subjective body
entails a move from 'meaning' to 'sense'.
5 See Jacques Derrida, "At This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am", trans. Ruben Berezdivin, in Re-
Reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1991).
6 See Jacques Derrida, "At This Very Moment", p. 36 especially.
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excess demands a felt response, which corresponds to an awareness of exposure
pertaining to the specific temporal reality of embodiment. What I have called the
otherness of self-awareness is precisely the designation and effect of this excess of
otherness, which is first of all affectivity pertaining to the subjective body.
This premise of 'experience' and its language exceed the central tenets of classical
phenomenology, as recognised by Henry as well as Derrida's later reading of Levinas.
Because the Other and this awareness of otherness re-present excess with respect to the
formation of consciousness, the relation with otherness constitutive of subjectivity must
be understood according to a conception of desire which differs from the classical
conception based in lack. Desire is conceived here as a positivity that recalls Deleuze and
Merleau-Ponty: a consequence of a sensibility or orientation - affectivity - that is
productive of what Deleuze, in considering Merleau-Ponty's later work, terms an infinite
infinite7. Time is the infinite impending arrival of the Other, because the separation
which creates the tension, the awareness of otherness, is not overcome or neutralised. The
premise for this situation with regard to temporality and otherness is the affectivity bound
up with the subjective body. As bound up with the subjective body, the awareness of
otherness goes beyond the 'finite' alterity that is neutralised in the identification of the I.
The subjective body is a condition for the awareness of otherness that marks the self, and
a condition for a reception of exteriority that actually preserves the sense of otherness in
the relation. Embodiment is awareness ofdifference, as affectivity is inseparable from the
life of the subjective body, irreducible to consciousness. Exteriority, inseparable from the
condition of embodiment, orders an awareness which, as a consequence of the otherness
that marks it, is creative or productive of the new in its singular response to what is
equally singular. The insistence on singularity on this point is consequent on the
conditioning by the body and not reducible to the abstraction of a general concept of
otherness or the 'intuition' of a general 'other'. This impingement of exteriority or the
Other is not reducible to our understanding or conception of it, it re-presents an infinite in
the finite which is anterior to conscious understanding or 'the intelligible', or the intuition
7 See chapter three of this thesis, p. 148.
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of classical phenomenology. It is productive of the self which orders intellection and
intuition. Thought and conception - in both senses of the word - emerge from a
sensibility that originates with the life or situation of the subjective body. This is a
conception of the originary that is not reducible to phenomenological beginning or the
phenomenological discourse set in motion by it8. In Time and the Other, Levinas
describes the 'hypostasis' or event of the emergence of subjectivity as "a rip in the
infinite beginningless and endless fabric of existing. The present [because marked by the
trace of the Other and so 'impure'] rips apart and joins together again" (52)9.
The important consequence of this argument regarding the infinite and desire, is that the
relation with what is absolutely other is a communication 'in eros', of the body, which is
'not a knowledge', but which disturbs the autonomy of supposed presence-to-self (88).
The condition of subjectivity delineated in Levinas is premised on the openness of a body
singularly exposed to the proximity of the other. Meaning, or sense rather, is created from
this situation, which translates in Levinas as a desire for the other, an "absolutely original
relationship of eros" (88). Sense is (produced as) orientation towards an Other (92). That
there is no teleology involved in this desire, no 'arrival at meaning', is precisely because
the other cannot be contained as such. Levinas states: "the relationship with the Other is
the absence o/the other" (90, my emphasis). This description of time recognises that
temporality is bound up with an absence, and this marks 'sense'. This absence to
consciousness is neither recognised nor thematised in phenomenological meaning. Ab-
8 When Levinas describes the event of difference as the emergence of subjectivity from the plurality of the
ily a, the important point made is that it is the awareness of difference from self that is the condition of
self-reflection; the genealogy of a difference in Levinas is the emergence of sense according to a "pluralism
that does not merge into unity" (TO 42).
9
Diachrony, or the 'time of the Other' is irruption in inner time consciousness. What is important to note is
that the irruption is a qualification on the part of the subjective body which thus expands upon the concept
of 'human time'. The notion of the life of the subjective body, as a specific and singular position or
temporality inseparable from affectivity, works according to the Bergsonian insight that reality is not
reducible to 'one realm of explanation'. See John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999). Beyond the distinction, however, between conscious human experience
and 'vitalism' as a name for a process of physical reality, the relation between time and affectivity yields a
notion of the life of the body, which brings together the insights of Levinas, Deleuze and Michel Henry.
Foremost in this expansion with regard to Bergsonian distinctions - the manner in which for Bergson
'discontinuity' happens 'on the level of biological evolution rather than conscious human experience' (6) -
is Levinas's notion of an awaiting of the Other and a specific conception of desire.
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sense, or what is 'of sense' according to Levinas's argument, marks an awaiting or
condition of the subjective body, which entirely escapes the genesis of meaning
according to act-intentionality and object-manifestation on the classical account.
(b) (Ab ) sense in the Visual Works of Michaux
The sense of the phrase 'the otherness of self-awareness' is nowhere more succinctly
expressed than in the works of Henri Michaux. The phrase works well as a general
description of an event that characterises the entirety of his artistic creation: the circuit of
affectivity, dynamism and emotion. Michaux's works are expressive of embodiment, the
immediacy that marks the life of the subjective body. His art works are responses to the
expressive body as much as they are expressions of the life of the body. To a large extent
devoid of teleology, or designated 'meaning', his visual works express movements rather
than still-life, a dynamism of lines that escape the attempt by vision to fix its object.
Generally, his visual artworks may be described as disturbing vision. The visual works
are best approached through an understanding of temporality concurrent with
embodiment. His art demonstrates a relation to what cannot be contained or even enter
the present/presence couplet of classical phenomenological logic; the life of the
subjective body always already breaks through delimitation or representation by
presence. The visual works, particularly, inscribe this excess, a polyvalence that eludes
the expression of verbal art. It is precisely the awareness of this excess - heightened and
exemplified in his experiments with hallucinogens - that makes him explore a dynamic
life of the affective body more readily expressible or 'drawn out' in painting than poetic
writing.
Michaux's art expresses the extent to which subjectivity may be designated according to
the development of the body as energetic materiality and the revelations - in other words,
affectivity - that concur with this situation. His experiments with hallucinogens are only
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one expression of the extent to which awareness of this situation of the subjective body is
abrasive to 'the world', if by that designation we mean what is 'recognisable to us' in
simple correlation to the consciousness of classical phenomenology. This turn away from
the world of designated meanings suggests that phenomenology's powers of description
are always inadequate in consequence of its forgotten premise, the life of the subjective
body. In La Nuit Remue10, Michaux speaks of "the hollow in me" as the time of the
subjective body or the absent contents of time, the otherness of self-awareness. The
'hollow in me' is inseparable from an intimation of exteriority. Levinas's claim is that "a
plurality insinuates itself into the very existence of the existent" (TO 75). This plurality is
an origin, which is not identified with conscious correlations of meaning. This claim is
entirely in agreement with Michaux's notions of subjectivity, exteriority and the
(creative) time of the body. Levinas recognises a genesis regarding the relation of time
and subjectivity as concurrent with the impending arrival of an Other, always already felt
according to the orientation in our corporeal situation, beyond the 'Being of the world'.
Something not containable according to the directives of a self e/affects the orders of
creation. Genesis of meaning is not reducible to the manifestation of a visible world or
the acts of consciousness. Accordingly, a certain ab-sense marks the visual art of
Michaux. Ab-sense as such designates a genesis of meaning, or sense, that is exterior to
the dictates of conscious correlation on the phenomenological model.
In summation of the Levinasian argument 'drawn out' in Michaux's work, the subjective
body retains a memory of a difference, which precedes the emergence of subjectivity in
the awareness of its condition, the corporeal difference that speaks of absolute otherness.
What Michaux describes as 'the hollow in me' is the awareness that difference,
separation, or the absent contents of consciousness, are the non-synthesisable conditions
of experience. The proximity of the Other, inscribed in the situation of corporeality, is the
irreducible premise that allows us to attribute experience to a subjectivity. The
phenomenological imperative of a 'return to experience' must take into account the
absolute anterior position of the affective body, the openness of a body singularly
exposed to the proximity of otherness. Simon Critchley states that the entire
10 Henri Michaux, La Nuit Remue (Paris: Gallimard, 1967).
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phenomenological thrust of Levinas's Otherwise than Being is to 'found' intentionality
on sensibility and to 'describe' - I would say determine - sensibility as a proximity to the
other11. I agree with the emphasis. The consequence of this emphasis is a further
consideration of subjectivity as orientational in a corporeal sense. The awareness of
otherness, which marks the life of the subjective body, is traceable to a corporeal
situation - an orientation - that allows for reception of the other person, and the
preserving of what is singularly other about him, and about the self. The latter point
particularly informs Michaux's work.
Levinas's as well as Michaux's work demonstrate a relation of time and body which
prompts the insight that creation is not necessarily reducible to a teleological principle.
Creation in Michaux is an effect of the dynamics of the subjective body, and so involves
a resuscitation of an energetic materiality or singular genesis by the body. Creation on
this model involves the awaiting of otherness, rather than the telos which marks the
creative imagination or intentional consciousness in the accounts of classical
phenomenology and most critical commentaries on art and creation. Genesis or creation
must be understood, according to Levinas as well as Michaux, as originating with the
desire born by the corporeal situation, its orientation towards what is other than self, and
as anterior to intentions or what is presentable through conscious acts. Going beyond
parameters that would be recognisable to classical phenomenology, Michaux's art
attempts to trace the ab-sense born(e) by a temporality that does not belong to the self,
and which testifies, in Michaux and Levinas, to the otherness that haunts, as well as
constitutes, desire for the other. Genesis is in this sense immanent to otherness. Genesis
on this account does not go through formative propositions, which identify the world for
intentional consciousness. Immanent genesis originates as movement without beginning,
because it originates as difference or difference from self. This is the dynamics of the
corpo-real. The analyses of this corpo-reality constitute the subject of the main body of
11 Simon Critchley, "Introduction" in Critchley and Bernasconi eds. The Cambridge Companion to Levinas
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 21.
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Michaux's work. The visual works particularly demonstrate a genesis of sense from
sensibility/corporeal orientation.
II. Absence and Expression: Emergences-Resurgences
Emergences-Resurgences was first published as part of the series "Les Sentiers de la
creation"12 and demonstrates a tracing of the self according to the anterior emergence
onto the canvas of the affectivity that marks the life of the subjective body. The
'emergences' are re-traced through the 'resurgences' in the verbal expression that follows
them. Like all Michaux's work, Emergences-Resurgences is of a provisional and
occasional nature13. This characteristic of the works - the visual as well as the verbal -
must be understood according to Michaux's attempt to give expression to a profound
movement or expressivity characteristic of the material with which he works - the body -
and according to the materiality or energy conveyed. That is, not only the materiality of
the resulting visual or verbal expression, but the energetic materiality that marks the
body-subject as an anterior condition and informs the creative impulse. Michaux's work,
especially the visual work, traces the bodily premises of creation. The 'drawing out' of a
certain life of the subjective body traces the emergence of self/subjectivity. The trait is a
key word with regard to Michaux's art, derived from the Latin trahere, meaning to draw
or to draw out14. Emergences-Resurgences traces the development of Michaux's ventures
into drawing, from the earliest attempts in the 1920s until his mature expression in the
12Henri Michaux, Emergences-Resurgences, trans. Richard Sieburth (New York: The Drawing Center,
2000). Hereafter referred to as ER.
13 See ER, Translator's Note, p. 7.
14 See ER, Translator's Note, p. 7 as well as chapter four of this thesis, where I point out the same
etymological origin with regard to Derrida's treatment of the trait in his Memoirs of the Blind. Richard
Sieburth's translation of ER operates with 'line' according to Michaux's use of the term, but it is of equal
importance to include the fuller semantic range of the word, which in French includes marks, traces,
distinctive features and moves. Ref. Translator's Note, p. 7.
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1950s and 60s. Michaux opens Emergences by noting that painting allows him to
'decondition' himself (ER 10). What is interesting is the impulse that makes this
deconditioning imperative for Michaux. The deconditioning of his self is expressive of
the search for the traces of self in an anterior condition truer to the life of the body.
Michaux's drawing taps into the energetic materiality which marks the emergence of
subjectivity, the awareness of the life of the subjective body anterior to the self given by
its being 'in the world'. The work taps into the elan of a condition, pre-subject, pre-
reflection, in order to express a life that is entirely different from the world of manifested
objects. The 'objects' of Michaux's visual works are traces of a life of the body as
exposure, and express a manifestation or 'phenomenality' different from one of
intentional activity or intellection by consciousness. The expression on the canvas does
not belong or conform to the visible world as determined by intentional activity or
conscious intellection. Rather, what one sees in Michaux's work "is an entanglement, a
drawing as it were desiring to withdraw into itself" (10). What is threatening to withdraw
into itself is what Derrida and Merleau-Ponty mark as the in-visible, and what Michel
Henry speaks of as 'Life' rather than 'world'. Drawing performs according to the traces
of a different language, as a communication born according to an energetic materiality,
which is first of all the life of the subjective body. In short, Michaux's 'visual works'
open up to the life of the body, to the expression of the emergence of subjectivity as
much as the emergence of 'the work' by tracing the line of an 'in-material' condition.
That is, his work traces sense from an originaiy sensibility. Derrida's Memoirs argues
that inscription or drawing attempt to 'restore sight' rather than the object of visibility.
Drawing commemorates invisibility. Drawing or inscription is indebted to a certain
absence and inseparable from corporeality15.
Michaux's work traces the line of a certain ab-sense; he speaks of the line as "loath to
arrive, line of blind investigation. Leading nowhere [...], without the perception of any
object, landscape, figure" (10). His work with the line - le trait - traces sense rather than
intention, or its own 'arrival' in meaning. Michaux's work on the canvas does not trace a
15 See chapter four, section 2.
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telos, but is rather marked by an infinite awaiting, in the sense discussed in the previous
paragraphs with regard to Levinas. That is, there is no telos of the work conducive to
intentional consciousness, but rather an awaiting, of an expression that originates in
sensibility. "Encircling nothing, never encircled" (10). The trace must proceed in the
night (MB 48); it is not born of a desire based in lack, but according to an excess of
sensibility, and does not express 'a work' as grasped by either correlation or mimesis, the
main progenitors of consciousness on the classical model16. "Line not yet having made
its choice, not yet ready to have the point explained" (10).
Later, the traces become, or function as, sign. Michaux's work concerns itself with the
relation between trace and sign, and the sign's ability to express "life" as "a murmur
without end - which continues us, above and beyond quality. This is what needs to be
bodied forth" (10). The development of Michaux's work leads him to explorations of
signs. His work takes up the concept of 'writing' according to Chinese calligraphy, and
traces the development of the increasingly abstract nature of the ideogram from the
almost mimetic, and he discovers the rhythms of an expression true to a drawing
threatening to withdraw through le trait17. "I want my tracings to be the very phrasing of
life - yet supple deformable, sinuous" (10). Lor Michaux, tracing on canvas becomes a
matter of sign and line; his "pleasure lies in making things appear and then disappear"
(13), he wants to trace what is "most withdrawn, most mine - and not with geometrical
forms" (12), not "'reproduce' anything already out there in the world" (12). Lor Michaux
such tracing must leave behind words, and engage with signs, lines. This is his version of
the phenomenological reduction; his expression of sense traces the energetic materiality
of the subjective body, which in its awareness of otherness is more primordial than the
self.
161 refer the 'classical model' to classical phenomenology as well as most historico-critical approaches to
art.
17 See Henri Michaux, Ideograms in China, trans. Gustaf Sobin (New York: New Directions Books, 1984).
Recall Derrida's argument that "the just measure of 'restoring' or 'rendering is... infinite" (MB 30). The
trait takes up time rather than space.
228
Michaux's approach to the question of otherness and origins is similar to Levinas's in
that he recognises the passivity involved in the reception of otherness. This passivity is
1R
understood according to the openness of the body or the corporeal situation .
Subjectivity, which is first of all marked as subjective body, is never enclosed in its own
skin. The life of the subjective body is exposure, vulnerability, and openness to the
approach of the other. The trace, as the manner of signification by the other, is the mark
of its own effacement or incompleteness and according to Derrida, constitutive of
presence19. In Michaux, otherness is traced through faces or heads 'appearing' through a
responsive life of the body. The traces function as signs denoting transcendence
according to immanent genesis: that is, the immanence of an immemorial past and a mark
of otherness irreducible to the opposition absence/presence.
In all unfinished things I discover heads. Heads, the gathering points of moments,
of probings, of anxieties, of desires, of whatever drives things forward, where
everything combines and appreciates... including drawing. Once it has come to
rest, everything fluid becomes a head. I recognise all imprecise forms as heads
(14).
For Michaux as well as Levinas, otherness is always traceable to the Other. According to
both, the Other comes out of the 'dark' so to speak, but does not enter into phenomenality
on the classical account. The Other is not given as a generality shed light on by general
conceptions that belong to the 'Being of the world'. Rather, the emergence of the singular
Other is "independent of visible causes" (14). Both express in their works a reluctance to
accept any primacy on the part of the traditional alliance between the visible 'world' and
designated meaning, or the static concepts and orientation of evidential 'knowledge'. The
origin or emergence of the Other is traced, rather, to the "night" of a corporeal situation
or orientation that allows the emergence and reception of otherness "alive, individual,
18 Derrida shows in MB that drawing is a response, beyond the distinction between passivity and activity,
and this is precisely the argument of Levinas, as well as what is expressed in Michaux's reflections on his
art and the dynamics of creation. The time of the body is creative beyond intention and manifestation.
19 See Derrida's essays "Difference" and "At This Very Moment at This Work Here I Am".
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fluctuating, graphic" (14). Michaux speaks of "throwing himself into" some watercolors
in order that they "respond" (22). Sense/ibility is inseparable from response, the
oscillation of sign and trace. Michaux recognises the irreducible 'affect' of the subjective
body. Orientation or creation do not originate with thought, but according to the energetic
materiality or elan we have designated as the corpo-real20. Michaux speaks of this
"throwing himself into" the works as "minutes of genuine blindness. Spontaneous.
Superspontaneous" (29). Paradoxically, spontaneity marks for Michaux the non-
intentional, what is and remains absent to reflection, conditioned by a temporality
irreducible to the intentional self. The blindness is a consequence of corporeal life, which
in being drawn or traced remains foreign to the correlation of intentionality and visibility.
The 'work' of corporeal orientation does not return to the self, but is a departure without
return or recognition/re-appropriation in reciprocity. It is the mark of a certain
'generosity' of the creative impulse. When Michaux argues that "dissolution [is] a
necessary pre-requisite" (29) for drawing, he points out that in corporeal orientation sense
is 'drawn out' through a different communication than that of visibility and designated
meaning. Sense is drawn out by a 'profitless investment', a 'passage to the time of the
20 The Bergsonian elan, as it designates the dynamism of life, refers to the fact that there are, according to
Bergson, different types of reality, static and mobile. See John Mullarkey, ed., The New Bergson
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999) p. 9. Bergson's vitalism transcends classical materialism
with the concept of duration. Deleuze of course expands upon Bergsonian insights in his development of
the notion of an energetic materiality. The notion of movement central to Bergson's metaphysics is the
premise according to which Bergson understands "abstraction itself as a physical process in its actual
operation and not just its origins" (6). Mullarkey points out that in Bergson "the individuality of movement
is its metaphysical status. What makes a movement individual is the rich particularity of the situation in, or
rather with which it unfolds. When represented, however, this movement has each of its various dynamic
properties 'extracted' as a concept... Abstraction for Bergson is always extraction" (6, my emphases added
to Mullarkey s). Bergson recognises that 'the concept generalizes at the same time that it abstracts' (6), and
so reduces the thing represented to an image for thought, that is, the concept is 'image of an image' (8).
Mullarkey points out that Bergson, while he does not explain the 'of' in terms of reference, asserts the
"existence of an imagery from the outset that is subsequently more and more decontextualised" (8).
Importantly, what Bergson points out here is that this inattention characterizing the process of abstraction
or concept formation is "simultaneously the process of inattention to specificity" and this process is
"ultimately described as a process of immobilization [and] that is why it concerns the physical, because it
concerns time" (8). Where Bergson speaks of 'inattentiveness' (6), this is another designation of the
forgetfulness outlined in this work. The orientation with regard to thought, abstraction and concept
formation argued in this work must be understood as coming out of the Bergsonian orientation, which
speaks of the physical event of a reality "between idealism and materialism" (7) which gives rise to
thought. All Mullarkey's references here are to Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to
Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946)
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other'21. According to Derrida's argument regarding drawing in Memoirs, sense is
'graphic' rather than figural or representational. Michaux's work is not deliberated; he
speaks of faces turning up - "there are faces in the air" (29) - and acknowledges that the
receptivity involved is beyond the distinction between passive and active insofar as the
response is creative. Faces emerge from the paper, having "expressed themselves well in
advance of me, rendering an impression which I do not recognize and which I will never
know if it has previously passed through me" (32, my emphasis). However, as the
response is creative, conditioned by the particular temporality pertaining to the body, the
work allows the emergence of what is not grasped or possessed by the self in
'knowledge' or what is already 'said'. The work is not the product of intentional activity,
and so "these are the truest faces" (32). Their reception is the product or conception of
sensibility. This is the significance of the appearance of 'the face', as what eludes a
possessive cognition22. Michaux speaks of "signs returning, not the same signs, not the
ones I had in mind and not signs having to do with language - all emerging from the
human shape", "human by the inner dynamism" (34, my emphasis). Levinas speaks of
the approach of the Other according to a 'manifestation' that exceeds the idea of 'the
other in me'. In "The Trace of the Other", the approach exceeds manifestation by the
context of my horizons. That is, it signifies in and out of context: While the Other
manifests itself according to a culturally determined phenomenality, "the other is given in
the concept of the totality to which he is immanent" (TRO 351). On the other hand, the
approach of the Other involves a "signifyingness of its own, independently of this
signification received from the world" (351). That is, the other also affects without
mediation, "his presence consists in... making an entry. This can also be stated in this
way: the phenomenon which is the apparition of the other is also a face" (351). The other
exceeds the image that would enclose it in so far as it also approaches as face, according
to the response of a mobile orientation of the body. Michaux's art works according to the
approach of the in-apparent, that is, a function of the sign which traces a surplus of the
21 The references to 'profitless investment', the generosity of the 'work' according to corporeal orientation
and 'departure without return' are obviously informed by Levinas. See in particular, "The Trace of the
Other", trans. Alphonso Lingis, in Deconstruction in Context, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1986). Herafter referred to as TRO.
22 See Levinas, "the face is a living presence; it is expression" (TI 66).
231
epistemologically willed 'image' or metaphorical/rhetorical figure. The emergence of
these faces is for Michaux inseparable from the 'life' designating his/a corporeal
orientation, which is also the emergence of his own subjectivity. In this sense also, they
are "bodied forth": "Man happens to me, comes back to me, unforgettable man" (34).
The event is immediate: "immediacy, immediacies... the newly arrived... in status
nascendi... freeing up I know not what in me [...] an unexpected "becoming": gouaches"
(50). The manifestation of the other is a "surplus over the inevitable paralysis of
manifestation" (352), as approach it signifies as Life, its dynamic concrete being. This
dynamic being de-structures the present as what is present to self. Face, as the
expressivity of expression, refers phenomenality to a language not based in manifestation
on the classical account, and resists the dissimulation of otherness in a theme or image.
As approach rather than disclosure, the face signifies according to itself and not
according to my intention. The other signifies, according to Levinas, "without qualities or
attributes" (TI 74), in withdrawal, passage, and so is ontologically 'inevident'.
Michaux's drawings express energy, as of materiality, and the potentiality of what
paradoxically 'appears' as the withdrawal of the trait23. The 'withdrawal' must be
understood according to the response of a bodily communication prior to the exchange of
signs on a linguistic model; it refers to what is other or singular in the Other and the
affect which results from exposure of the subjective body. Michaux speaks of an
obligation to respond (40) to an appearance that assaults his sensibility. 'Beginnings',
understood as 'creative intention , are 'secondary' effects of the 'moment' of energy
engaged by the approach of what is other with respect to the self: "nucleus of energy
(which is why its object or origin are irrelevant)" (41). What matters is the "tonus, the
energy"; "it is toward this that one directs oneself, consciously or unconsciously, toward
a state with a maximum elan, which is a maximum of density, of being, of actualization -
whose remainders are merely combustibles, or occasions" (44). Michaux's art is oriented
toward an approach of otherness, which "thus provides the most energetic inner means"
(44). It is registered according to a creative impetus. According to the nature of the
23 See illustrations pp. 36-37 in ER. See also Jacques Derrida, "At This Very Moment in This Work Here I
Am", where he acknowledges the structure of the trace as inscribed in being effaced (37).
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response, the creative impetus is "to know nothing" (44). The relation of the creation and
the orientation must be understood in a corporeal sense, a communication according to
sensibility on the Levinasian model. Michaux claims in Emergences that he paints/draws
"in order to manipulate the world (its forms), to touch it more closely, more directly"
(44). His drawing presents a corrective to the truth of the forms of the visible, or 'the
world', for an affective reality which in-forms visibility, or knowledge. Michaux's art is
concerned with a production of the new, in the sense argued by Deleuze. The question
posed in Emergences is "where to find the terrain for expansion, the terrain to carry out a
life, another life in the making... a life not there before" (52). This would be a life not
thematised or reduced according to the parameters of 'the world' of visibility which
corresponds to the phenomenological ego-consciousness forgetful of the body.
(b) Expression/Expressivity: Resonances of the Body
When Deleuze reads Spinoza according to the term 'expression', a term not central to
Spinoza's Ethics, he does so in order to trace the 'Saying' of this text. That is, what
Spinoza thematises in his work attests to a force at work, but not contained by its
thematisation, or the 'said' of the text. In fact, Deleuze manages to elevate this notion of
expression to the central notion of Spinoza's work. My argument with regard to the issue
at hand, the corpo-real orientation of a thought that originates in bodily affectivity and
exposure, is that the notion of expression as developed by Deleuze, can also be used to
illustrate the orientation that informs the work of Levinas as well as Michaux.
Levinas distinguishes between the thematisable, or 'essence', what discourse makes
correspond to an already given meaning - "an identification of this and that in the already
said" - (OB 37) and a certain 'work' pertaining to subjective existence which is always
already exposure to what cannot be contained by 'established meaning'. By this
distinction, Levinas delineates a necessary move from 'meaning' to 'sense'. 'Sense' is
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what is traced through the response to what is other and prior to self, in other words, what
does not coincide with self, that is, the self's designations. The work done by 'sense', the
approach of the 'new' or singularly other, involves an infinite work never commensurate
with the self, conditioned by the exposure of the body and its temporalisation of time.
Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence designates this work of 'sense' as resistance to
the "multiplication of the identical" (29) that characterises thematisation. Sense is on this
account inseparable from 'sensibility' and the manner in which a singular individual is
expressive in his situation of exposure, and in the response to this exposure. In Levinas,
the exposure or corporeal orientation of the individual is the condition for the ethical
relation and the constitution of ethical subjectivity. Levinas brings it all back to the face-
to-face relation, conditioned by an expression based in the body, that is, a different
manifestation than that of the 'world'. The resonances or reverberations of expression in¬
form the themes and history of discursive knowledge and ontology which has tended to
forgetfulness of the "silent resonance of the essence" (46), different from the essence or
discursive truth. Levinas's 'Saying' is expression, or rather the expressiveness of
'expression' as commonly understood. Otherness and the reception of or response to
otherness, are terms and signs of a corporeal orientation, which eludes the act of
intentionality and the themes of visible manifestation. Saying, according to Levinas,
makes "signs of this veiy signifyingness of the exposure; it is to expose the exposure
instead of remaining in it as an act of exposing" (143). Here lies the significance of
expression or the corporeal orientation, which relates the work of Levinas to Michaux's.
The work of both expresses the reality of exposure in which alterity renders the particular
individual expressive and a sign/Saying without 'dissipating the opacity' (29) of the
relation between sense and the expression of alterity. The 'opacity' remains in so far as
expression is conditioned by the temporality and sensibility of corporeal orientation.
Temporality and sensibility come to be synonymous here. Michaux's work on mescaline
in the 1950s and 60s explores the particular expression according to which temporality
and sensibility become synonymous. The point for Levinas as well as Michaux is to trace
a broad sense of language in which the expression of alterity is given significance.
Alterity is given significance, not according to an expression of signs given (in the given)
but of the immediacy of a giving of signs whose expression/expressivity emerges from a
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sensible situation. Levinas's as well as Michaux's works are attuned to the particular
sense of 'expression' which emerges through this situation. In Totality and Infinity [here
is a section called 'Expression is the Principle'. Otherwise than Being, or Beyond
Essence, as much as the former work, emphasises the corporeal situation of exposure and
vulnerability as a condition for the revelation rather than disclosure of expression, in as
much as expression is inseparable from the giving and deliverance of signs (TI 92).
Michaux's experiments with mescaline can be read as heightened experiences of an
expression of sensibility. The experiments with mescaline make up a significant portion
of Michaux work, and become one of these 'terrains to carry out a life', one of
heightened sensibility. The couplet of 'expression' and 'expressivity' in Deleuze's
reading of Spinoza can be related to Michaux's as well as Levinas's investigations into
the relationship between manifestation and the formation of subjectivity. Expression is
'the principle' which lets manifestation occur and vice versa, insofar as manifestation is
understood according to a different phenomenality, as pointed out by Michel Henry.
Expression and manifestation work according to circuits of affectivity.
The principle of expression works according to the expression's folding in upon itself,
that is, according to an anterior 'expressivity' pertaining to the subjective body. Levinas
argues that manifestation turns into an expression, "a skin left desolate by an irreversible
departure" and adds: "expressions, saying, is not added on to significations that are
'visible' in the light of phenomena"24. He speaks of an irretrievable delay of the said after
the saying. The significations of the former absorb the latter in its thematisations, which
bear only a trace of the significance of saying25. The interruption of the said by the saying
is the resonance of an expressivity of the subjective body, the trace of which is contested
and effaced in discursive knowledge or what Henry designates as the 'theory of thought'.
Ultimately, the significance of the couplet expression and expressivity lies with a
particular dynamic - and for Levinas ethical - conception of the meaning of being and
subjectivity. This conception permits these resonances of meaning to interrupt the
24 Emmanuel Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, ed. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1987) p. 69. My emphasis.
25 See Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 69.
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entrapment of meaning in a static thematisation, which reduces the singular, dynamic
'life' to a general category or 'object for thought'.
What Levinas calls the 'infinition' of the other, or 'face', exceeds any particular figurality
or 'image' of otherness. The infinite significance of the face, its infinite work on (ethical)
subjectivity, refers to a physicality - the singular Other - but not one that can be figurally
represented, or contained by a representational image of otherness. That is because
representation projects otherness from subjectivity. In this sense, the ethical relation is
one that is 'beyond image'26. Its dynamic is indissociable from the folding of
expression/expressivity, which proceeds from the subjective body rather than 'the self'.
Michaux describes the approach of otherness under mescaline as a "spectacle... inflicted
on rather than offered to [the eyes]" (ER 52, my emphasis). Mescaline leaves him with
the awareness of the potential of the subjective body as open to "invasion... this
dynamic, unlike a painting or a coloured surface or even a coloured aspect one might
want to gaze upon, was a response, the reaction of some nerve buried deep in the optic
channels that had been aggressed, victimized (the spectacle of colours is secondary)"
(52). Michaux's experiments with the hallucinogen demonstrate the exposure and
vulnerability of the corpo-real situation always already prior to self27. The explosion of
colours effected by the drug is "taking place in violation of my own integrity. Without so
wanting to, I was involved in colour fabrication... an awesome infinity of photons, but
without light...and...without photons" (52). Anterior to the intentional self, the situation
of embodiment creates, or lives through, a corpo-real, which always already informs the
contents of forms projected by the intentional self upon 'the world'. Mescaline points
26 Insofar as intentionality seems to imply a transparency in the relation of image to object, Levinas rejects
this type of 'signification'. According to Levinas, the intentional 'image' detracts from the reality of
singular being. Michaux's work repeats this rejection for the singularity of the corpo-real, in-dividual
signification neither presented as image nor object.
27 The similarity of Michaux's descriptions of passivity and exposure and Levinas's notion of 'subjection'
to otherness is striking. Levinas says in Otherwise than Being that the vulnerability that marks the relation
to the other is something that happens 'on the surface of the skin, at the edge of the nerves' (15) and so
emphasises the relation and the meaning of the trace according to circuits of dynamism, affectivity and
emotion. Michaux's art explores the Levinas's notion of proximity, outside 'social' or 'ontological'
parameters.
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Michaux to the in-visible reality of a corporeal affectivity and the reality of an expression
not reducible to the intentions and projects of the self.
While experiments regarding the heightened sense experiences effected by hallucinogens
are nothing new, in literary or other contexts, the dedication to the effects of the drug
witnessed in Michaux's work is of a quite unusual kind. When Michaux states that he
paints in order to 'decondition himself, it involves quite explicitly a rejection of the
conception of 'the meaning of the world' made visible by the 'conditioned' self. In
Michaux's work is detectable a similar move from meaning to sense that marks the
'ethical relation' in Levinas. The significance of the face is inflicted on, and interrupts,
the coherence of the phenomenological reduction of the 'self'. Michaux describes a
differently reduced self, an orientation by the body titillated as a nerve in the dark (58).
This situation expresses images firstly as "responses... energies... skin-pricks" (58). That
is, the subjective body is exposure to a sense, or signification, which is in excess of the
'present' contained in the correlations of 'self' and 'world'. When Levinas speaks of the
'absolute experience' as revelation, not disclosure, and describes it as a "coinciding of the
expressed with him who expresses" (TI 66), this is not an argument for a 'continuity' in
Merleau-Ponty's sense, but for a precondition of the reception of sense/otherness in the
orientation and affectivity of the subjective body. What Levinas argues is that the ethical
relation opens up a space of 'sense' not recognised by philosophy's emphasis on
intellection and intentionality. Michaux speaks of a similar opening up of a space of
responses to otherness. "Space occupied, overoccupied, by an endlessly renewed
occupation, space teeming with new arrivals" (60). Levinas, as well as Michaux,
describes a dynamic being of a corporeal orientation, which is dissociable from a classic
'materialism'. The work of both highlight the signification involved in the 'energetic' life
of the subjective body, its importance with regard to the reception of an otherness not
reducible to the generality of a representational concept or 'image' of thought.
"Unbelievable how ['new arrivals'] turned up on the blank space from all sides... I could
not have followed them with my pencil, not even in the smallest corner of the page" (60).
Michaux turns to drawing in consequence of this particular orientation of the body,
heightened by mescaline. Michaux's painting follows the traces of "the vibratorium" of
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an experience that goes "well beyond visualization... less seen than evident", a "felt"
experience or "sensation of presence" (64). Michaux traces the lines of this experience, in
the expression of a rhythm, "a phenomenon of repetition - attenuated, uncontrollable",
the expression of a pattern of lines "animated by a life all their own" (64). For Michaux,
the graphics of ink drawings is an attempt to translate this life, as it eludes the intentional
self28: "These I rendered partially - perhaps because they had so struck me, or because of
my repeated failures to fight them off and master them" (64). The affectivity of the
subjective body produces a situation in which the object eludes the self. The object has
"ceased to be objective, ceased to be stable" (65). The drawings are testament to the
situation in which the subjective body operates as energetic materiality:
Where stability had once reigned there was now only flux, a flux indiscriminately
traversing both the firmest and most supple of substances, a flux not unlike those
cosmic particles which traverse the earth without cease, without ever slowing
down. All measure lost, all dimensionality - all definition cancelled (65).
Michaux's experiments with drawing demonstrate the impossibility of a full, exhaustive
circumscription of an 'object for thought', the 'object' is ever subject to new elongations
(66). The graphic trace involves a disappearance or withdrawal of the object as well as
objectivity; this withdrawal of the trait is its "own impulse" (66).
Construction of the Infinite. In the absence of which, Constitution. Graphic
epitome of an overall - and highly metaphysical - situation (68).
The positioning for, or as, affectivity points to the meta-physical situation of the approach
of the otherness of the Other. Michaux describes a painting that "comes from forgetting
oneself and what it is one sees or might see" (68). The point is that this painting, or
drawing rather, allows an expression of this otherness of the Other, or "its particular place
28 The immanence of this 'Life' is described in Michaux according to "ever-receding depths of the
indefinitely differentiated, yet always remaining within unity, given the overall rhythm of the repetition"
(ER 68). Deleuze describes immanence, as a life, according to the infinite repetitions of intensities, the elan
or energetic materiality, which informs our being. See chapter three.
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in the World" (68, my emphasis). Michaux's statement towards the end of his project in
Emergences-Resurgences sums up a condition of embodiment, the effects of which
renders the response of drawing in a way similar to that argued by Derrida in his
Memoirs. It concerns the particular relation between the subjective body and the logic of
the trait.
I have painted in order to render the world more 're-markable', all the while
refusing behavioural 'realism' - or that of ideas. What I thus opened up on the
one side, I kept closed on the other. Signs, my first and foremost quest. The world
reduced to a minimum. There are those who reduce the world to intelligibility,
which is to reject it in part - witness those whose cast of mind is abstract, ever
more abstract, ever more repressed. But the world is in fact heavy, thick,
encumbering (76).
Michaux's descriptions of the 'thickness' of the world do not express continuity between
self and world, but refer to the extent to which this world - in so far as the particularity of
an-other has a place in it - is not rendered spectacularly. The concrete, singular encounter
with the other is not encountered in the spectacular, or on the spectacular's "terrain" (77).
Michaux describes the dis-appearance of the trait in the faces which accost him. Thus,
"[m]ore than their features, it was their evanescence that accosted me", the "eyes, shot
through with another world" (82). Michaux's drawings under the influence of mescaline
attempt to bring to the fore, to the greatest possible extent, the 'expressivity of
expression', the being at one with an experience as being for an Other, in the awareness
of otherness. These drawings attempt to record experience, as the awareness of otherness,
without mediation. In graphic expression, Michaux's art approaches total immediacy
according to a movement not directed by the self. The rhythms expressed on canvas are
the rhythms of the subjective body in its exposure to what is other than self. The graphic
expression taps into a continuous life of the body beneath our perceptions, which always
already in-forms perception. The life of the body in Michaux is expressed as a sort of
seismographic current which is always there, but which is under normal circumstances
im-perceptible according to the intentional act. Abrasive to the world determined
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according to perceptive intention, tapping into the awareness of otherness, which pertains
to the situation of the subjective body, Michaux's graphic art expresses a forgetfulness of
egoic subjectivity - double genitive. In this sense, the orientation of such expressivity is
disinterested. "Expressivity" points to an infinite aspect or quality of this life, it is not
meant to express an other world as we usually understand this phrase, but the infinite in
the apparently finite.
II (a). The Displacement of Interest: Spaced, Displaced and the Dis¬
positions of the Self
Michaux's work overall engages in a critical account of the legacy of representational
discourse. Like Derrida's descriptions of the drawings in Memoirs, they say something
about what is bypassed in the legacy of representation. A prevalent characteristic of
Michaux's work is the recourse to the work of the body in relation to the position of the
self. His work disputes the static stability of the self in so far as it is identified with mind,
and probes the reality of a 'Bergsonian vision', an "authentic mobility; elan vital, pure
impetus traveling, not to go anywhere or vanish into its destination, but simply to
replenish itself and perpetuate departure"29. Peter Broome points out the extent to which
time in Michaux is "massively enlarged... beyond any controllable frame of mind... a
lurch beyond images, visual and mental, as they are outpaced and erased by the
abstraction of sheer movement"30. When Derrida, in Memoirs, argues how the artworks
in question perform a 'cancellation of sight', he points to the reality of the body as what
does not appear to us according to the 'transcendental illusion of the ego', in the light of
the world. That is, the departure from the tradition of representational knowledge, and its
29 Peter Broome, "Introduction", in Henri Michaux, Spaced, Displaced (Newcastle upon Tyne: Bloodaxe
Books, 1992), p. 32.
30 Peter Broome, "Introduction", p. 32.
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modeling of the 'world' according to 'evidential insight', bases this 'faith' in a negation
of the relation between time and the 'intense' non-objectifiable reality of the body. I
emphasise that the temporality of the body informs the dispositions of the self to the
extent that it performs its displacement. Michaux's work recognises the instability and
fragility of the self in so far as it is subject to the specific temporality of the body.
The visual works in particular demonstrate the body as such as what 'cannot be thought'.
Dis-appearance in the works translates 'empathetically' this non-thought of thought. In
tapping into this empathetic work, which is of the body, Michaux effects a dis-
positioning of the self, which repeats the receptivity of the subjective body. As his work
explores the idea of positions of the body and states of mind, it testifies to their continual
effacement. For Michaux, the "SELF is merely a point of equilibrium"31, subject to
continual displacement according to circuits of affectivity, or the temporality of the
subjective body. Form in Michaux is replaced by manner; the frameworks of the mind
and of representation are inadequate to the modes of the body. The explorations of traces
and their development as signs attempt to express the transitory reality of these modes
and the affections, which in-form the self.
The self, an elastic being there in this simplified figure
in conjunction with a stupendous ballistic force unknown,
measureless, never slowing32.
The self is not reducible to a 'point of equilibrium', or intentionality, but is subject to a
force of creativity. The point is not to 'neutralise' the position of subjectivity, as in the
work of the 'image' of representation, but to demonstrate the manner in which
positioning must be considered according to the body. This is precisely the point made by
Derrida with regard to the point of view. Michaux's work expresses the extent to which
the individual must be 'able to transcend his form and his syntactical link with a world',
31 Plume, p. 213. Quoted in Peter Broome, "Introduction", p. 40.
32 Henri Michaux, Spaced, Displaced, p. 181.
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in the tracing of the extent to which 'a non-organic life burns us'33. The expressivity of
the body, its orientation, coincides with perception. In this sense, the real is that which
creates what it perceives or conceives. Michaux's work demonstrates the dispositions of
the self in regard to his art as originating in sensibility. The move towards the drawing of
that which animates the life of human being, betrays the orientation of the body - non-
objectifiable. Language begins with sensibility, but is not adequate to it. The logic of the
trait, and the performative withdrawal of the graphic sign, is testament to this fact.
Fixedly stared at, the eyes unswerving... a form which more and more
abstracts itself. As if detached from there propelled without restraint
by an ever more extreme release, soon beyond any horizon
beyond everything into a seemingly stellar space but without visible stars
without landmarks anywhere34.
The body as such cannot 'be thought'. Thought is 'a phenomenon which betrays a spirit -
its frame or form - and that which this frame intended'35. The correspondence or
correlation is what is important in the intentional act, but the subject-matter is necessarily
in excess of this framework. The demarcations of 'the world' work on the premise that
the self orders meaning, manages the object. Michaux's descriptions of the dispositions
of the self in the subjective body refute the exhaustive tendencies of this premise. For
Michaux, as for Levinas, the priority of this tendency of thought reduces the other in the
Other. The experience of otherness is negated in the categorisations and
conceptualisations performed according to objectivising consciousness. In "A Crowd
Come Out of the Dark", Michaux describes how his "life as a spectator" is assaulted by a
life pertaining to the sensibility of the body, a 'physical depth' of being. According to his
sleeping self, "the film and my own trembling were dramatically combined, the screen
was invaded by my physiology, the spectator and the spectator's impaired vision were
33 See Gilles Deleuze, LS, p. 178.
34 Henri Michaux, Spaced, Displaced, p. 183.
35 Henri Michaux, Un Barbare enAsie, (Paris: Gallimard, 1967) p. 37.1 have modified the translation.
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confused"36. The point made here is that of the effect on the in-formation of vision by the
condition of being affected and affecting as a body. Michaux's art acknowledges that
perception is not synonymous with understanding, but that perception coincides rather
with a certain expressivity of the particular body to produce the real. The artist's
engagement in the world as subjective body conceives outside act-intentionality and
object-manifestation. The 'intense' awareness of otherness expressed in Michaux art
must be understood according to corpo-real positioning or orientation.
(b) Orientation, Dis-Interested Thought
A certain orientation with regard to thought is expressed in the drawings according to the
infinite, probing line, without arrival in 'meaning'. The movement of sense is infinite; the
temporality of the body is always ahead, out in front, like 'antennas' on Derrida's
description. In Ideograms in China, Michaux emphasises the perfect 'writing' as open to
the life of the body according to its signs. The calligraphy of his drawings has this
openness as they express the gesture involved in the giving and receiving of signs. They
express a dynamism not found in linguistics' 'syntactical link with the world'. Michaux
argues for the relevance of reducing being to signified - or im-mediate - being. "No
longer imitate nature, but signify nature. By strokes, darts, dashes"37. That is, by 'traits',
elans, 'ascesis of the immediate'. According to Ideograms, the Chinese language 'does
not draw conclusions of its own, but lets itself be read', the 'meager syntax' opens to a
creative response, 'out of the multiple comes the idea'. Michaux's art approaches 'that
most difficult point', according to Merleau-Ponty, "that is, the point between the flesh
and the idea" (VI 179). He develops "writing" or drawing fertilised by the processes of
energetic materiality, which marks the situation of being a body, for thought.
36 Henri Michaux, Spaced, Displaced, p. 51-52.
37 Henri Michaux, Ideograms in China.
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The gesture involved in the body's response to and giving of signs must be understood
pre-intentionally and pre-semiotically, that is 'beyond meaning'. Levinas's notion of face
- or visage - defined as the manner in which the other presents beyond manifestation on
the classical account, gives an account of man's signification or expressivity in so far as
'man' is infinitely other, Autrui. Autrui, as visage, is prior to semiotics and prior to
'figural' meaning. In the "infinity of his transcendence", the Other, according to an-other
phenomenality, "resists us in his face, is his face, is the primordial expression" (TI 199).
The Other thus makes of 'the work', even the work of art as expressed in Michaux, a
"profitless investment" (TRO 350). The autosignification of the face refers to language
understood in the broad sense, in active surplus to the linguistic presuppositions of act
intentionality and object manifestation as thematised by classical phenomenology.
Levinas's notion of le visage dAutrui, Henry's argument regarding the reduction of
language in consequence of the 'ontological monism' of classical phenomenology, and
Deleuze's logic of expression all point to an excess of sensibility which questions
'interest' as the motor of language and thought. The conceptions of an expressivity or
Life in excess of language, in the narrow sense, interrupt the thought of a being reduced
to the abstractions of Being for ego-consciousness. My argument is that these
propositions represent a difference in thought, located as forgetfulness immanent to its
language. This is what Henry designates as the theory of thought.
When Levinas speaks of the relation between expression and response/responsibility as
"the ethical condition or essence of language" (TI 200), language exceeds the speech-act
situation and discursive language generally. Ethical language has its condition in the
individual's orientation in a corporeal sense. It involves an Other, but is not reduced to
the Other's presence. That is, it concerns the manner in which one responds as a singular
individual to the singularity of expression understood in terms of an expressivity, which
preserves otherness in communication. The notion of visage does not denote the presence
and visibility of an Other, it speaks of the expressivity which marks the Life or
singularity of the subjective body. In Levinas, the notion of proximity becomes an
alternative to visibility, and speaks of a transcendence of the singular being, as it exceeds
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my consciousness. Levinas's specific notion of transcendence refers precisely to the
sense of immanent genesis I expound in this work by bringing together specific premises
of Derrida's, Deleuze's and Henry's thought, in a certain proximity to Levinas. Levinas
states: "illumination that would allow for an 'act of consciousness'... is precisely the
visibility of the same to the same, which is sometimes called openness" (OB 30).
According to my argument, immanent genesis is conditioned by an openness which is not
an access to the visible object for consciousness, but is understood according to energetic
materiality. Openness refers to a dimension of exteriority, or 'world' without objects.
Michaux's art approaches this 'worldlessness', or exteriority not reducible to the 'other in
me'. His art presents things according to their materiality, not as representations for
thought. Levinas asks about the ontological significance of "materiality itself"38. My
argument is that beyond the materialisation of being which is the Levinasian il y a, an
anonymity of being which anticipates the ethical forgetfulness of ego-consciousness,
Levinas explores the material sense of being a singular bodily being according to a notion
of energetic materiality similar to that of Deleuze. The reality of the ethical relation in
Levinas is affectivity, the awareness of immanent genesis.
There is a specific aesthetic evident in Levinas, as well as Henry and Deleuze, regarding
an energetic materiality. While the aesthetic in Levinas at times appear to be alien to the
ethical39, the orientation of his work on the question of art is 'twofold' rather than
contradictory. The 'problem of aesthetics' in Levinas is reducible to the aesthetic linked
to the emphasis on 'the visible' and the violence inherent in its exclusive politics of
knowledge, the translatability of the 'image' for/according to consciousness. However,
the former aesthetic must be seen as inseparable from Levinas's ethics of signification
and the face40. This aesthetic has accordingly less to do with forms of art, as when Gerald
38 Emmanuel Levinas, "Reality and its Shadow", in Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 8, cited in The
Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002) p. 212.
39 The earlier works on art seem to support the 'anti-aesthetics' of Levinas's philosophy, such as the 1949
essay "Reality and its Shadow". See Levinas, in Collected Philosophical Papers, pp. 1-14. However, the
position of the aesthetic in Levinas is more complex.
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Bruns points out the "emancipation of singularity from the reduction to an order of
things"41 in Cubism, or with asking the question of what forms of art have more or less
value according to a Levinasian view of art. Levinas's aesthetics has less to do with the
ontological status of art than with signification and 'expressivity', according to 'energetic
materiality', that is, affective being. Michaux's art should be seen less as art than as an
aesthetics approaching this energetic materiality and orientation in corporeal Life. The
aesthetic and the ethical as outlined in the works of Levinas, as well as Henry and
Deleuze, take up a specific position with respect to cognitive discourse. The orientation
of the thought of these writers taps into a different communication based in sensibility
and a language in excess of cognition, "the language of the eyes, impossible to
dissemble" (TI 66). The aesthetic and the ethical come together according to this
orientation, before the ego-subject, which experiences the world spectacularly, as of
vision. The point of view, or the point of orientation, is 'blind'. Accordingly, the position
of the self must be understood with respect to anterior circuits of affectivity. Thought is
informed beyond interest; it emerges from affectivity or sensibility, a corporeal
awareness or orientation - in Levinas's terms, proximity.
40Furthermore, as is well known, Derrida points out in his two essays on Levinas, that Levinas's specific
philosophical language imports resonance and repetition in what becomes akin to aesthetic/artistic practice
in order to take traditional philosophical conceptualisation outside ontological finitude. See for example
"Violence and Metaphysics", in Writing and Difference, p. 312.
41 Gerald Bruns, "The concepts of art and poetry in Emmanuel Levinas's writings" in The Cambridge
Companion to Levinas, p. 212.
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Conclusion
'Out of the multiple comes the idea' says Michaux in Ideograms in China. That thought
originates from the sensible is a presumption shared by the undeniably diverse thought I
engage here as a particular reception of classical phenomenology. The premise of this
thesis has been that the specific problematisations of phenomenological beginnings,
which variously mark this reception, reorient thought to its origins in the 'multiple', or
the body. 'The body' is thought according to sensibility, the designation of 'the multiple'
according to the singularity or Life of the 'subjective body'. The specific critiques of the
French reception approach the question of language in a broad sense, according to a
notion of signification inseparable from the orientation of the body in a corporeal rather
than representational sense. Michaux's art, as exploration of and testament to the work of
the body, takes up the notion of an energetic materiality according to the affective body.
His body of work shows the extent to which the subjective body disrupts the supposed
linearity of 'interested' or intentional thought. The 'line of thought' in Michaux does not
'arrive' in 'meaning', but traces a sense or signification inseparable from the infinite
work of the body: it is testament to a different manifestation than that of representational
objectivity and takes precedence with regard to acts of intentionality. Sense-formation is
traced in his works outside self-present consciousness, and the latter's specific
delineation of the subject-object relation. 'Sense' is not accessible according to the
mediation of 'essential insight', but is testament to affective being, or signification as
'profitless investment', or the investment of the body. His art draws out the processes of
energetic materiality marking the situation of bodily sensibility in face of thought. His art
thus presents a challenge to the mediated and representational presumptions of thought.
Michaux's verbal as well as his visual works take up the question of the position of
thought and demonstrate that its origins are inseparable from the orientations of the body,
or 'the multiple'. While the body as such cannot be thought, his art demonstrates the
imperative that thought is approached according to the situation of the body. This thesis
has deemed the body of classical phenomenology to be a body subjected in a specific
sense, suspended according to the schematics of phenomenological scientism and
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determination, or the specific 'inter-esse' of this thought. The body suspended, the body
of thought, is the subjective body.
The singularity of affective being is a forgotten premise in object-oriented thought and
leads to unsustainable reductions. This thesis has pointed out, through the reading of the
manner in which these various French critiques approach the 'problem of the body'
according to a phenomenological problematic, that Being is in excess of being-object for
thought and concerns the Life of the body before thought. The subjective body is marked
by its 'original transcendental content' and represents as such what is other to thought
and what necessarily escapes its determinations in classical phenomenology. The
contention of Michel Henry is that this specific forgetfulness is a condition for this
thought, but necessarily reduces experience to its own theoretical determinations. Michel
Henry sees the way out of this impasse according to thought's reorientation towards a
different conception of phenomenality and language. 'Manifestation' of sense exceeds
object-manifestation: it is born(e) by signification irreducible to acts of intentionality and
'
visibility'/eidetic insight. While Michel Henry does base this reorientation in
phenomenology in what is undeniably a problematic account of self-manifestation, it is
necessary to see his claims in terms of the notion of sensibility and subjective body that
support this reorientation. As this thesis argues, it is vital in order to approach the
significance of the body's work with regard to thought, that the body is not reduced in
thought to its representational content. The body needs to be approached according to the
singularity of its affective being, the manner in which it in-forms thought. The various
approaches to this issue in phenomenology with which this thesis engages, shows that the
forgetfulness of the body and 'what a body can do' is immanent to the language of
thought. This language is based in the subjection of this body. What Henry's criticism of
'ontological monism' brings to the fore is that thought always thinks more than it thinks;
that is, thought is always in excess of the 'theory of thought'. These arguments open up a
space to reconsider the relationship between the language of thought and the body. Since
the body cannot be thought as anything but the subjective singular body, this calls for a
conception of language in a specifically broad sense, conditioned by the signification
pertaining to the life of the subjective body and its position in a corporeal sense. We must
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look at how this position, which is always already the situation of thought, affects
thought. The original transcendental content of the subjective body in-forms thought and
its effects are not reducible or suspendable, but must be taken into account in the
discourse of philosophy. This specific reception of Husserlian phenomenology calls for
precisely such reorientation toward the transcendental significance pertaining to the
situation of being a body in thought, that is, towards the reality of immanent genesis.
Is this preoccupation with a subjected body of thought important? Does the reality of
immanent genesis in-form thought in a significant manner that needs to be adequately
accounted for? This thesis starts from the premise that what a body does and can do is
important to the extent that its subjection appears to be a premise of the specific tradition
of thought that culminates in the methodological premises of classical phenomenology.
Deleuze points out the necessity that we "[distinguish] between things and their
simulacra... [it is] a question of making the difference, thus of operating in the depths of
the immediate (DR 60). The 'problem of the body' as a forgotten premise of thought is
that the singularity of experience, by the situation of being a body, becomes reduced
according to the generality of the concept in thought. Corporeal signification is im¬
mediate, and is necessarily uncontainable in thought. Forgetfulness of the situation of
being a body leads thought to relate to the body - or the otherness of self-awareness - by
bracketing off this original (transcendental) content, that is, the body is reduced to its
representational content. The other of thought is reduced to what falls outside its
theoretical determination, while 'the other' becomes recognisable to thought according to
the generality of a concept. In so far as this specific orientation of thought speaks in terms
of its concepts, 'the world' is reduced to what appears in the light of its designations, in a
thought absolutely present to itself. The critique by the French tradition engaged in this
thesis reorients thought away from its designation in 'the world' of objects or 'objective'
determination and identifies a certain failure and danger in its thematisation of 'the
world': the other of thought is ultimately referable to it. Whether we consider the human
or the infinite other - what is always already other to thought - otherness must be
approached in its singularity, that is, according to a body which is not reducible to
thought. Levinas points out that the language of thought, or the conceptuality or
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generality its propositions, is disrupted or redirected by the face-to-face language of the
other's address. Whether this address is conceived as a signification expanding our notion
of language or as linguistic language imbued with an excess of meaning, it is not
reducible to the language of thought or classical phenomenological determination.
Levinas's reorientation with regard to Alterity calls for a move from 'meaning' to
'sense'. Derrida designates a "writing" which precisely identifies this excess of
signification/sense against the determinations of 'arrived meaning', in excess of thought.
Both Levinas and Derrida emphasise the effect of the trace in its withdrawal of itself
from presence and thus shed light on the corporeality of that which cannot be retained in
memory and disrupts self-presence. The notion of an immemorial past that has never
been present to consciousness in the purity of self-presence points to the fact that there is
signification 'of itself', or genesis outside phenomenological consciousness and the
designations of the language of thought. Levinas's conception of the other in the Other,
irreducible to its referral to my 'consciousness of' the other in the concept, marks or
makes up/creates the corporeal significance of the other's 'face' as the trace which is its
own withdrawal and a withdrawal from thought or theoretical assignation. The
corporeality of the 'face', as what signifies of itself, cannot be reduced to thought's
approach to it, but approaches thought. The (notion of) face presents a challenge to
thought in the singularity of its corporeal significance, always in excess of thoughts
assignation. It is the argument of this thesis that this challenge is relevant in regarding the
'politics' of thought, the presumptions that generate its politics of concealing and
unconcealing a specific 'world'.
The inadequate account of the body-subject in relation to thought in classical
phenomenology is consequent on an inadequate probing of the issue of signification, as
Derrida points out. Signification, and by extension language, must be approached
according the body placed outside thought: the corpo-real and an account of immanent
genesis. Deleuze makes an important contribution to this critique in that he recognises
and emphasises that we 'do not yet know what a body can do'. Thought needs to reorient
itself towards an exploration of the significance of the body and embodied thought.
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This call for a reorientation means that thought become aware of its position, its
orientation or 'interests'. The critique of classical phenomenology undertaken by way of
these specific approaches to thought as such, takes up the traditional metaphysical
concerns of the forms and conditions of knowledge and representation and the
foundations for relations of subjects and objects in/of thought. The reorientation concerns
the reality of a genesis that operates (as the) outside of thought. That genesis eludes the
classical forms of mediated representation, the assimilation of 'the world' as a body of
knowledge, suggests that principles of creation are irreducible to representational content.
When Levinas speaks of 'ethics as first philosophy' this does not imply a substitution of
philosophy for ethics, but reorientation within philosophical practice as such: philosophy
problematises its orientation. The question posed here is not that of the transcendence or
'immanence of thought, or the conceptualisations of philosophy, but of the relation
between immanence and transcendence in thought. The reorientation posed by the above
critiques might warrant the objection that they merely substitute for classical
conceptualisation an absolute principle in the notion of immanent genesis. The present
work argues that the issue is more complex than that. The 'absolutism' of the Deleuzian
creative principle, the expressivity of creation as such - of virtuality; of Levinas's
alterity; of Henry's 'essence', which is difficult to separate from its theological
implication of an absolute being, indivision, unity and homogeneity - all these
approaches to what has been identified here as a principle of immanent genesis, work
against the charge of absolutism on the basis of one qualification. It is the argument of
this thesis that what negotiates the apparent impasse of 'absolutism' is that these
reorientations think immanent genesis according to affective being, that is, as based in the
life of the subjective body. The singularity of this body is its sensibility, the particularity
of affect. Genesis, as a certain autonomy and creation of transcendental content by the
body, is not 'related' in principles of mediation or representational categories, but
manifests differently. The affective or subjective body is not a given meaning, does not
relate through an objective for thought; it signifies or is expressive in itself. The general
gist of this reception of phenomenology attributes the principle of immanent genesis to its
involvement with the body, as the subjective body: a vital affective reality of the body is
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already a content of thought, but does not appear in the light of classical phenomenology.
Thus classical phenomenology represents that tendency in thought to subsume
corporeality and particularity in the generality of its conceptualisations. The critique
works against such subsuming generality.
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